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ABSTRACT
Currently the “network centric operation” and “network centric warfare” have generated
a new area of research focused on determining how hierarchical organizations composed by
human beings and machines make decisions over collaborative environments.
One of the most stressful scenarios for these kinds of organizations is the so-called
“extreme events.” This dissertation provides a hybrid simulation methodology based on classical
simulation paradigms combined with social network analysis for evaluating and improving the
organizational structures and procedures, mainly the incident command systems and plans for
facing those extreme events.
According to this, we provide a methodology for generating hypotheses and afterwards
testing organizational procedures either in real training systems or simulation models with
validated data.
As long as the organization changes their dyadic relationships dynamically over time, we
propose to capture the longitudinal digraph in time and analyze it by means of its adjacency
matrix. Thus, by using an object oriented approach, three domains are proposed for better
understanding the performance and the surrounding environment of an emergency management
organization.
System dynamics is used for modeling the critical infrastructure linked to the warning
alerts of a given organization at federal, state and local levels. Discrete simulations based on the
defined concept of “community of state” enables us to control the complete model. Discrete
event simulation allows us to create entities that represent the data and resource flows within the
organization.
iii

We propose that cognitive models might well be suited in our methodology. For instance,
we show how the team performance decays in time, according to the Yerkes-Dodson curve,
affecting the measures of performance of the whole organizational system. Accordingly we
suggest that the hybrid model could be applied to other types of organizations, such as military
peacekeeping operations and joint task forces. Along with providing insight about organizations,
the methodology supports the analysis of the “after action review” (AAR), based on collection of
data obtained from the command and control systems or the so-called training scenarios.
Furthermore, a rich set of mathematical measures arises from the hybrid models such as
triad census, dyad census, eigenvalues, utilization, feedback loops, etc., which provides a strong
foundation for studying an emergency management organization.
Future research will be necessary for analyzing real data and validating the proposed
methodology.
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When I was six years old, I observed pictures from Biafra, where starving children were trying to
survive. After forty years, I continue to observe the same problems in Darfur, Sudan. This
dissertation is dedicated to all children in the world who do not have the same opportunities that
God, my dear parents Sergio and Maria Angelica and my country provided for me. I hope to do
something significant for those children.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Background of study
In order to model a system, people involved in simulation have a tendency to use the
traditional techniques based upon either discrete or continuum approach. Practitioners rarely
combine two or more techniques for representing their models. On the other hand, simulations have
been used extensively for modeling physical systems, and those do not adequately include methods
for studying people making decisions in a collaborative environment.
Simulations for representing decision making structures have been limited to the use of
cognitive frameworks, and only a few models have been published based on either discrete
simulations or agent-based modeling. In general, organizational simulations based on quantitative
techniques are either scarce or poorly documented.
At present, the network centric concept has enabled a new approach to mathematical analysis
regarding how civilian and military organizations perform over a linked environment. In the
previous context, the current challenge with modeling and simulating is dealing the scenarios in
which the organizations have to make decisions under pressure due to extreme events (such as
tsunamis, forest fires, urban chaos, chemical accidents, peacekeeping missions), since these
problems take place either in the infrastructure supporting the network-centric process or in
information, coordination, resource management, and synchronization of tasks.
We suggest that a hybrid simulation implementation could be useful for modeling a network
centric decision making environment. The collection of data obtained in this model would allow the

1

identification of bottle necks, procedure validation, quantification of reaction time, job loading, and
new layouts, among other characteristics.
This research proposes a hybrid simulation based exclusively on mathematical and
simulation foundations, and it will not incorporate any cognitive framework. The goal is to create a
framework to acquire knowledge about the organizational structure in different stages of crisis
situations through metrics and measurements of merit.

Problem statement
In the past decades three simulation approaches have been used widely for representing
discrete processes, aggregated levels, and agent-based behavior. However, this will likely change
in the future, as complex organizational systems really require elements of all three approaches
in order for their complexity to be appropriately captured (Dooley, 2002).
We support the idea that the simulation community needs to combine simulation
techniques that can represent the dynamic behavior produced in an organization in the loop.
Mapping real entities into a simulated environment requires use of the three main simulation
paradigms.
Current simulation systems such as constructive simulation do not fit very well for
analyzing organizational behavior, because in these systems the outcomes are produced by the
models, and we need to collect data from the real human behavior and not that performed by
synthetic models.
However, when researchers have to analyze real organizations (such as organizations in
the loop or C2 systems), the main problem is how to collect data for modeling, validating, and
evaluating those structures, especially when there are many decision making nodes and a great
2

deal of information being sent between them. For instance, if we analyze an organization with
100 nodes (each node is composed of one or more persons) we could collect as many as 9,900
types of pairwise interactions.
The current network centric environment enables us to collect data from systems based
on information technology; therefore, the procedures made for hierarchical organizations could
be captured and modeled. Lin (1994) stated that simulation provides insight for the evaluation of
organizational designs with less cost than conducting human experiments, and once the main
factors have been identified, human experiments can be done to test the theoretical results. We
argue that the difficulties for simulating distributed decision making is still complex and likely
never will be validated, but in the context of emergencies and disasters, the use of clear and well
documented incident command system (ICS) and the data collection from the C2 systems should
allow us to explore the design of synthetic models of contingency that enable the decision
makers to know what happened, how it happened, and how could improvements be made in the
future.
This dissertation defines an emergency organizational structure as a “complex system
which performs as a network,” and according to Dooley (2002) such a system should be modeled
with a hybrid approach that incorporates the three main simulation techniques. Furthermore, we
identify the need to combine simulations of organizational networks with a topological analysis
of their structures and the identification of statistical properties which emerge from their
behavior.
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Scope of research and hypothesis
A hybrid simulation based on the three main simulation paradigms – System dynamics
(SD), Discrete event simulation (DES), and Agent based modeling (ABM) – will be the basis of
our methodology for modeling the network centric decision making environment performed by
an organization facing extreme events. The theory of social network analysis (SNA) will allow
analysis of the dynamic changes produced in organization structures over time. The collection of
data obtained from the models will allow the identification of metrics and measures of merits
such as bottle neck, identification, procedure validation, reaction time measurement, job loading
identification, dangerous event identification, automatic modification of security policy, and
“just-in-time” modification of organizational procedures, among other characteristics.
Furthermore, mapping real flows and critical tasks into a simulated environment will enable the
detection of possible vulnerabilities.
The simulation methodology should cooperate with the decision makers in three
scenarios:
•

To assess the behavior of different nodes (in the after action review analyzed messages
flows and resources flows).

•

To design better organization structures making use of micro-world scenarios.

•

To control the performance of different roles in real time (organization in the loop).
Figure 1 shows a network centric environment in which an emergency organizational

structure depicts dynamic behavior over time. The network centric environment is a system of
systems with an initial layout, nodes, and endogenous variables; therefore relationships of
causality can be identified, modeled, and simulated. The exogenous variables strike the system
over a specific location, and they produce an immediate reaction of one node, a subset of nodes
4

or of the whole system. Notice this approach presents multiple opportunities for analyzing
organizational layout, information flows, resources flows, and tasks synchronization.

Network Centric Decision Making
Extreme
Event 2

Airplanes
Government
Red Cross
County

UN

Command and Control

Extreme
Event 1
Police
Logistics

Firefighter

Extreme
Event 3

Command Post

Supply

Figure 1: Representation of a hybrid simulation

The hybrid simulation combines the network’s analysis with the procedural behavior and
interactions shown by the nodes. Thus this dissertation proposes the following sets of
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: With the purpose of detecting metrics and vulnerabilities, a hybrid
simulation based on DES, SD and ABM is an adequate platform to represent the dynamic
sequences produced in an “organization structure” when it faces different extreme events.
Hypothesis 2: A hybrid simulation can be combined with social networks analysis and
linear programming in order to assess the evolution of an organization structure over time, and
this type of simulation is suitable for detecting bottle necks, quantification of reaction time,
loading job, vulnerabilities, priorities, and synchronization, among other measures of
performance.
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Contributions
There are three main schools of simulation practice; DES, SD, and ABM. Simulation
researchers typically remain in one camp and do not work in all three domains. Characteristics
of each of the three simulation approaches are shown in Table 1 (Dooley, 2002).

Table 1: Three main paradigms in simulation (Dooley, 2002)
Simulation approach
Discrete event

Condition for use

Main characteristics

System described by

Events that trigger other

variables and events that

events sequentially and

trigger change in those

probabilistically.

variables.
System dynamics

System described by

Key system variables and

variables that cause change

their interactions with one

in each other over time.

another are explicitly
(mathematically) defined as
differential equations.

Agent-based

System described by agents

Agents with schema that

that react to one another

interact with one another

and the environment.

and learn.

This research presents a hybrid methodology, since it puts together the three main
simulation paradigms for modeling organizational structures facing extreme events. As the
organization changes dynamically over time, the different states of the organization will be
analyzed according to the social network theory (based upon graphs) and eventually linear
programming. Metrics and causal analysis will be obtained from the proposed hybrid model.
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Therefore, these are the three main contributions identified in this research:
•

To propose a methodology to understand the relationships in complex systems such as
ICS for emergency response based upon the combination of social network techniques
and simulation techniques.

•

To propose a hybrid simulation scenario, based on DES, SD, and ABM, creating the
conditions (if data is available) for modeling organizational emergency structures which
develop their tasks over a network centric environment. Furthermore, the hybrid
simulation could be applied to another type of organization, such as military
peacekeeping operations and joint task forces.

•

To provide a framework for study of the lessons learned concept in military and civilian
organizations and to support the after action review (AAR), base on the collection of data
obtained from the C2 systems that an organization has in the network centric
environment.

Dissertation outline
Chapter One presents the problem statement, scopes and hypotheses of this research. The
main contributions also are named at the final part of the chapter.
Chapter Two describes the literature review emphasizing in the terms of network centric
warfare and network centric decision making. The concept of extreme event and its implications
for a distributed decision-making process are defined. The literature review includes the previous
intent for modeling and simulating organizations. The previous studies on social network
analysis are explained in this chapter. A comprehensive review of the three main simulation
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techniques are described and contrasted in a table that shows which one is best situated for
modeling and simulating selected problems.
Chapter Three presents the methodology and five semantic analyses of past extreme
events.
Chapter Four describes the domains in which an emergency organization performs its
tasks and defines the properties of a digraph from an incident command system perspective and
additional techniques are discussed.
Chapter Five explains how to combine different simulation techniques, and also defines
the conceptual hybrid model for analyzing organizational emergency structures.
Chapter Six proposes the implementation of a hybrid model, keeping parallel with the
configuration of the command incident system represented as a digraph.
Chapter Seven presents the conclusions and proposes future studies for continuing this
hybrid implementation.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Network centric warfare (NCW) and network centric decision making (NCDM)
There are similar characteristics in the way military and civilian organizations make
decisions under extreme events; as a result, it is possible to identify models and methodologies
which are useful in both types of organizations. Thus, the Army’s network-centric approach to
operations could serve emergency responders equally effectively (Committee on Army and
Technology for Homeland Defense, C4ISR, 2004).
The NCDM takes its foundation from the NCW and network enabled capacity (NEC)
concepts, the former from a US military perspective and the latter from a UK military
perspective. NCW is the product of network connectivity, and the military uses this concept for
increasing both strategic and tactical advantage in battle (MacMillan, Diedrich, Entin & Serfaty,
2005). NCW essentially encompasses the idea of interconnecting a heterogeneous range of actors
and objects in the battle-space through telecommunication and computer networks (Bakken,
2004).
A fundamental assumption in NCW is that improving information infrastructures will
improve military decision making and therefore military effectiveness (Hanzel & Fewell, 2004).
Those characteristics could be useful for modeling and optimizing an emergency organization
structure. One advantage is the gain which can be achieved by simply sharing information
among the nodes. As Moffat notes,
If the nodes are distributed globally, and each having a 5 percent probability of
possessing a given piece of information that is needed to make a plan successful and the
planner only has access to organic information, he would only have a 5 percent chance of
9

generating a successful plan. If the planner has access to n sources, he would increase the
probability of having the information necessary to develop a successful plan to [

1 − 0 . 95 n ]…” (Moffat, 2003).
Even though that NCW theory proposes to achieve a tactical advantage by using
information superiority and a well situated situation awareness shared by the whole organization,
currently there are no systematic studies evaluating network-centric strategies versus alternative
strategies (Finder, Fendley, Narayanan & Raymond, 2003). The author suggests that this
research could be an initial test-bed for evaluating the alternative strategies mentioned by Finder
et al.
Studies have been made to identify the benefits of NCW, but few have taken an analytical
view and produced quantitative results. A study was conducted by five allied countries to redress
the lack of quantitative evidence about network-centric capability. Using queuing theory
models, the concepts of shared situational awareness and collaborative information environment
were analyzed for improving anti-submarine warfare (Klingbeil & Galdorisi, 2004).
In a NCW environment there are intensive information flows between sensors, C2,
shooters on a network of networks, and synchronization of information arrivals and updates. The
elapsed time of each interacting component and the message delay can play a critical role in such
scenarios. Estimation of delay is essential to verify if the system meets timing constraints. The
message delays from each component system can change the order of task execution and may
cause a synchronization problem.
In order to evaluate performance prediction of a NCW system, Shin and Levis (1999)
implemented Petri net and queuing net for modeling functional and physical layers as shown in
Figure 2. Their application modeled the information flow between sensors, C2, and shooters. An
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experimental system design was established based on two rules of engagement, seven input
parameters, and four output parameters.

Functional Architecture Model
Pi-1

Tj

Pi

@+ τj

P*i

Tj+1

Pi+1

@+ τj+1

A(t +τj + δj )
Run Time

A(t +τj )
Interface

Queue

Server
B(t)

Figure 2: Functional and physical architecture models (Shin & Levis, 1999)

The above study supports the goal of this dissertation in terms of finding analytical
models for simulating NCDM during emergency and crisis situations.
Most of the current studies about net-centric environments are focused on complexity
theory, which is difficult to apply to real crisis situations; however there are a set of
mathematical and statistical tools (such as queuing theory) which have been validated, and can
support realistic organizational models for improving coordination and synchronization in
emergency response organizations. The only premise for carrying out this goal is the requisite for
collecting empirical data from real structures such as either a command and control system or
organization in the loop (training system).
11

This research is intended for generalizing the network centric concept into a generic
organization (civilian, military, or combined). Table 2 identifies similar features between NCW
(military arena) and NCDM (organizational emergency environment).

Table 2: Contrast between NCW and NCDM
Features

Network Centric Warfare
Radar, units on the battlefields,
UAV, airplane, etc.

Network Centric Decision Making
Seismographs, early warning tsunami, people on
the ground, etc.

Shooters

Weapons, troops on the ground,
ships crew

Emergency responders for prevention or
mitigation of the effects of extreme events

Decision Support and
Analytic tools

Geographic information systems,
expert systems, agents, data
mining

Geographic information systems, expert systems,
agents, data mining

Command, Control,
Communication and
Computers (C4)

According to the scenario and
units: different levels.

According to the scenario and the event: different
levels, but it is closer to C2 coalition
interoperability

Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR)

People, signals, sensors,
photographe, satellite images, open
sources information, UAV

People, photographes, satellite images, sensors

Situation Awareness

Common operational picture

Not well developed as of yet

Nodes

Military units, weapons systems,
C4ISR, point of logistic support,
sensors, hubs

Police, red cross, federal agencies, governor,
mayor, C4ISR, NGO, fire rescue, sensors

Infrastructure

Military networks

Civilian networks, military networks

Grid

Communication grid

Communication grid

Information grid

Information grid

Scenarios

Battlefield (urban and ground )

Any place

Structure

Command chain

Depends on extreme events, fuzzy

Interoperability

Hard among coalition forces

Hard among different organizational nodes

Measures of
Performances

In development.

Do not exist

Span of Control

Very well defined

Hard, fuzzy, depends on scenario, extreme event
and time for reaction

Sensors

According to the force: coalition
Interoperability.

12

Using the military approach, network-centric systems can be defined as those that make
users more effective “by networking sensors, decision-makers and emergency responders to
accurately see, understand and act on the situation facing them” (Committee on Army and
Technology for Homeland Defense, C4ISR, 2004).
This dissertation has as its main assumption that an organizational structure prepared for
facing extreme events works over a network centric system. Thus a model to represent a NCDM
should encompass the following capabilities performed through real-time networking:
•

All nodes of the network should have access to all networked resources according to their
tasks and required knowledge for carrying out their missions (sharing of situational
awareness).

•

Networked decision makers can make more informed decisions.

•

A networked organization can more effectively and efficiently synchronize its assets.

Distributed decision making
Distributed Decision Making (DDM) is a neologism which captures the cumulative
change in the nature of multi-person decision making. This process is usually supported by
technologies such as satellite communications, electronic messages, teleconferencing, and shared
databases (Committee on Human Factors, 1990).
DDM is performed by either teams or organizations; usually researchers merge both
concepts and do not give enough attention for defining each one separately. Blau and Scott
(1962) defined a formal organization as a “purposive aggregation of individuals who exert
concerted effort toward a common and explicitly recognized goal”. On the other hand, Orasanu
and Salas (1992) defined a team as a group whose members share a common goal and common
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task. Furthermore, Kang, Waised, and Wallace (1998) in their paper “Team Soar, a model for
team decision making” argue that the most critical distinction between teams and groups is the
degree of differentiation of roles or expertise relevant to the task and the degree of member
interdependence.
Even though team and organization definitions present similar characteristics, general
knowledge identifies the team concept as a small group of people who accomplish their task over
a short timeframe and an organization as a long-lasting complex institution. This research will
use the organization concept for studying network centric decision making under extreme events,
since an organization presents procedures and hierarchies, which can be summarized as protocols
or a set of rules, attributes essential for modeling and simulating an organizational structure.
The literature regarding “team decision making” suggests that teams make better
decisions than individuals, especially for complex tasks (Prietula, Carley & Gasser, 1998).
Nevertheless, the team performance will depend of the previous knowledge that it has of its
tasks, the role and position of its members and the configuration that exists in the team.
Hazen and Fewell (2004) did research about the history of decision-making models, and
they defined two branches that are not always clearly separated; the first one defines the aim of
decision-making models to assist decision-makers in making better decisions (for instance
Bayes’s theorem). The second identifies models which describe how decisions are actually made
in practice and quantifies the quality of those decisions. This dissertation pursues the second
approach, since the author is interested in simulating the way an organization performs under
extreme events in order to collect the most significant parameters and enable quantitative
analysis based on AAR and lessons learned methodology.
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The organization structures for responding to extreme events usually accomplish their
missions in separate locations. Depending on the type of event, there are many actors who
support the decision making process. Those actors have different skills, knowledge, missions,
and resources. In the previous context, one of the main challenges is trying to measure the
performance of an organization both as a whole and as an individual role (The reader should note
that an individual role can be configured by many people performing known tasks).
This dissertation proposes that the performance of those organizations should be
measured when they face complex scenarios. These environments of tension can be
characterized by four main features:
•

The organization has clear procedures and structure for responding to the extreme events.

•

There is a short time for decision making.

•

Critical decisions must be made with vital results.

•

There is collaborative work among all actors in the organizational structure.

Extreme event concept
Sarewitz and Pielke (2000) defined ten properties of extreme events and their associated
implications for decision making. See Table 3.
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Table 3: Properties of extreme events (Sarewitz & Pielke, 2000)
Properties
Rapid onset vs.
“creeping change”

Implications for decision making
The decision making implication may be quite different for
different events.

Rare

Little opportunity for learning. Relevant experience may be
lacking. May or may not be a factor in evolutionary
psychology. Rare events may control system evolution.

High consequence

Attention will be focused on event. Decisions matter.

High uncertainty

Generally, extreme events are difficult to predict. They often
occur with insufficient warning. Some extreme events may
be predicted months or years in advance (meteor strike,
Y2K) but that may still not provide sufficient time or
motivation for action.

Time pressure

Limited time for analysis. Stress producing.

Disruptive

Normal activities may cease. Loss of constancy. Stress
producing

Pose complex, ill
structured problem

This lack of structure may encourage intuitive mode of
responding when analytic mode is more appropriate.

Potential to create long
term change

In the aftermath of an extreme event, decision makers may
face a new environment. Again, loss of constancy and stress
are likely.

Affect large numbers of
people and/or large
ecosystems.

Group decision, leadership, government action, trust, and
cooperation/communication among stakeholders are
important for implementation of effective decisions.

Under-represented and
disenfranchised groups
tend to be
disproportionately
vulnerable.

Equity should be explicitly considered in decision making.

Generally speaking, the literature identifies extreme events with dangerous situations
produced by man-made or natural disasters; we include the previous approach, but do not
exclude those critical events which affect organizational structures, such as a problem in the
banking system due to an unexpected stock market slump, a lack of raw materials in a factory
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due to an interruption in the supply chain, or the sudden failure of critical infrastructures such as
an electrical blackout. This research is an attempt to identify and simulate similar pattern
behavior in highly hierarchical organizations, with known procedures which must face critical
and unusual situations.
Brunner (2000) described some extreme events as those which disrupt the routine
practices of many people at the same time, such as the OPEC oil embargo in 1971 which
produced long waiting lines at gas stations, among other consequences. Pielke (2000) described
different models which represent the natural observable fact named extreme event, but he did not
model the effect that these events could produce in an organization.
Mendonca and Wallace (2003) pointed out that extreme events are those which create the
need for cooperation among responding organizations. Activities to mitigate the effects of these
events can be expected to range from planned to improvised. Previous planning is fundamental
for facing an extreme event, but it is necessary to collect data in order to understand how an
organization and its decision making nodes react, especially when they must respond with
improvisation because the extreme event was never considered a possibility.
A different approach is presented by Carver and Lesser (1994), who developed the theory
of opportunistic planning; this assembles a solution to face extreme events using the library of
cognitive and behavioral processes contained within an emergency and response system. This
dissertation claims that the roles under a crisis situation do not usually adhere to established
procedures for coordination and resource utilization, and many of them present irregular
behavior depending on how the situation changes over time.
A key element necessary for modeling organizational behavior facing extreme events is
how the data on organizational decision making during emergency response may be captured.
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A mathematical approach for the management of emerging phenomena is presented by
Guastello (2002), who stated that it is possible to introduce mathematical structures that underlie
organizational events and observe some patterns in the way an organization reacts to an extreme
event. He proposes nonlinear dynamical systems theory for representing organizational behavior
and suggests a structural equations technique for testing the nonlinear hypothesis. The Guastello
approach matches with the purpose of this research in order to use SD combined with other
techniques for simulating dynamic system behavior of different actors who accomplish their
tasks over a NCDM environment.
Figure 3 shows a definition of four scenarios regarding events versus location made “to
illustrate the range of situations against which potential command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) needs for emergency
responders might be identified” (Committee on Army and Technology for Homeland Defense,
C4ISR, 2004).
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Supermarket Fire
Paraguay.
2004 Complexity 1
Kobe, Earthquake
City collapse
1995 Complexity 2
Tsunami
Asia
2004 Complexity 3
Hurricane Mitch
Honduras
1999 Complexity 4

Single Event

Multiple Events

Single Location

Multiple Locations

Bombing attack
Oklahoma City.
1995 .Complexity 1
San Francisco
Earthquake,
1906 Complexity 2
Wildfires
San Diego-Santa Ana
2003 Complexity 3
Earthquake/Tsunami
Chile,
1960 Complexity 4

Figure 3: Eight emergency situation area shown with four scenario definitions

The four scenarios previously identified are an initial attempt to develop a parameterized
framework which would allow us to quantitatively study a NCDM environment.
Halachmi (1980) stated that several studies have demonstrated that unexpected extreme
events within a social system may result in the same patterns of disruptive behavior, even when
such events are anticipated. As a consequence of extreme events, he identified two stages: first
order effects and second order effects. The former are direct, unidirectional, and hard to control;
they produce changes in organizational behavior, operational behavior, and managerial roles.
The latter are the result of multiple interrelations and reciprocal influence, and organization
behavior directly affects performance, for instance “during a crisis it is difficult to find a case of
an available organization that does not try to play a part in the disaster effort” because it is
expected that all roles develop new tasks in response to the disaster which may generate
confusion, message overloading, and increasing demand for scarce resources.
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Initial requirements for simulating the effects of extreme events produced by terrorism
acts were developed by Sandia National Laboratories in 1998. Even though this report considers
only terrorism circumstances, it encompasses significant modeling and simulation requirements
which could be applied to any sort of extreme event.
According to resounding effects, four scenarios were selected and the corresponding
actors, simulation output, and modeling approach are described. All the scenarios require the
“interplay and coordination of numerous decision-makers and resources to assist in response and
recovery effort.” The simulations should be capable of calculating three types of outputs: social
impact, economic cost, and organizational effectiveness. The report points out that “a primary
use of the model would be to determine the optimum degree of organizational effectives to
reduce the social impacts and the economic costs of any incident” (Pryor, Marozas, Allen,
Paananen, Hiebert-Dodd & Reinert, 1998).
Smith (2002) presented a related approach that explored the concepts for creating a
“simulation of national infrastructure” which could be used to explore the collective impact if
some critical infrastructure sector is disrupted by an extreme event. He made a ranking of the
most studied critical infrastructures, electrical power being the most studied, followed by
telephone systems and water processing. Most of the literature uses the term extreme events for
referring to terrorist attacks; this dissertation uses the terminology to describe events produced
by man-made or natural disasters.
Peerenboom (2002) depicted the implications of multiple contingency events which may
affect infrastructures. His main concern is centered on failures affecting the interdependent
“systems of systems” infrastructure. Three general category failures are described: cascading
failures, escalating failures, and common cause failures.
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Modeling and simulating organizational structures
According to most classical research in organizational theory (such as Taylor, Fayol and
Weber) it is possible to define the best way an organization could perform in its environment. In
contrast to classical scholars, current organizational theorists believe that organizational design
depends on the size, technology, strategies, and environment that surround the organization
(Borgatti, 2001). The latter approach is known as contingency theory.
In order to define contingency theory, Donaldson (2001) first describes the contingency
approach in science, in which the relationship between two variables is part of a larger causal
system involving a third variable known as the moderator factor. Thus the focus of the
contingency theory” is to study the impact of a third variable on effectiveness and efficiency.
Burton and Obel (1995) summarized the application of mathematics in organizational
studies, and they concluded that “information processing is the fundamental way to view
organizations and their designs.” They defined “the contingency model of organizational
design,” which makes a relationship between factors for organizational structure and structural
configuration of the organization and its properties. The first criteria selected were “effectiveness
and efficiency”.
Using contingency theory Burton and Obel presented several mathematical programming
models of organizational design based on strategy, technology, size, and managerial style. They
merged an information processing view of organization with contingency theory, in order to
present a combined framework for considering organizational design choice. Table 4 shows the
main models supported on classical organizational paradigm and contingency theory.
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Table 4: Mathematical programming model (Burton & Obel, 1995)
Model

Κ

max

C
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B

1

x

1

µ1 + µ2 ≤ b0
Max
A1 x1
B 1 x1

C

+
B

A
x

2

x

2
2

≤

b

0

≤ b1
≤ b 2
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C 1 x1
≤ µ1
≤ b1

Max
A2 x
B 2 x

C1
A1
B1
b1

Implication
A block-angular structure may model a large
organization at two levels. Many emergency
structures can be studied by rearranging the
rows and columns.

2

C
2
2

2 x 2
≤ µ 2
≤ b2

C2
A2
B2
b2

M-form organization modeled with
coordination. Most of the examples apply to
finance planning or allocation of resources in
the industry, but the model fits well for
analyzing a combined organization
composed of civil, military and nongovernmental organizations facing an
emergency situation.

Headquarters determine
Goals

HQ
Subunit 1

Subunit 1

(

Max C j − π I
B1 x 1

≤ b1

j

)x1

(

)

~

Max C j − π A j x j
~

~

Bjxj

Modeling an organizational structure with a
headquarters and two divisions. “The
mathematical model shows the information
interchange in a formal organization. The
technique can be applied to multi-level
perspective.”

~

≤ bj

In an organizational context, it is usually difficult for decision makers to evaluate the
performance of similar units; likely the most successful models have been those known as data
envelopment analysis (DEA), which was introduced in 1978. The main purpose of DEA is to
evaluate the performance of similar decision making units (DMU) with the same goals and
objectives (Anderson, Sweeney & Williams, 2000). Using the previous approach, Zhu (2003)
developed new DEA models for evaluating value chains and congestion measures.
Based on a classical organizational paradigm, Virtual Design Team was one of the first
simulations which incorporated a hybrid environment to study the total duration of a complete
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project along the critical path by means of sub tasking. The central idea of the Virtual Design
Team was essentially “information-processing structures and communication systems.” The
models were built under the paradigm of DES and “qualitative reasoning concepts derived from
artificial intelligence” (Levitt, Cohen, Kunz, Nass, Christiansen & Jin, 1994).
This dissertation makes a distinction between simulation systems that allow for the
collection of data directly from real people (organization in the loop) and those implemented as
synthetic entities based on classical paradigms such as discrete simulation, agent-based
simulation, or cognitive architectures.
Constructive simulation has been one of the most classical systems for simulating
organizational structures, usually used for training military commanders and their staff.
According to the Department of Defense glossary (DoD), (1995), this type of simulation means
“models and simulations that involve simulated people operating simulated systems. Real people
stimulate (make inputs to) such simulations, but they are not involved in determining the
outcomes". These sorts of simulations were the first attempts to improve organizational behavior
in a military context, in particular those performed by the commanders and their military staffs.
Even though constructive simulations are very useful for testing planning and execution, the data
acquired from these simulations is produced by the models and not by human behavior.
MacMillan, Dirdrich, Entin and Serfaty (2005) completed a research project called
“Measuring Organizational Performance in Simulation Environment.” They provide examples
regarding the use of theories and constructive simulations to structure empirical data collection
for organizational performance. They focus their research on organizational structures for
military command and control, including new structures associated with the concept of NCW.
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From this work, the author selected six meaningful findings which confirm the approach of this
dissertation:
•

Computational organizational models can make predictions about the performance of
organizations that do not yet exist.

•

Controlled experimentation and correlation studies are severely limited in their ability to
consider dynamic causal effect over time.

•

Models can act as dynamic theories or dynamic hypotheses by making testable predictions
about how multiple variables will interact to produce measurable outcomes.

•

At the heart of NCW is the challenge of creating new organizational forms and structures that
can use the rapid movement of information to create and maintain a strategic and tactical
advantage in military conflicts.

•

“The creation and use of constructive simulations to test new organizational concepts does not
free us from the need to collect data through empirical human-in-the-loop testing”.
The US Navy Tactical Decision Making under Stress (TADMUS) Program has been the

most significant research so far in the area of decision making under stress, considering the issue
of how individuals and teams are required to make critical decisions during changing and intense
situations (TADMUS Report, 1998). TADMUS was the product of two critical events: the first
was the USS Stark incident, where the commander did not engage an inbound aircraft which was
not thought to be a threat to his ship, and 27 US naval personnel lost their lives. The second one
was the USS Vincennes event, where the commander ordered his crew to engage the inbound
aircraft which turned out to be a commercial airline and all personnel aboard were killed
(TADMUS Report, 1998).
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In 1999 the US Navy published the main benefits from transitioning the TADMUS
products and process to other types of civilian and military organizations that must execute their
tasks in a collaborative environment, with little reaction time and facing critical decisions. The
TADMUS report identified potential advantages to other organizations:
Many operational environments have the same characteristics as Navy environments.
Specifically, information from multiple sources must be processed quickly, events are
fast-paced, situations are constantly changing, requiring acute situational awareness and
the ability to make decisions quickly in the midst of seeming chaos, decisions can have
major impacts (life or death), and teams of experts from various locations and agencies
are formed on site and must quickly learn to function as one expert team (TADMUS,
1998).
Even though this dissertation will not incorporate cognitive task analysis, some results tested and
validated by the TADMUS Project will be used as a basis for modeling an organizational
structure to manage emergency situations.
An experiment was conducted using a synthetic environment reported to investigate the
complexities of distributed team interaction and problem solving performance within a
controlled setting (Fiores, Cuevas, Scielzo & Salas, 1999). Training performed with 25
undergraduate students allowed the testing of hypotheses regarding problem solving measures
and general metacomprehension. The study found that multiple computer-based methods of
diagnosing problem solving performance can be used to assess knowledge acquisition for a
complex synthetic team task.
Supported by these hypotheses, a novel methodology, designed by the Chilean Army
and known as Training Organizational Behavior, was implemented by means of a collaborative
software known as Simulation for Training Emergency Response, a web-based training system
whose main purpose is to produce data to evaluate organizational behavior when critical
decisions are to be made and response time is limited (SIGEN Project, 2003). This methodology
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has been used in the training of more than 120 users that belong to civilian and military
organizations, including an emergency system for Honduras facing an event similar to Hurricane
Mitch, an emergency system for Chile facing an earthquake, and a peacekeeping operations
battalion posted in Haiti. Although the system enables the improvement of collaborative decision
making as a whole, individual behavior and information path analysis is still hard and timeconsuming for analyzing and determining the cause-effect relationship between decisions made
in different roles.
Lin (1994) argued that “often, success is not guaranteed by the existence of a complex
organization design nor by the existence of high-quality information alone.” His research showed
that an organization with a high performance level must have an organizational design matched
to the task environment, and he concluded that the best design is contingent.
Yasuhiko (2004) in a novel study defined an organization as “a complex system of
interconnected human and nonliving machines” (Notice that the definition is comparable to a
net-centric environment, previously described in this dissertation). In their research they identify
two approaches to develop formal results for an organization: The first one is named “qualitative
mathematics or organizational cybernetic theory” and the second one is named “computational
approach.” Table 5 summarizes the two approaches.
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Table 5: Contrast between two approaches for modeling organizations (Yasuhiko, 2004)

Internal
Structure

Organizational Cybernetic
Theory
Three layers, each one with
very well defined functions.

Computational Organizational
Theory
Less structure, there is a collection
of processes and intelligent adaptive
agents with a dynamic behavior.

Components

•

Goal-seeking object

•

Agents

•

Goal-seeking activity
(optimization,
coordination, and
adaptation according to its
hierarchical position).

•

Tasks

•

Skills

•

Process model

Methodology

Mathematical qualitative
approach.

Simulation, expert system, and
numerical analysis.

Research
Area

Organizational design.

Organizational design and learning,
organizational and information
technology, organizational evolution
and change.

Constraints

Implicitly handled as
constraints to a goal-seeking
activity.

Explicitly defined.

Social networks
A social network is a set of actors that may have relationships with one another.
Networks can have few or many actors (nodes), and one or more kinds of relations (edges)
between pairs of actors (Hannemann & Riddle, 2005). The use of a network for representing
mathematical relationships among entities was started in the 17th century when Spinoza
developed the first model. In 1937 Moreno introduced sociometry and sociograms and in 1948
Bavelas founded the group networks laboratory at MIT. The concept of centrality was specified
at this time and in 1949 Rapaport developed a probability-based model of information flow. In
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the 1970s the social field emerged based on new features in graph theory and computational
analysis of complex data sets (Freeman, 2000).
Based on SNA, Carley (1995; 1999) described the concept of computational organization
analysis in which the organizations are viewed as inherently computational entities and she
defined a set of key measurements for characterizing organizational architectures. Carley has
developed significant contributions in the area of dynamic social networks, most of them
supported by mathematical foundation and computational analysis.
In order to design the best possible C2 architectures for the Australian Defense Force,
FINC (Force, Intelligence, Networking, and C2) methodology was implemented based on a
social network foundation. The method allows the calculation of three metrics for every C2
architecture: the information flow coefficient measuring tempo superiority, the coordination
coefficient measuring coordination superiority, and the intelligence coefficient measuring
information superiority. Based on a test-bed, it was possible to explore the impact of different
organizational architecture under a range of different conditions (Dekkler, 2002).
Similar experiments have been developed at the Center for Computational Analysis of
Social and Organizational Systems at Carnegie Mellon University. One of the most
representative deals with “Measuring and Modeling Change in C3I Architectures” using
PCANSS formalism, mathematically represented C2 architecture as a set of matrixes linking
personnel, resources, tasks, and relations among them. Results pointed out the degree of
similarity/difference in the various measures, the relative ability to predict performance, and the
relative ability to predict adaptability in C2 Architectures (Carley, Ren & Krackhardt, 2001;
Hazy & Tivnan, 2004).
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Simulation-based statistical inference for the evolution of social networks was presented
by Snijders ( 2004), who asserted that single observations of networks are snapshots and the
results of untraceable history, and then the more descriptively oriented type of statistical
modeling of linear regression analysis cannot be transplanted to network analysis, where the
focus has to be on modeling dependencies.
Extreme events analysis with data coming from real people and real events is expensive
and time consuming for implementation. Mendonca and Wallace (2003) describe one of them:
…interview data from Hurricane Camille, directed graphs were constructed, a total of 52
interviews were analyzed and 106 response personnel in more than 85 organizations
identified. Based on social network analysis, the results suggested that among the senders
the most central organizations were the Police Department and the Emergency Operating
Center; on the other hand, among the receivers the most central organizations were the
National Guard and Radio Station. Additionally this analysis incorporated basic matrix
operations applied to the adjacency matrix to examine the centrality of the network. The
study identified that the Police Department, the National Guard and the Radio Station
played central roles as senders since their respective normalized degrees were greatest.
These groups can be viewed as the ones that requested the appropriate authority for an
update of the situation, announced to the public on the current condition of the Hurricane,
and/or declared a curfew/warning….
This dissertation suggests that a social network could be combined with other simulation
techniques, allowing the possibility for gathering different snapshots of organization states over
time. The merged techniques may be used to describe behaviors of individuals and groups when
there are digital systems that allow the logging of communications, tasks, and decisions. Figure 4
shows two states of the evolution of an organization when it faces an extreme event.
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Figure 4: Networks and matrix to represent an emergency management organization in two
periods

This research requires identification of the main variables and states of an organization
over time in order to decide which merged techniques are more suitable for simulating either the
variables or the states.
Lorrain and White developed an evolutionary approach for studying structural
equivalence in social networks; their work was known as blockmodeling, which is characterized
by two main aspects
•

To provide a way to analyze role structures (positions).

•

To allow identification of basic structures of social networks (usually organizational
structures with more than 15 roles are difficult to analyze).
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In practical aspects blockmodeling seeks to reduce and simplify a large network which could not
be well understood. The reduced network can be represented by its relational matrix known as an
“image matrix” (Lorrain & White, 1971).
There are several algorithms which are used to assign a block to a subset of data, one of
the most well-known is CONCOR (convergence of iterated correlations), which is based on the
convergence of iterated calculation of the Pearson correlations of pairs of either rows or columns
(Netminer, 2005).
To identify common behavior of actors working in an organization, Schwartz and
Sprinzen (1984) identified that,
the occupant of a common position will exhibit a common pattern of relations, across
multiples relations, consistently tending to have certain relations with occupants of
particular other positions and to not have the same type of relation with of yet other
position”.
In order to study transactions in interdependent relations, Buskens (2002) described social
networks as a “valued directed graph with weighted nodes.” A valued network representing n
nodes is a pair (π, A ), where π is a n-vector of weights indicating the importance of each node
with

∑

n
π
i =1 i

= 1, π i > 0

for all i, and A is a n x n matrix where αij, 0 < αij < 1, is the importance

of the tie from node i to node j. Moreover Buskens described “global network parameters which
can measure the properties of a network as a whole and can explain interaction networks
effects.” Several inferences on the effects of network parameters on information diffusion rates
are summarized in Table 6 and Table 7. Implications are inferred according to this research.
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Table 6: Individual network parameters (TR= Transition rate, RR=Reception rate) (Buskens,
2002)
Individual
Outdegree

Network Parameters
1
D out ( i ) =
∑ π iα ij
1 − π i j≠i

TR
+

RR
0

Implication for NCDM
Nodes with higher out degree could send more information
and generate less uncertainty for situation awareness.

In- degree

1
D in (i) =
1−π

0

+

Nodes with higher in degree receive more information,
likely more congestion, require more analysis.

Out
degree
Quality

Q out (i ) = F (π , Dout , α ) +

0

In-degree
Quality

Q in (i ) = F (π , Dout , α , )

+

Local out
degree
density

LDout (i) = F (π , α )

Local in
degree
density

LDin (i) = F (π ,α )

Depend on network position. This parameter shows the
extent to which a node is linked to nodes which have high
degree themselves. We suppose higher degree quality could
increase the transmission of information but could be
dangerous if the initial or bridge nodes are critical points
into a NCDM environment.
If one node receives information from one node it receives
partial information if the sender node receives information
from only one node. Extreme consequence for decision
makers if this node does not have certain autonomy.
This parameter measures the extent to which a node
transmits information to connected neighbors. In a NCDM
environment it could be expected that information is
transmitted more slowly if a node informs two nodes which
have many contacts between themselves.
This parameter measures the extent to which a node obtains
information from connected neighbors. Likely nodes with
higher in degrees will receive information sooner than
nodes with lower local in degree.

i

π iα ji
∑
j ≠i

0
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Table 7: Global network parameters (TR= Transition rate, RR=Reception rate; Buskens, 2002)
Global
Network
Parameters
Density

Out degree
variance

In-degree
variance
Out-degree/
In degree
variance

Network Parameters

∑ ∑ ππ α
∆ = i =1 j ≠i i j ij
∑i =1 ∑ j ≠1π iπ j
n

2

n
n
⎛
⎞
VOUT = ∑πi ⎜⎜ DOUT − ∑πJ DOUT(J)⎟⎟
i=1
j=1
⎝
⎠

TR

RR

+

+

Working on network centric environment. Could
information be transmitted faster on networks with higher
density?

-

-

Average variance in the out degrees nodes in the network.
Centralization could accelerate information diffusion if the
central nodes are important in the diffusion process.

-

-

Average variance in the in degree nodes in the network.
Centralization could accelerate information diffusion if the
central nodes are important in the diffusion process.

+

+

There are not clear inferences for centralization
parameters; Buskens argues that likely the “information
transmission rate and the information reception rate
decrease with out degree and in degree variance.” Note
that this analysis is a “conjecture” in a social network
environment; we are exploring possible tools for analysis
in a NCDM environment.

2

⎛
⎞
VIN = ∑πi ⎜⎜ DIN − ∑πJ DIN (J)⎟⎟
i =1
j =1
⎝
⎠
n

n

⎛
⎞
VIN, IN = ∑πi ⎜⎜ DIN − ∑π J DIN (J)⎟⎟ *
i =1
j =1
⎝
⎠
n

n

n
⎛
⎞
⎜ DIN − ∑π J DIN (J)⎟
⎜
⎟
j =1
⎝
⎠

Network
Size

Implication for NCDM

Network size, because Buskens defines πi = 1/n then the
numbers of nodes can have effects on information
diffusion.

N

Carley (2003; 2005) introduced the concept of dynamic network analysis, and she
pointed out that “traditionally SNA has focused on small, bounded networks, with 2-3 types of
links among one type of node at one point in time, with close to perfect information.” Dynamic
network can deal with large dynamic multi-mode, multi-link networks with variable levels of
uncertainty. Her analysis is based on three key innovations:
•

Meta-matrix – Focusing on people, knowledge-resources and tasks.

•

Probabilistic ties – The links in the meta-matrix are probabilistic.

•

Multi-agent network model – Using basic social and cognitive processes people can
learn, do tasks and take part in events.
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Carley's approach is an attempt to define a new theory named Dynamic network analysis, and
her analysis is supported in numerous previous papers and toolkits such as PCANS, DyNet, and
OrgNet. (Carley & Kanmeva, 2004)

Discrete event simulation
In DES passive objects represent entities, which travel through the blocks of the
flowchart and wait for getting a service. The literature shows few examples regarding studies of
organization structures from a DES perspective. One of the main advantages of DES for
modeling organizational structures is that it enables parallel, distributed, and interdependent
organizational traffic flow across the network to be accurately simulated (Griffin & Skinner,
2003). Moreover, DES enables tracking the status of individual entities in a shop floor
(organizational structure) and estimates numerous performance measures associated with those
entities (Venkateswaran, Son & Jones, 2004).
On the other hand DES simulation is not appropriate when state variables interact with
one another on a continuous basis, and when entities and their internal mechanisms are a more
important element of the simulation than an event, per se (Dooley, 2002). There are significant
elements which are appropriate for modeling organizational structures, although this technique is
not enough for gathering all the characteristics of an organization.
A DES simulation approach was used for modeling the critical decisions timeline
performed by the crew of the USS Vincennes (Franceschini, McBride, & Sheldon, 2001). We
estimate that significant activities performed by an emergency organizational structure can be
modeled and simulated with DES, such as workload, priorities, saturation, timeline, service time,
etc.
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A different perspective is presented by McGinnis (2005) who explored the concept of
organizational simulation using the knowledge acquired from two domains: integrated circuits
(ICs) design and discrete event logistics systems. He said “in terms of design features, a
contemporary IC is clearly a more complex artifact than could be contemplated.” ICs have many
levels of abstractions in which at the lower level there is a small set of bases and simple
functions, and thus very precise simulation models can be compiled and can predict behavior.
Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Hardware Description Language is the technology
which enables design automation for digital ICs.
However, a discrete event logistics system is not a completely formalized process and
there is an absence of a formal modeling discipline (ad hoc discipline). As McGinnis (2005)
notes, “Nevertheless a large portion of the organizational simulation problem domain consists of
organizations which exhibit discrete flow of materials, people, or information, and whose
behavior over time is intimately related to these flows.”.
Biswas and Merchawi (2000) reported the implementation of a discrete simulation model
in conjunction with an agent based scheduling engine. Their implementation enabled validation
of an adaptive scheduling using a discrete simulation software package in which several factories
are simulated. Controlled input parameters were sent through of a message broker to an agent
based scheduler in which several agents make decisions based on their own individual priorities
and rules.
On the other hand, Venkateswaran, Son and Jones (2004) modeled a hierarchical
production planning using two levels, the first one named planning (higher decision level) and
the second named scheduling (lower decision level). A SD model simulated “the production
dynamics involved in the execution of the production plan,” and a DES model simulated the
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operations carried out in the enterprise such as material processing, transfer, and storage. The
interaction between SD and DES was made via a high level architecture. The results
demonstrated that the hybrid simulation framework provides seamless integration between SD
and DES models and can be used to analyze interdependency between planning and the
manufacturing processes in an organization.
The two previous examples show the integration of two simulation paradigms in a
manufacturing environment, and both applications enclose significant techniques which could be
customized for simulating a network-centric process.
Searching by organizational structures which perform their tasks over a network-centric
environment, this literature review summarizes the most complex model found based on a DES
named “A Study on the US Expeditionary Warfare System.” The study was conducted at the
Naval Postgraduate School and the model basically emulates an expeditionary force which is
defined as a system of systems where ships, aircraft, vehicles, fuel, food, water and so on are
linked on a network-centric environment. The simulation enabled the evaluation of three issues:
•

A system of systems analysis for a expeditionary warfare architecture.

•

The study of interfaces and synergies among ships, aircraft and systems within
architecture.

•

The comparison of different operational concepts in terms of troops, vehicles and
logistics support.
Even though the two models built provided significant knowledge about how to analyze a

military organization in a dynamic environment, this simulation has some limitations: Some
steps require user inputs; there is a constant rate of consumption based only on vehicles and
troops; the simulation does not produce the best solution, and there are no optimization modules
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in the system; and finally, the assets and resources are generalized into different categories
(Students of the US Naval Postgraduate School, 2003).
The Network Warfare Simulation is a discrete event simulation tool built under a netcentric approach. The system allows the simulation of voice and data communication required
during civil and military crisis events. The architecture is supported by commercial off-the-shelf
software, and is made up of a set of libraries, a scenario builder, planning capacity, a simulation
engine, and analysis tools. Simulation can be used to model communication equipment,
organizations, and information (Flournoy & Murphy, 2002).

System dynamics
The basis concept in SD is that behavior of a system arises from its structure. In system
dynamics this structure is modeled based on feedback loops, stocks, and flows (Sterman, 2000).
Much of the literature points out that SD is a technique for dealing with complex systems
because nonlinearity emerges as the most common behavior. Mathematically, an SD model is a
system of differential equations, in which the model works only with aggregates. The items in
the same stock are indistinguishable and there is a global structural dependency (Borshchev &
Filippov, 2003).
In order to describe a problem in SD, the modeler has to show the system’s behavior as a
number of interacting feedback loops, balancing or reinforcing. The system’s behavior must be
first generalized from specific events associated with the system under study, and it requires
investigation as to how the variables change over time. Therefore, when the behavior is known,
the modeler can look for the system structure which is the cause of the behavior. Usually the
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systems present four types of behavior patterns and each is generated by different structures.
Tables 8, 9, and 10 show these behavior patterns (Kirkwood, 1998, Sterman, 2000).

Table 8: Positive feedback loop (modifications to Sterman, 2000; Kirkwood, 1998)
Pattern behavior

Analytical solution

System Structure

dx(t )
= g ⋅ x(t )
dt

X(t)

Bank
Balance

Performance

x(t ) = Stock variable x at
time t.

g = growth rate (g>0)

X0

x(t = 0) = x0

Interest

x (t ) = x 0 ⋅ e g ⋅t

Time

Table 9: Combination of positive and negative loops (modifications to Sterman 2000;
Kirkwood, 1998)
Pattern behavior
X(t)

Analytical solution

Sales

x∞

System Structure

⎡ x(t ) ⎤
dx(t )
= g ⋅ ⎢1 −
⎥ ⋅ x(t )
dt
x∞ ⎦
⎣
x(t ) = stock variable x at
time t
x∞ = stock limit of variable
x(t) when t tends to be infinite
g = maximum fractional
growth ( g >0 assuming that

X0
Time

Morale

⎡x
⎤
1+ ⎢ ∞ −1⎥ ⋅ e−g⋅t
⎣ x0 ⎦

−

+

+

Sales

+

x(t = 0) = x0 , the solution
x∞

Motivation

Opportunities

Saturation of

to the former equation is:

x(t ) =

+

Income

Delay

Market Niche
Size of
Market
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Table 10: Negative feedback loop (modifications to Sterman 2000; Kirkwood, 1998)
Pattern behavior

Analytical solution

System Structure

Negative (balancing) feedback
loop.

dx(t )
= β ⋅ [x∞ − x(t )]
dt

Temperature
Setting

x(t ) = stock variable x at
time t
β = growth rate ( β >0)

Actual Temperature

X(t)

x∞ = limit x(t) when t→ ∞

X0

Gap

+

x(t = 0) = x0

Actual

x(t) = x∞ − [x∞ − x0 ]⋅ e−β⋅t

temperature

Desired

+

Temperature

x∞
Time

In order to build a SD model, a modeler breaks down a known process into distinct stages and
represents the interactions between the various stages. Such models are called “compartmental”
and are graphically depicted by block diagrams (Nagle, Saff & Snider, 2004).
In the early 80s, Coyle (1980) published a model about “The Dynamic of the Third
World War,” which represents a hypothetical war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Although it is recognized that SD technique allows aggregate modeling (high abstraction for
policy), the model showed real parameters combined with different strategies in a specific
timeframe. Resources, vehicles, weapons, and forces were also incorporated into the model.
Three main conclusions arose:
•

The model was an aid to understanding structures.

•

It was proposed as a tool for analyzing contingency planning.

•

It was identified as a decision support at the heart of a C2 System.
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Twenty years later, SD simulation technique continues being used (beyond the business
arena). For instance, Sandia Laboratory analysts have created several models to combine generic
components of specific systems in order to simulate domestic infrastructure protection. “Their
goal is to create a modeling structure and software module that can capture the
interdependencies” between critical infrastructure (Smith, 2002).
Yerkes and Dodson ( 1908) developed a curvilinear relationship between stress and
performance known as “Yerkes-Dodson Law of Arousal”, which states that an organism’s
performance can be improved if this organism is aroused in some manner. However, if the level
of arousal increases too much, the level of performance decreases. Using the previous
relationship as an assumption, Rudolph and Repenning (2003) implemented a SD model to study
how organizations react to an ongoing stream of interruption of normal activities; they
demonstrated a new crisis archetype, the quantity-induced crisis. Their study suggests that the
strategies often proposed for mitigating a novelty-induced crisis – stepping back and reframing
the situation – can be counterproductive when confronting a potential quality-induced crisis. As
shown in Figure 5, any action that temporarily slows the interruption resolution rate can push the
system closer to an unstable equilibrium, making collapse more likely.
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Desired
Resolution Time

Interruption
Arrival Rate

Interruptions
Pending
Interruption Resolution Rate

Desired Resolution

Stress

Normal
Resolution Rate

Figure 5: Structure of disaster model (model developed for this dissertation, following the
facsimile of Rudolph et al., 2003)

Agent based modeling
There is no universal definition to describe the ABM paradigm, and people are still
discussing what type of properties an agent must have to deserve this label (Borshchev &
Filippov, 2004). This literature review enabled the collection of several attributes which could
characterize a piece of software named agent: decentralized behavior, learning from experience,
bottom-up modeling, global behavior emerging from many individual entities, demonstration of
some degree of intelligence, perception of the environment and that influence reactions, capacity
for interaction, and social ability.
The agent definition which more faithfully represents the objectives of this research:
“Agents are programmed software modules that scan their environment and make a decision”
(Ilanchinski, 1996).
From an academic perspective, Wooldridge (2002) presented abstract architectures of
intelligent agents; his main contribution is the “formalized view of agents.” Initially he defined
the surrounding agents’ environment which is based on a finite set of discrete states (E={ e’, e’’,
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,e’’’… }). The agents “are assumed to have a repertoire of possible actions available to them

which transform the state of the environment” (Ac={,α’, α’’, α’’’ … }).
Interaction is produced when the agent chooses an action α to perform on E= e. Then
the E responds with a number of possible states e; nevertheless the agent “does not know in
advance” which will be the future state. Thus new cycles can be executed.
In the context of this research, we consider significant three attributes defined by
Wooldridge:
•

Agents are assumed to be deterministic.

•

The environment is history dependent and implicitly non-deterministic.

•

Agents make decisions about what action to perform based on the history of the system.

This literature review found few examples regarding applications of ABM to organizational
structure analysis, and we are going to concentrate on those which combine two or more
simulation techniques.
TalenSim is a prototype based on the SD and ABM paradigms. It enabled the
implementation of different scenarios with respect to organizational transformations and their
impact “on workforce without any of the real-world consequences such as lower performance,
turnover, low organizational commitment, etc.” Three entity types are modeled in the simulation:
environment, company, and individual (Prasad & Chartier, 1999).
Qudrat-Ullah (2005) pointed out that SD validation techniques can be applied to ABM.
He argued that there are three strong similarities between both techniques:
•

They can model non-linear and complex systems.

•

Both assume that micro-structures of a system are responsible for its behavior.

•

Both aim at discovering the leverage point in complex systems.
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Kang, Waisel and Wallace (1998) used computational modeling with distributed artificial
intelligence as a paradigm for studying team behavior. The architecture that they chose was
TeamSoar, which enabled the interconnection of individual agents. A naval command and
control team was modeled and simulated and its results indicated that simulation is adequate for
studying teams and predictions can be obtained regarding what happened.
Even though computational models are useful for analyzing team decision making, those
teams are made up of few nodes (4 nodes were described by Kang et al.) and tasks are strongly
linked to the environment in which the team executes its mission.
Borshchev et al. (2004) presented a methodology for transforming SD and DES models
into an ABM: The idea behind this approach is to simulate more sophisticated behavior using the
statechart design. This approach is congruent with the Prasad application named TalenSim
developed four years before. Statechart design is based on state machines adopted as a part of the
standard Unified Modeling Languages (UML). Statechart enables the capturing of different state
transitions of agents, communication among them, and actions which are performed by each one
(agents). According to Borschev et al., using statechart it is possible to “re-conceptualize”
existing SD and DES models.
The previous statement does not mean that the ABM approach is a replacement for SD or
DES; there are a lot of applications where both simulations fit very well to solve real life
problems. Moreover, for many such applications, ABM will not make much sense, being less
efficient, harder to develop, or simply not matching the nature of the problem.
After analyzing this technique based on Unified Modeling Languages-Real Time, this
literature review found useful features for modeling an emergency organizational structure by
linking the concepts of ABM and statechart.
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In order to generate understanding and inform research into the dynamics of cellular
receptors, a study was conducted to compare SD and ABM. The comparison measured the
overall approach, the underlying mathematics and analysis, the easiness with which results can
be communicated to others, research relevance, and educational potential. The results showed
that SD is more conceptual than ABM and the modeler should be careful to select the appropriate
level of aggregation. Nevertheless SD is easier to implement and to conduct sensitivity analysis.
On the other hand, ABM obligates the modeler to describe clearly the definition of agent and
also the modeler needs to specify the rules which will control the agent’s behavior (Wakeland,
Gallaher, Macovsky & Aktipis, 2004).
Even though SD is a relatively high level technique (aggregation), it presents difficulties
for identifying stocks and flows in a system such as an emergency organization structure. This
problem becomes fundamental if we want to model the reality into a synthetic environment.
In contrast, SD provides the capacity for modeling “non-linearity” based on feedback
cycles and delay functions, aspects that could be useful for modeling organizational behavior
over a networked structure.

Conclusion based upon literature review for “Modeling and Simulating a Network-Centric
Scenario under Extreme Events”
Based on the literature review, this research proposes and justifies the use of
mathematical and simulation techniques for developing a digital network-centric environment in
which generic organizations could validate, study, and predict organizational behavior under
extreme events. The term “generic organizations” is used to represent civilian, military,
humanitarian, non governmental organizations (NGO), or merged organizations which perform

44

their tasks over a collaborative scenario, in separate locations and where each one has clear
procedures for dealing with the information. Note that a “generic organization” interacts over a
communicational infrastructure where many devices present individual and collective behaviors,
such as databases, sensors, hubs, and decision support systems.
In this step, some people could ask “why does this research incorporate a SNA and not
consider graph theory?” The answer is simple: SNA has its foundation in graph theory, and
researchers have found many findings supported by graphs. Therefore, we make use of their
interpretations to analyze a network centric environment.
Table 11 presents the main characteristics of the three main simulation paradigms and
SNA. The table merges the findings of Chapter Two with our experience using the named
techniques.
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Table 11: Comparison of SD, DES, ABM and SNA
System Dynamics

Discrete Event
Simulation

Agent Based
Modeling

Appropriate for
modeling the
aggregate behavior
resulting from
effects (non
interactions) among
multiple types of
categories.
Undistinguished,
only dimensions
and categories.

Appropriate for
modeling
details, known
processes and
different entities
and levels.

Appropriate for
modeling movement
and state changes of
individual entities,
their interactions and
rules. Implementing
different levels.

Appropriated for predicting
future layout.
Appropriated for analyzing
topological structures.

Distinguished
entities.

Distinguished nodes, but there
are not transactions among
them.

3. Best use

Efficient for
modeling large
number of
continuum
interactions.

4. Parameters

Parameters cannot
be modeled in
different levels.

Efficient for
modeling large
number of
discrete
transactions and
processes.
Parameters can
interact in
different levels.

Distinguished
entities with
interaction but
usually there are not
transactions.
Inefficient for
modeling large
numbers of
interactions.

Parameters cannot be modeled
in different levels.

5. Actions

Level and flow
cannot represent
actions.
Good for showing
system’s structure
and numerical
results.

Can implement
rules but not
actions.
Good for
capturing
processes and
measuring
performance.

Micro and macro
parameters can
interact. Vertical
influence.
Actions allow
generating behavior.

Good for display topology and
relationship between nodes.
(dependencies, connections,
centrality, cohesion,
equivalency)

Numerical
integration of
difference
equations.
Stochastic
processes
Abstract, via state
variables and
equations that are
solved to simulate
behavior over time.

Queuing theory
and stochastic
processes.

Good for showing
the behavior of
individual entities.
Difficult to
implement structure;
it emerges naturally.
Logic, algorithms,
and probabilities.

Physical emulation
of “agents” whose
rules for behavior
mirror the real world.

Realistic and observable.
Easy to implement physical
emulation of locations and
relationships.

Easy to identify
unique entity
behavior.

No behavior is shown.

1. Level

2. Entities

6. Internal
structure

7.
Mathematic

8. Abstraction

9. Behavior

Difficult to identify
unique behavior at
the entity level.

Realistic,
entities travel
through several
paths, server
process,
transform and
sent to another
server.
Easy to identify
behavior at the
entity level.
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Social Network

No interactions for modeling.
Inefficient for large network
analysis, requires “complex
network analysis” technique.

Nodes and ties cannot represent
actions.

Graph theory and structural
analysis.

System Dynamics

Discrete Event
Simulation

Agent Based
Modeling

Social Network

10. Systems’
understanding

Useful for
increasing
conceptual
understanding.

Modeler can easily
define a high level
of aggregation
which may not be
adequate for
simulating a
system.

12. Data
Inputs

Does not require
exhaustive data
collection.
Requires right
empirical evidence
and right input
parameters.
Many outputs; if the
empirical evidence
(policies) is
modeled using
wrong parameters
the outputs will be
worthless.
Notice, outputs are
tendencies
(policies). For
current
methodology, it is
not allowed to
apply statistical
analysis.
Validation could be
easy if it is
implemented at a
high aggregated
level. Hard if the
aggregate level
presents many
parameters or there
is a high level of
abstraction.
No calibration.

Useful for
understanding
interactions and
global behavior, but
it requires a previous
conceptual
understanding.
Modeler must
consider the
definition of agents
in the right level.
Selecting the
adequate rules and
interaction could be
a possible source of
mistakes.
Requires observable
rules and interactions
with the
environment.

Requires a well known layout,
based on location, and
relationships. System’s
properties must be emulated.

11.
Inaccuracy

The system
must be known
before
modeling. Does
not increase
conceptual
understanding.
Modeler easily
can define the
right physical
layout for
simulating a
system.

Many outputs,
statistical
analysis is
required.
Good for
performance
analysis.

Many outputs,
difficult to select the
right measurement of
performance.

Outputs are new metrics
deduced from new
configurations, nodes size, ties
and positions.

Depending on
the simulated
system and
historic data
available.

Available
information does not
enable a conclusive
answer.

Yes

13. Data
outputs

14. Validation

Requires
exhaustive data
collection and
accurate
distribution
probabilities.
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Two sources of mistake could
be found:
Input data set and
Data interpretation.
Requires knowledge of the
system under study.

Requires exhaustive data
collection, which makes for
difficult identifying and
collecting.

System Dynamics

Discrete Event
Simulation

15.
Intelligence

No

No

16.
Sensitivity
Analysis
17.
Optimization
18. Dynamics
Changes

Well situated for
sensitivity analysis.

Agent Based
Modeling

Social Network
No

Better situated
with DOE.

Yes, but the modeler
must specify what
type of
“intelligence.”
No information
available.

No

No

No

No

No.

No.

Yes.

No.

Yes

Twenty one significant conclusions are derived from the literature review:
•

Currently there are no models which use a hybrid simulation technique to represent the
performance of an organization structure under an extreme event. The few models are
based on linear programming and ABM.

•

General simulations based on quantitative techniques are either scarce or poorly
documented. Mendonca and Wallace (2003) reported an analysis of Hurricane Camille
using a SNA technique; Doreian et al. (2005) used the same technique for analyzing
“Interorganizational SAR Network” formed after a small tornado flipped a boat on Lake
Pomona in Kansas.

•

The USS Vincennes' incident and “A Study on the US Expeditionary Warfare System”
are the only research efforts which mention the use of DES technique for simulating an
organization.

•

Data output collected from either training systems (those which the author named
“organization in the loop”) or real systems such as C2 is not used for implementing a
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“synthetic organization in the loop.” In the past, researchers have preferred to implement
synthetic entities based on cognitive architectures.
•

Organizational in the loop, C2 systems, and surveys are the only means for collecting real
data.

•

Most of the analysis found is performed in laboratories for testing hypothesis about team
performance and cognitive task analysis, but usually does not involve real people with
their real roles, working on the real organization structures facing real threats. This
research is based on real organization structures, and the data input collected comes from
digital training exercises and case analysis.

•

The literature does not show any operational system which allows implementing the
AAR based on quantitative analysis.

•

The network centric environment presents characteristics which could be applied to
military or civilian organizations facing extreme events, and this environment could be
modeled using traditional simulation techniques. This dissertation argues that
“technological organizations walk toward a network-centric environment” (Organization
structures for dealing with extreme events are technological organizations).

•

In the content for modeling network-centric environment, the literature review found
significant studies whose purposes are modeling and simulating some aspects of a
network centric process. Most of these studies use DES.

•

The contingency theory provides a framework for modeling NCDM since it supports the
concept that organizational designs must be in accordance with the contingency
environment.
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•

Extreme events should be modeled in their consequences for critical infrastructure and
their disruptive effects over emergency management.

•

Mathematical programming and SNA fit well enough for evaluating organizations before
facing extreme events.

•

DOE could be a useful technique for improving organizational behavior.

•

The literature review found few examples about combined applications of SD-DES and
SD-ABM.

•

In the context of emergency response, the literature review found few examples regarding
to applications of SD, DES, ABM and SNA.

•

In two older studies SNA was used for representing a small emergency organization’s
response. The Australian Army has experimented modeling a network-centric
environment with SNA technique.

•

Guastello (2002) proposed NDS for modeling organizational reactions to extreme events;
this idea is in accordance with the objectives of this dissertation.

•

Sandia Laboratories works with SD techniques for analyzing vulnerabilities of critical
infrastructure.

•

Dynamic network analysis is a novel technique, which does not consider the traditional
simulation paradigm, even though it is based on SNA technique.

•

There is no concrete definition of agent based simulation. Two possible definitions of
agents are: “emergent behavior arises from microscopic entities” and “entities which
present some degree of intelligence.”
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Past research efforts and comparisons shown in Table 11 enable us to build dynamic hypotheses
for evaluating different configurations and circumstances in which organizations face extreme
events.

Gaps identified in the literature
Table 12 shows the area in which this research will be conducted and describes other
research efforts evaluated at the present time.

Table 12: Research gaps relevant to this dissertation
Simulation technique

Planning and Decision
Support

Command and Control
Systems

Network Centric
Decision Making

Social network
analysis

Carley

Carley, Ren, &
Krackhardt, 2001

Dekker,2002

Mendonca & Wallace
CASOS, CMU.

Care, 2005.

Mendonca & Wallace,
2003
CASOS. CMU.
Care, 2005

Systems dynamics

Sterman,2000.
Coyle, 1980.
Sandia Laboratories.
Smith, 2002.

GAP
Literature does not
describe examples. The
author assumes
confidential
information.

Discrete events
simulation

Student of the US
Naval Postgraduate
School, 2003.

Franceschine et al.
2001.

Hazen & Fewell, 2004.

Agent based modeling

Many researches and
models

Research without
validation

GAP

Hybrid simulation

Venkateswaran et al.
2004.

Literature does not
GAP - Current research
describe examples. The
author assumes
confidential
information.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF
EXTREME EVENTS

Introduction
This chapter provides the methodology we will use to conduct this research in order to
map real entities into a simulated environment using the three main simulation paradigms
combined with social network technique.
The literature review identified a consensus among researchers that complex systems can
be modeled making certain abstractions regarding the entire system details but capturing the
aspects that have more influence in the system’s behavior.
We apply the previous assertion, since a networked environment is a complex system where a
structured organization must deal with many tasks and uncertainties due to the nature of the
extreme events, which makes it impossible to model and simulate a complete scenario with a
high level of detail.
Making certain abstractions regarding the characteristics of the extreme events, we will
concentrate our research on the structure of the organization and its flows, since those elements
usually are very well defined in the plans and system reactions of the organization. Processes,
procedures, messages, synchronization, and metrics for assessment are the key elements to be
simulated and studied in a hybrid simulation platform.
We will use the term “nodes” to refer to the agents who integrate an emergency
organization; such nodes can be human beings or machines, both integrated over only one
system of prevention and mitigation of extreme events. Examples of nodes are command posts,
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managers who manage facilities, sensors such as radar or satellites images, sensors such as
tsunami warning alerts, or a commander and his staff.
The existence of a plan, such as the Emergency Operations Plan described in National
Incident Management System (NIMS, 2004), is significant for making some hypotheses
regarding the future performance of the organization. This research identifies the initial
configuration of an organization as a structure composed by nodes, connections, resources, tasks,
and several procedures which are fired depending of the type of extreme event.
The evolution of an extreme event causes the structure of the organization to change.
Therefore, new connections, messages, resources, and procedures are generated, making it
extremely hard to evaluate this type of system.
There are similar patterns in how historically different emergency response organizations
have reacted facing extreme events. This research illustrates and identifies those patterns as
elements either to incorporate or analyze in a synthetic scenario. We argued that if the
emergency response organization, in all the levels of reaction, has a clear incident management
system, then it will be possible to identify vulnerabilities making use of mathematical techniques
and simulation paradigms.
This hybrid simulation methodology presents two techniques for analyzing the initial
layout of an emergency response organization – social network and linear programming. This
effort aims to identify areas in which both techniques can produce a synergy for evaluating the
initial structure of the organization.
Since graph theory and structural statistical analysis have enabled the development of
many social network techniques, based on sociograms and matrices, we will use those
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approaches for understanding, evaluating, and predicting the performance of an emergency
response organization that performs its tasks in a networked decision making scenario.
Someone could ask: why do we not directly apply graph theory in a network centric
environment? The answer is simple: in past decades, researchers from the field of psychology
have conducted a vast number of experiments to model and to evaluate the relationships among
social entities; we argue that an emergency response organization is a social entity in which
teams, leaders, supporters, decision makers, devices, machines and so on, are all integrated for
protecting society before and after an extreme event. Therefore, a hybrid simulation that
incorporates a mathematical interpretation of the dynamic relationships of different objects in a
networked scenario could enhance the current response systems and plans for disaster
management.

Methodology for developing a NCDM analysis
The way we will conduct this study is similar to the hybrid methodology proposed and only
different in the analysis of five recent extreme events made with the purpose of detecting the
features most significant for modeling and testing the different simulation techniques. Figure 6
shows the steps considered, and they are explained below:
•

Determine the organizational structure based on network centric concepts and
contingency theory. Two critical documents provide a good portion of this information:
the Incident Command System (ICS, 2005) and the Emergency Operation Plan (EOP).
The use of databases (from command/control or training systems) could provide a more
accurate structure of the nodes and their tasks.

54

•

Using SNA technique and linear programming (LP), analyze the emergency
organizational structure. The predictive outcomes should be shown to decision makers
and stakeholders in order to infer the organizational behavior.

•

Identify the critical events according to the EOP of the jurisdiction. Parameters should be
entered according to the manner defined in this research.

•

If data exists, conduct a structural analysis (multivariate analysis) in order to identify
correlated data. This information could be obtained from databases, surveys, expert
interviews, and organization in the loop.

•

Identify the features most appropriate in DES, SD, and ABM for modeling the objects,
attributes, and flows that represent the organizational structure under an extreme event.

•

Test the interoperability of models, variables, and parameters among the three simulation
techniques. Calibrate the model.

•

Select a timeframe for capturing the matrix of relationships among the nodes; then apply
network analysis for testing the evolution of the organization. Notice that so far, we are
dealing with the simulation model, but the possibility is still open for applying network
analysis to the organization in the loop or to a command and control system in real time.

•

If data exists, statistical analysis should be made in order to compare synthetic data
(obtained from simulation) and data obtained from the organization in the loop. Provide
measures of validation of the model.

•

If the model can be validated, then conduct a design of experiment (DOE) for optimizing
either the structure or EOP of the organization.

•

If the model can be validated, define metrics and testing for identifying vulnerabilities in
the organizational structure.
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•

Use the model to support the AAR in real scenarios and training organization in the loop
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Figure 6: Methodology for implementing the hybrid simulation
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Questions for testing in the simulated hybrid model
We define two types of questions for testing the hybrid simulation model.

Technical questions
•

What features of an emergency response organization are possible to simulate in a
networked scenario?

•

Is there a more suitable simulation technique for modeling the interactions among nodes
in an emergency management organization? (Testing best candidate simulation
technique)

•

How could two simulation techniques work together in a network centric scenario?

•

How could a model enhance its usefulness when combined with graph theory?

•

What mechanism of control could a modeler use for controlling a hybrid simulation?

•

Is it possible to combine team performance with flows and tasks carried out by nodes in
an emergency organization structure?

•

Can the hybrid simulation be validated for predicting performance of an emergency
organizational structure?

Operational questions
•

What social network metrics are more significant for designing an organizational
structure?

•

Does the network diameter increase or decrease in an organizational structure when it
faces an extreme event?
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•

How could the position and performance of a node in the network determine the behavior
of the whole organization?

•

How could the agent technique improve the validation of a NCDM scenario?

•

Is the hybrid model simple enough to be used for decision makers and stakeholders to
improve their ICS and EOP?

•

Could the hybrid model be suitable for supporting the AAR of a real disaster
independently of its size and location?

•

Does the hybrid model improve organizational learning and lesson learned concepts?

Assumption for modeling scenarios (types of events)
We make a new categorization of extreme events based on the necessity for quantifying
the concept of an extreme event. Some of the properties and implications defined by Sarewitz
and Pielke (2000) are utilized in the elaborated categorization.
In the context of this dissertation, “scenarios” are defined as the combination of events,
organizational deployments, tasks, resources, and policies for facing extreme events. These four
characteristics allow visualization of a preliminary layout for modeling a NCDM environment.
At the same time, the scenario definition provides a framework for developing a mathematical
approach to the interrelationships produced among all the nodes which make up an emergency
organization.
We define an extreme event in an organizational context: “Extreme event is an n
dimensional vector which has two attributes named magnitude and direction. The dimension n is
a function of the number of nodes which turn out to be affected, the event consequence is
represented by the vector magnitude and the area affected is represented by the vector direction.”
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According to this definition, in an organization with n nodes, we are able to identify three types
of events: The first affects only one set of nodes and is known as an isolated event (IE); the
second one affects n - k nodes (1< k <n ) and is known as a partial event (PE), and the third one
affects the whole organization (many jurisdictions) and is known as a universal event (UE).
Figure 7 shows an extreme event affecting an organizational emergency structure.

Extreme event IE affects only
one set of nodes, at location 1
with magnitude 10.

Extreme event PE affects two
sets of nodes, at location 1
and 2 with magnitude 12.

Extreme event CE affects
many places with magnitude
15.

Figure 7: Classification for modeling extreme events

For instance, we can characterize one event as PE [3, 12, 5, 4], which means that this is a partial
extreme event affecting 3 sets of nodes with magnitude 5, at 12 locations and it hits the locations
at time 4. Note that the characterization will enable the measurement of performance in the
organizational structure as a whole, since the type of event and its associated attributes will
produce different reactions in the complete emergency structure, according to the fixed
procedures previously designed by the organization.
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A contrast between the classification formulated by Sarewitz and Pielke (2000) and the
classification formulated in this research is shown in Table 13. We estimate that the vector
representation allows preserving four properties from Table 3.

Table 13: Contrast between Sarewitz and Pielke (2000) extreme event properties and those
proposed in this research
Properties
Rare

High
consequence
Time pressure
Affects large
numbers of
people and/or
large
ecosystems.

Implications for decision making
Little opportunity for learning.
Relevant experience may be
lacking.
Rare events may control system
evolution.
Attention will be focused on the
event.
Decisions matter.
Limited time for analysis.
Stress producing.
Group decision, leadership,
government action, trust, and
cooperation/communication
among stakeholders are important
for the implementation of
effective decisions.

X1= Number of nodes
X2= Event magnitude
X3=Number of locations
affected

X4=Event time

Vector for modeling
different events.

Main characteristics of an organization facing extreme event scenario
In order to identify the main characteristics that an organization depicts facing extreme
events, we analyzed five cases in which natural and man made disasters have produced a huge
impact in the population. Our attempt was to identify the most significant variables, nodes,
flows resources, chains of command, sequences, signals, and others quantitative factors required
for modeling the behavior of an emergency response organization. These are the events
analyzed:
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•

Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, 1986, Ukraine (Appendix A)

•

Oklahoma City Bombing, 1995, USA (Appendix A)

•

Kobe Earthquake, 1995, Japan (Appendix A)

•

Hurricane Mitch, 1998, Central America (Appendix A)

•

Hurricane Katrina 2005, USA (Appendix A)
The five cases analyzed have in common that all of them could have had defined

emergency procedures based upon information technology. Nevertheless, according to our
research, only Hurricane Katrina encompasses all the characteristics required to be characterized
as a NCDM scenario mainly because there are organizational and machine behaviors collected in
the database of the C2 systems.
The findings found in each event are presented in Appendix A with the structure shown in Table
14.

Table 14: Attributes used for analyzing the five cases of extreme events
Extreme event
Features for modeling

Classification for
modeling
Lesson learned

Define scenario
Information flow and resources flow.
Disaster planning.
Communication system.
Situation awareness.
Interoperability.
Human Factors.
Chain of command.
According to size, level, and
consequences.
Hints at direction for the simulation
and after action review.
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After analyzing the most significant factors in the deployment of an emergency response
organization, we built Table 15 based on nine factors. Conclusions regarding the features useful
for modeling and selecting the most suitable simulation technique are presented at the end of this
chapter.

Table 15: Comparing extreme events
Factors

Oklahoma
Bombing
1995

Extreme event

Isolated event:
Bombing

Area affected

Small area into
Oklahoma City.
Perimeter was
rapidly
delimited.

Actors

Scalable
participation of
nodes.
Local reaction
was clearly
significant.

Kobe
Earthquake
1995

Mitch
Hurricane
1998

Earthquake
followed by
fires in urban
areas.
Disruption of
public
infrastructure
Three main
Japanese cities.
Largest area but
very well
delimited.

Hurricane
followed by
floods and
disruption of
public
infrastructure

Many nodes
were involved
for several
days.
No well
defined
jurisdiction,
unclear chain of
command,
confused
response plan.
Not all the
resources
available were
used.

Many
organizations
without any
coordination.
Lack of unity of
control.
Lack of
command.
No well defined
jurisdiction.

63

Largest area
affected by three
days, three
countries
suffered the
consequences
simultaneously

Chernobyl
Nuclear
Disaster
1986
Isolated event:
Reactor
explosion
Extreme
consequences
at the time
Initially a
small area
which evolved
toward a
continuous
event that
involved
several
countries.
Scalable
participation,
from the local
to national
authorities.
Required
specialized
commander in
the incident
zone.

Katrina
Hurricane
2005
Hurricane
followed by
floods and
looting,
disruption of
public
infrastructure
Extense and
dynamic area;
there was an
evolution of
the magnitude
of the event at
the time.
Nodes from
Federal, State
and Local
level were
involved
gradually.
Local
authorities
played the
main role.
Delimited
jurisdiction.

Factors

Oklahoma
Bombing
1995

Kobe
Earthquake
1995

Mitch
Hurricane
1998

Data base
available

Only semantic
documentation.
No
quantification
of sequences.

Only generic
reports or
focusing over a
factor.
No
quantification
of sequences.

Only semantic
documentation.
No
quantification
of sequences.

Decision
Making Process

Clear. Flows
could be
identified and
modeled
making use of
surveys.

Poor, difficult
to model chain
of command.

Unclear, it is
difficult to
identify chain
of command.
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Chernobyl
Nuclear
Disaster
1986
Lots of
research from
a technical
perspective, no
decision
making
analysis.
Sequence
defined by the
evolution of
the event.

Confusing and
there is only
generic
information.
Technical data
available but
this does not
have
relationship
with decision
making
process.

Katrina
Hurricane
2005
Yes, not
public domain.
Federal
government
reported a
quantitative
analysis.
Clear
sequences of
the reaction
of different
levels, clear
delays in
some
authorities.
The best
extreme event
suited from the
perspective of
decision
making
process. Good
chance for
modeling if
all data were
available in
the database
of the
command
and control
systems.

Factors

Readiness

Oklahoma
Bombing
1995

Kobe
Earthquake
1995

Mitch
Hurricane
1998

Chernobyl
Nuclear
Disaster
1986

Katrina
Hurricane
2005

No, mainly by
the absence of
previous attacks.
No documented
training before
the attack, or
any simulation
model studied
before of the
attack.

Yes, for the
previous
experience of
Japan in Earthquakes.
Documented
training at the
local level. No
simulation
model known
for studying
organizational
response.

No, civilian and
military
authorities were
unprepared for
an event of that
magnitude.
No training
before the
event, no
simulation
model for
analyzing a
best response.

No, reactions
were assumed
according to
the evolution
of the event.
Training was
made at level
of technical
people who
managed the
plant, no
organizational
training, no
simulation
model known
for studying
organizational
response.

Unclear and
only based on
physical
communication.

No
Lack of
interoperability information
available.
prevented
communications
among different
groups and
agencies.

Yes, based on
National
Incident
Management
System.
(NIMS)
No training
known for
facing
Hurricane,
but previous
events
provided the
best lessons
for
diminishing
the
consequences.
No simulation
model
regarding to
NIMS is
known so far.
Initially very
well defined.

Based on Local
authorities, but
lack of unified
command.
National
government
did not realize
the magnitude
of the event.

No sustained
Command and
Control.

Communication Yes, event
systems
affected small
portion of
telephone
system, but
demand
collapsed the
system. Problem
with
interoperability
of radios in
local authorities.
Command and
Yes.
Control
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Confusion in
the first three
days. National
government
did not realize
the magnitude
of the event.

Confusion.
National
government
did not
realize the
magnitude of
the event.

Factors

Situation
Awareness

Oklahoma
Bombing
1995

Kobe
Earthquake
1995

Mitch
Hurricane
1998

Chernobyl
Nuclear
Disaster
1986

Katrina
Hurricane
2005

Very well
defined likely
by the
characteristic of
local event.
It assumed a
useful use of
remote sensors
like satellite
images and
GPS.

Poor, local
authorities did
not transfer
their
assessments to
other levels
and horizontal
agencies.
It is assumed
deficient use of
sensors
available since
they were not
used on time.

Event
magnitude did
not permit
assessment of
the situation
mainly because
the agencies in
charge of this
activity also
were affected by
the event.
No known use
of sensors.

Unclear, the
worst situation
awareness in
the five events
analyzed. The
magnitude of
the event only
was known
days after the
explosion.

The magnitude
of the event
did not allow
situation
awareness as
defined by
the National
Response
Plan (NRP)
and Incident
Command
System (ICS).

We formulated four conclusions useful for implementing a conceptual design of a network
centric scenario.

Conclusion 1: Organizational behavior and interactions among the nodes
We concluded that there exist three types of behavior in a network centric scenario:
causal, discrete, and internal behavior.
Causal behavior triggers the sequence of reaction in an organization, this coming from

either a natural or man made origin. In the context of extreme events, causal behavior can be
represented as a continuous or discrete variable. Notice that we are not interested in modeling the
physics, chemical or atmospheric characteristics of the event; our primary concern is to model
the signals emitted by the event which fires the organizational reaction.
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Those signals have different interpretations, and should be defined in the plans and
management systems of an organization. Thus a type of signal could fire the reaction of a single
local level, and consecutive signals could point out that it is necessary to involve multiple
jurisdictions. Causal behavior is a candidate to be modeled as continuous or discrete signals in a
NCDM scenario.
Discrete behaviors are the pair-wise interactions between the nodes of an organization.

Usually the incident reports, textual research, and technical analysis refer to the discrete
behavior as flows. Nevertheless, in order to model different transactions in the network, the

modeler will need to distinguish between types of flows. For instance, the primary concern in a
disaster is to keep the communication systems working, and the interactions produced through
those communication systems should be modeled as discrete entities. SD technique identifies
those flows as information and resources. We take those expressions, but since our model is
more rich in detail, we differentiate among different type of information and resources.
Internal behavior is shown by the teams, task forces, agencies, commander’s staff, etc; it is the

most difficult part for modeling and validating and involves the decision making process, we will
suggest a internal discrete behavior based on discrete entities.

Conclusion 2: Data available for modeling the NCDM scenario
According to the five cases summarized for purposing the model, we defined three types of data:
“semantic data,” “qualitative data” and “quantitative data.”
Qualitative data is included in reports, public reviews, researches findings, and media

reports. Qualitative data refers only to the event and its context. Always it describes the
consequences of the extreme event as a function of the population affected and the public and
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private infrastructure damaged. The main actors are clearly identified. Most of the time
qualitative data contain fuzzy numerical data as an attribute of a determined situation.
Semantic data is included in technical reports, after action reviews, plans to manage

incidents, and format messages used in the command and control system of the organization. The
National Incident Management System (NIMS, 2004) and Incident Command System (ICS) in
the USA are classic examples of semantic data.
Quantitative data is numerical data used in a specific context, and it describes a process

by mean of quantities, timing, and sequences. This data can be obtained only from two sources:
either databases of the command and control systems that the organization used for dealing with
the emergency or a very well defined survey made in the after action review of the event that
includes all the critical actors in the event.
Semantic and quantitative data for modeling and simulating the deployment and posterior

evolution of an organization will depend on the command and control systems that the
organization had before, during, and after the extreme event, and the plans and incident
command systems that the organization implemented before the extreme event.
For instance Hurricane Katrina is the event with the most data available for modeling the
behavior of the complete deployment that the incident command system did at the local, state,
and federal level. The reason is because there was a standardized management system used in all
the levels and a command and control system which supported the collection of digital data for
subsequent analysis. No other extreme event in the history of the extreme events has recorded the
data required for modeling what happened, how it happened, and how the incident systems can
be improved in the future.
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In conclusion, data available for modeling a NCDM exists only in the database of the
command and control systems of the organization; complementary data could be obtained from
surveys and after action reviews collected from real people who were involved in the real
extreme events.

Conclusion 3: Time scale and space scale in a NCDM scenario
The mapping between a simulated environment and the timing collected from the real events
does not permit simulating time scale and space. The granularity of a network requires that each
critical object, named “node,” depicts its behavior simultaneously with other nodes. Thus the
synchronization of the procedures only could be made if we consider one scale of time.
The space scale is not considered in this methodology, since our effort aims to understand
the topological interactions among the nodes independently of their geographic location.

Conclusion 4: Main problems performed by an incident command system
•

In general there is no assessing of the information to identify which were the priorities in
the process of decision making.

•

Sequences of events are not very well documented with the exception of Katrina.

•

Fuzzy procedures among the nodes yield information overload and delay for the decision
makers.

•

Decision makers in the chain of command have a clear vision of the problem in their
jurisdiction but do not have the complete situation awareness if the extreme event hits
more than one jurisdictional zone. A higher position increases the decision maker’s
situation awareness, but it requires time to build.
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•

A lack of a standardized international structure to implement an incident command
system was identified.

•

After action reports make fuzzy identifications of actors, resources, capacities, and
missions performed during the extreme event.

•

There is no analysis between the correlation of extreme events and team performance.

•

There are no models for simulating the chain of command.

•

There are no distribution probabilities associated to processes, sequences, and flows.

•

After action reports do not show any methodology for increasing situation awareness.

•

Most extreme events report lack of “unity of command” to ensure unity of effort under
one responsible commander for every objective.

•

The integration of human beings and machines such as radar or an alert warning is not
reported or its analysis is scarce in quantitative term.

•

After action reports do not include any measure of performance in the organization.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MODELING DOMAINS AND APPLYING METRICS
INTO AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

Network centric decision making under extreme events: Conceptual domain
Ahvenainen (2003) described the relationships that take place in a network centric
warfare scenario based on three domains: physical, information, and cognitive. These domains
will be used in the context of this research to model the observable relationships when an
organization deals with extreme events.
•

Physical domain: This includes the critical infrastructure which has a strong impact in the
network centric processes. The main problem in this domain is the infrastructure
interdependencies among the critical systems, as only one contingency event may affect
the whole interconnected infrastructure of one or several locations. Therefore, this
methodology provides a framework for incorporating this domain mainly as a continuous
simulation, with feedback loops which may represent with more accuracy the
interdependency among critical infrastructure. Since many of the systems are dependent
upon electric power generation, we will include this topic in our test bed, leaving open
the option for integrating more refined models with another critical infrastructure using
the same technique. As a result, we will attempt to demonstrate how either continuous or
discrete flows of the interconnected infrastructure, could alter the behavior of an
emergency management organization.

•

Information domain: This domain provides the capability to detect, process, and share
information among human beings and machines in the network. According to the five
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cases analyzed previously, we will model information domain as discrete processes in
where there exists an influence of the physical and cognitive domain. Two techniques
were selected for modeling this domain; discrete event simulation and state of transition
techniques.
•

Cognitive domain: We modified the original Ahvenainen concept of the cognitive domain
because our prime goal is to develop a framework for studying the network centric
processes carried out in an organization composed mainly of teams and task forces. We
will concentrate our research on providing a mechanism to model how an extreme event
could disrupt the procedures and tasks that a group of persons must carry out in an
extreme event.
Making use of the Yerkes-Dodson curve, we will depict the curvilinear between stress

and performance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), and based on a System Dynamics technique we will
incorporate the effects of the Yerkes-Dodson curve in an overall model (Rudolph, et al. 2002).
Nevertheless, the methodology will still be open for incorporating other models either for team
performance or cognitive decision makers’ processes.
Figure 8 presents the interaction between each domain and the best candidate simulation
tools to be tested in a hybrid simulation methodology.
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Figure 8: Simulation techniques by domains

In order to model the main scenario’s interactions, we will use the three main simulation
paradigms and the technique of social networks, which supports its analysis in graph theory.
After comparing the manuals, plans, and disaster procedures used for three countries
(USA, Chile, and Honduras) and the reviews made by the United Nations, we concluded that
there does not exist any standardized international design for dealing with the organizational
structure, terminology, incident procedures, and interoperability in the management of extreme
events.
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Because of the lack of standards in this field, we will make use of terminology, structure,
and procedures accessible in the National Incident Management System (NIMS, 2004) which
coordinates federal, state, and local organizations to manage domestic incidents.
We suggest the hybrid simulation methodology based on the following assumptions:
•

In a network centric scenario, the agents, processes, and alarms must be previously
documented in an EOP, and historic data of the interactions of the emergency
management organization should be available for performing a structural analysis.

•

The network centric scenario can only be modeled if there exists a comprehensible
structure of relationships, procedures, and hierarchies between the levels of decision
making.

•

The agents depict a discrete behavior and they transfer messages and resources in the
network according to the extreme event evolution.

•

The agents make contact with other agents using the allowed channels previously
established in the plans and EOP.

•

Agents’ behaviors are highly dependent of the position that they have in the emergency
management organization and of the type of extreme event that affects their jurisdiction.

•

The network centric processes include interactions between human beings, remote
sensors, and “intelligent” machines.
These assumptions are an effort to capture the main quantitative interactions of an

emergency management organization which performs its tasks in a network centric environment
modeled mainly as discrete and continuous flows.
In this chapter, we propose to study the changes in the topology of the organization by
mean of graph’s index and by testing hypotheses based upon Monte Carlo simulations of random
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and scale free networks. Throughout the methodology, we will combine an object oriented
modeling approach with graph analysis, allowing investigation of complex emergency
management organizations, especially when data is available. Because of the strong relationship
between social network theory and graph theory, we will use both theories as similar terms for
referring to the network centric processes.

Components of a network centric scenario and levels of aggregation
The level of fidelity of a simulated system is strongly dependent on the granularity that
the modeler can incorporate in the model. While a high level of decomposition can imply an
ability to simulate complex behaviors and their interactions, a low level of granularity could be
easier for simulating, but likely less inference could be made from its outcomes.
Our approach enables us to make a mapping one to one between the real agents in an
emergency management organization and the simulated entities in the model. This supports the
hypothesis that if data is available, then it is possible to replicate some portion of how the agents
perform their tasks when an extreme event affects their jurisdiction.
The benefits derived from a granularity one-to-one are multiple. For instance, it avoids
dealing with several aggregation levels in the simulation, allows a direct mapping between real
data and simulated data, and allows analysis of the significance of an individual agent in the
organization.
Thus, we propose a methodology that distinguishes between the measures of performance
for the agents’ properties and measures of performance for the entire emergency management
organization.
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A high level of granularity and fidelity require that the organization be modeled as a set
of agents. In the context of this research, we will use the term nodes for referring to the agents
which are components of an emergency management organization. A node depicts toward its
surrounding environment a discrete behavior which must be validated with historical data. The
relationships between the nodes generate a network which represents the organizational
interactions for responding to extreme events. We will refer to those relationships as flows. The
overall network behavior arises from the isomorphism flows yield between two nodes, which are
named dyad flows.
The nodes are critical objects, which could carry out the following tasks:
•

Receiving data and resources and transferring those to others nodes.

•

Receiving, processing, and transferring the data and resources to others nodes.

•

Producing data derived of their perception of the environment and transferring it to others
nodes.

In time, some nodes modify their relationships with other nodes, according to the
dynamics changes in the network centric environment. The set of changes through time is called
longitudinal network.

The flows carry pieces of data which we call messages. Using the SD terminology, we
say that the flows can transfer either information or resources. The messages can have attributes
according to the node sender.
To test the hybrid simulation methodology, we define six types of primitive nodal
classes, each one with different internal objects and parameters. This approach enables us to
replicate hundreds of nodes performing their interactions over the network based on six types of
behaviors. In fact, we are providing a methodology for testing the mathematical structure of a
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graph merged with object oriented simulation technique, and thus take advantages of the synergy
of both techniques.
Table 16 shows the nodes classification and their attributes; this categorization is a
simplification based on the literature review and the current emergency management systems.
Nevertheless the methodology remains open for incorporating new type of nodes.

Table 16: Types of nodes modeled in the test bed
Classes

Who ( examples)

Attributes

1.Decision Makers

Chief of Federal
Government.
State Governor
Mayor
Commander Incident
Chief of Local Police

Command according to the rules of incident
command system.
At the lower level has a shorter chain of
command.
Have available resources.
Require information to make decisions.
Span of control no more than five nodes

2. Staff-Planning

Operational Officer
Logistics Officer.
Intelligence Officer.
Agencies
Departments

3.Situation Awareness

Analysis Group
Map Situation
Data Base
People in charge of logistics
resources.
Chief of facilities.
Hospital Director.
Police, Fire Fighter, National
Guard, Ambulances.

Present a high skill in their field.
Require data for supporting the decision
Maker.
Close contact with the decision maker.
Their opinions can be non conclusive.
Propose alternatives to the decision maker.
Coordinate with other decision makers.
Provide contingency and timely information
to other classes.
In charge of keeping the big picture.
Public and private entities which have
resources available for supporting the tasks
decided by the decision maker.

4. Support

5.Task Forces

6.Sensors

Satellites, Radar, Warning
Alert System.

Work on the ground. Usually have double
dependency from incident commander and
their own authorities.
Send signal according to defined rules.
Sometime provide the first warning alarm.
Supporting to situation awareness nodes.

The aggregation level enables n nodes which are instances of the six classes previously defined.
The incorporation of individual node parameters permits us to distinguish among the different
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object behaviors. The attributes showed in the six classes allow allocating to the node (class) in
the network structure.

Sequence for evaluating the networked centric structure
Figure 9 shows a holistic approach of the steps considered for evaluating the structure
and performance of the emergency management organization. The process begins with the
identification of nodes, sequences, and procedures. In absence of data, the best sources for
capturing the organizational structure are the manuals, emergency operation plans, and incident
systems. That documentation contains the standardized mechanisms cross-jurisdictional,
statewide, and interstate “for coordinating response and obtaining assistance during a large-scale
or complex incident” (NIMS, 2004).
Once the nodes and their relationships are identified, an analyst could apply social
network analysis to study the position of the nodes in the network and to examine the
characteristic of the whole network. This step can be enhanced with LP analysis.
The previous analysis corresponds to a static study of the emergency management
organization, and here there are no dynamic interactions among the nodes, but based upon these
results, either the decision makers or stakeholders could formulate hypotheses regarding the
organization’s future performance.
The alerting sequence of the local, state and federal emergency organizations is a function
of the event magnitude. The event or set of events should permit for testing the synthetic
reaction of the chain of command according to the EOP that each authority has generated for
facing the most probably critical situations.
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A significant subject in this methodology is how to simulate the internal nodes’ behavior,
since there exists only scarce data of the interactions in an emergency management organization,
and the modeling of decision making processes have not been adequately explored, modeled, and
validated in the simulation community.
Therefore, we make some abstractions of the internal structure of the nodes’ behavior,
and modeling those as a function of different messages that arrive and depart from a node
according to defined internal rules. If data is available, we propose an intermediate approach for
modeling the internal node structure based upon distribution probabilities.
The methodology proposes a way for selecting the flows of information and resources
more relevant to the emergency management organization; nevertheless this topic should be
tested with real data.
Once the events are detected, then we define a time frame for capturing a new set of
relationships among the nodes. The process is iterative and could continue according to fixed
times.
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Step 1
Identify nodes,
sequences and
procedures in the
organization.

Step 4
Make hypothesis
regarding future
organization
performance

Step 7
Define flows and
messages for
transferring data
between the nodes.

Step 10
Send randomly a
vector event for
exciting the
organization.

Step 2

Step 3

Build as many as
matrixes to represent
the organization
layout.

Apply social network
analysis and LP to
the matrixes.

Step 5

Step 6

Define the events
according to the
organizational
objectives.

Step 8
Define a cognitive
model for
organizational
performance.

Step 11
At time N get a new
matrix based on the
current simulation
status.

Define a discrete
behavior for each
node in the
organization.

Step 9
Test the dynamic
simulation with
discrete and cognitive
models.

Step 12
Analyze, modify, and
back to step 3.

Figure 9: Steps for modeling an emergency management organization
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Applying graph theory to the network centric decision making
We describe an emergency management organization by using graph theory, a graph G
= (N, L) is defined by a node set N = (n1, n2… nn) and an edge set L = ( l1, l2, …. lL ), elements of
the Cartesian product N x N ={ (n,z)/n ε N, z ε N }. (Adaptation, Degenne & Forse, 1999;
Wassermann & Faust, 1994).
The graph G presents n nodes and lL edges; the total number of nodes in G is called the
graph’s order. The connections among the nodes are called arcs when the graph is directed and
edges when the connections are undirected. In a directed and undirected graph the number of
arcs or edges converging to the node ni is named in-degree and the number of outbound arcs or
edges is named out-degree. The sum of both indexes is called node degree.
Sometimes we need to use a graph as a set of edges and arcs; in this case:
A graph is an ordered triple G = (N, L,D) where the set N is the node set of the graph G;
L is the set of edges, and D is the set of arcs of G. Notice the difference between the set L
which stands for an undirected set of edges and the set D which stands for a directed set
of arcs. If the set D =∅, the Graph G is undirected, and if the set L =∅, the Graph G is
directed (Doreian, Batagelj & Ferligoj, 2005).
Most of the time, the nodes’ relationships in a hierarchized organization are directed arcs,
especially when a contingency plan points out that the procedures, notifications, and alarms
must follow a determined path among the nodes; in this case each element li ε L must have a
direction. A directed graph is also known as a digraph.
A node is defined as an object which plays a role in the emergency management
organization; that role is designated according to Table 16. In order to define the protocols of
relationships, affiliations, and attributes of the different nodes, we consider three types of
variables by each set of nodes (Netminer, 2005):
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•

Adjacency variables: Describing a set of relationships among the nodes using directed

graphs and weights. We could find more than one adjacency variables in an emergency
management organization. Each adjacency variable is a layer, and we could analyze
simultaneously several layers of organizational interactions.
•

Affiliation variables: Describing the clusters of relationships produced between subsets

of nodes. The affiliation variables can be analyzed by using three main methods: comembership, overlap, and bipartite matrixes. Affiliation variable enable us to analyze the
behavior of nodes which participate simultaneously in different events. The simulation
community has not given enough attention to this variable due to the difficulty in
controlling object behavior performed simultaneously in different scenarios.
•

Attributes variables: Describing the individual attributes of each node. The attributes

incorporated have discrete values.
We classified and described the network’s characteristics and node’s measures more
suitable for this research. The starting point is the mode concept which explains how many sets
of nodes are used in the network analysis. The most frequent social network studies consider
one-mode, two-mode and ego-centered networks analysis.

A one-mode network analysis is the study made over the graph G = (X, U) cited at the
beginning of this chapter.
A two-mode network considers the analysis of the graph N= (U1, U2, R, w), where the
first network is denoted by U1={ u1,u2,…un} and the second network is denoted by U2=
{v1,v2,…vn} with U1∩ U2 =∅; the relation R ⊆ U1 x U2 is the set of edges between the nodes in
U1 and nodes in U2; the w represents the weight in the graph. (Doreian, Batagelj & Ferligoj,

2005). Researches have given little importance to multi-modal analysis with more than two
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modes; nevertheless this kind of network provides a rich structure for understanding the
organization performance with multiples tasks in different scenarios. We will analyze in depth
the two-mode network and will leave the methodology open for a higher modal analysis when
there exists more tools and research on this topic.
An ego-centered network analysis makes a quantitative analysis of a focal node, named
ego, and their adjacent nodes and connections. The ego-network of the node ni contains all the

sub-networks which are focusing on node ni. The most significant tool for analyzing an egonetwork configuration is the concept of triad, which will be explained in depth because it has

significant statistical consequences for the analysis of the whole network.
A complementary approach considers two classifications: individual networks parameters and
global networks parameters. Buskenks (2002) stated that in the context of information diffusion

rates, some conjectures regarding the effects of individual and network parameters can be made
to predict the performance of the network.
Since a network-centric structure is strongly related with a one-mode network, we will
use this configuration as a major source of network analysis. Complementary, to gain insight on
the organizational structure, we use two-mode analysis and ego-centered analysis. Nodes’
features that are not derived from their structural location in the network are named attributes
and they improve the analysis of one-mode network analysis. This research models a framework
which could be adaptable to any organization, independently of the type of extreme event.
According to the empirical evidence found in the five cases analyzed and although the local,
state, and federal authorities play the main roles dealing with extreme events, we incorporate the
nodes that represent nongovernmental organizations and private entities which also play a
relevant role in an extreme event.
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The processes of decision making in emergency structures are scalable and depend on the
size and type of the extreme event. In order to identify the complexity that arises in the
organizational interaction, we designed a test bed, based upon ICS (NIMS, 2004). Thirty-seven
nodes were situated in an adjacency matrix, which represents an emergency organization
(Appendix 2). The relationships, affiliations, and attributes of the organization were arbitrarily
located according to conventional EOP. Figure 10 shows the digraph derived from the adjacency
matrix.
The digraph shows the relationships between the components of an ICS and it includes
the chain of command in the organization. In order to deal with complexity similar to that found
in a real scenario, we incorporated a vector partition in the matrix to assign nodes to the federal,
state, and local levels.

Figure 10: Adjacency matrix used in the test bed of an emergency organizational structure
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To increase the association between graph theory and simulation techniques, we identify
five types of nodes and one type of arc in the adjacency matrix which could be modeled in either
a discrete or continuous model (see Table 17).

Table 17: Nodes classification in the adjacency matrix
Isolate nodes

Degree equal to 0

Transmitter nodes

In-degree is equal to 0, but Out-degree has a value.

Receiver nodes

In-degree has a value, but Out-degree is equal to 0.

Carrier nodes

The measures of In-degree and Out-degree are equal to one

Ordinary nodes

In-degree and Out-degree are greater than 1.

Bridge node

If it is removed, would disconnect the network

Networks and measures classification
In Figure 11 we suggest a network classification, a set of nodes’ properties and arcs’
features which can be used for testing a complex emergency management organization. The
mathematical foundation of each property is explained in the context of an emergency
organization, and we propose in advance some relationships of those properties with either a
discrete event simulation or system dynamics model.
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Networks
Random - Small Word - Regular Network - Scale Free - Hierarchical

One-Mode

Node Level
Analysis
Centrality Measures
Degree Centralization
Betweenness
Closeness
Eigenvalue
Neighbor Measures
Degree
Ego-net
Connection Measures
Shortest Path
Dependency
Connectivity
Accessibility

Two-Mode

Subset and Network
Level Analysis

Subset Measures
Dyad
Triad
Network measures
Density
Average degree
Inclusiveness
Reciprocity
Transitivity
Clustering Coefficient
Mean Distance
Diameter
Connectedness
Efficiency
Hierarchy
LUB

Affiliation Measures

Rates
Event size
Reachability
Connectedness

Others measures
Based on attributes

Figure 11: Classification of networks and nodes properties
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•

Random Network (RN): Nodes are connected with others nodes according to a specific

distribution. This type of network has particular properties such as a large variation between
nodes’ paths, low clustering, and random topology. Three main distributions are used for
generating RN are uniform, normal, and Bernoulli, if the network has one of the named
distributions then we state that they have a scale.
o Over a network centric scenario, it is significant to understand the main
implications of the RN behavior, since we may predict the performance of the
organizational structure if it presents a similar configuration to that identified in a
RN. Care (2005) proposed a minimum of fifty nodes in order to guarantee

common properties in the digraph. The type of properties will depend on of the
analysis carried out by the organization.
o For instance a digraph with n nodes, generated from a uniform distribution
implies that the probability of choices is

1
2

n ( n −1)

. The idea behind this distribution

is that each possible configuration of an adjacency matrix of n nodes which has a
n ( n −1)
different configurations has the same chance of occurring
sample space of 2

(Adapted from Wassermann et al, 1994).
•

Small World Network (SWN): Network based on Milgram's experiment which showed that

people in different locations are connected by a short chain of persons. This class of networks
is very regular and has good clustering (Cares, 2006). According to Milgram in a SWN, the
geodesic paths do not reach more than six steps (Milgram, 1967).
•

Scale Free Network (SFN): Network with a Power Law distribution of the links among the
−b
nodes, where the probability that a node has exactly k links is P(k ) ≈ k , where b is the

87

degree exponent. The SFN has a large amount of nodes with few connections, and a small
number of nodes, known as hubs, exhibit a large number of connections.
•

Regular Network (REN): Usually named as Lattice networks, REN have the same ratio of

connections among the nodes as the random network, but the clustering coefficient is
uniform, and therefore its structure is more regular.
•

Hierarchical Network (HN): Formed by the structure of an organization, it shows the chain

of command and the formal vertical and horizontal relationships among the nodes. According
to our definition of HN, it could be classified as any of the four networks previously
mentioned.

One–mode network: Measures and implication for an emergency organization

Centrality measures
•

Degree centrality: Standardized measure that shows the proportion of nodes adjacent to

the node ni and the maximum value that could reach the ni in the network. This index
allows comparing different network size.

Degree centrality =

•

d ( ni )
n −1

d (ni ) is the number of nodes adjacent to ni.

Degree centralization: Measure of variation in the degrees of nodes divided by the

maximum degree variation which is possible in a network of the same size. The index can
be used to determine the degree of centralization of the whole network. The index reaches

88

the maximum value 1 when one node ni is connected with the n-1 other nodes, and the
other nodes are connected only with ni.
n

Degree centralization =

*
∑ [C D ( n ) − C D (ni )]

i =1

[(n − 1)(n − 2)]

The C D ( n i ) are the n nodes degree indices, and C D ( n *) is the largest observed value
(Wassermann & Faust, 1994).
•

Betweenness centrality: Over an undirected network, the proportion of all short paths

between pairs of nodes (geodesic path) in the network and the geodesics which go through
the node ni. In an organization, assuming that the information and resources go by a
geodesic path, the nodes with a high betweenness score will be in central positions and will
play a vital role in the flows of information and resources.

Betweenness − centrality(ni ) = C B (ni ) /[(n − 1)(n − 2) / 2]
Where

•

C B ( ni ) =

∑n

jk (

n i ) / n jk

j<k

Betweenness centralization: The variation in the betweenness centrality of vertices divided

by the maximum variation in betweenness centrality scores possible in a network of the
same size.
n

Betweenness centralization =

2∑ [C B (n * ) − C B (ni )]
i =1

[( n − 1) 2 ( n − 2)]
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•

Closeness centrality: Useful index to measure the closeness of a node ni to the other nodes

in the network. It is measured by the inverse of the sum of the distance from a node to all
other nodes, which is normalized by multiplying it by (n-1).

n −1
Closeness (ni ) = n
∑ d (ni, nj )
j =1
For a directed network, each of in-closeness centrality and out-closeness centrality is
measured separately, depending on whether the distances 'from' or 'to' other nodes are
considered. The idea is that a node is central if it can quickly interact with all others.
•

Closeness centralization: To measure group centralization using nodes closeness

centralities. This measure enables us to know the variability of individual closeness
centrality scores (Adapted from Netminer, 2005).

Closeness centralization =

•

n
'
'
*
∑ [C D ( n ) − C D (ni )]

i =1

[(n − 2)( n − 1)] /( 2n − 3)

Eigenvalue (Perron-Frobenius theorem): This measure guarantees that there exists an
eigenvalue which is real and larger than or equal to all other eigenvalues in magnitude.

The largest eigenvalue is often called the Perron-Frobeniuos eigenvalue of the matrix
which is denoted by λ1(C) for a graph C. Further the theorem also states that there exists an
eigenvector of C corresponding to λ1(C), all of whose components are real and non-

negative (Jain & Sandeep, 2002). The eigenvalue allows us to find out the presence or
absence of closed paths in a network structure according to the following proposition:
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If in the network there is no closed walk, then λ1(C) = 0
If in the network there is at least a closed walk, then λ1 (C) ≥ 1
If in the network there is a closed walk and all closed walks only occur in sub-graphs
that are cycles, then λ1 (C) = 1

Figure 12 shows four sub-graphs with different topology (Adapted from Care, 2005)
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Figure 12: Measuring networked effects by using eigenvalues

Neighbor Measures: Set of indexes to evaluate adjacent nodes in a network
•

Degree: Measure to identify the size of the direct connection between the ni node and its

vicinity. The number of flows that are incidents over one node is known as in-degree
measures and the number of flows that a node sends to other nodes is named as outdegree. Both measures allow identifying the type of node and the vulnerability of the

distributed decision making.
•

Structural hole: Show six indicators to evaluate the position of all nodes in the network:

redundancy, efficiency, effective, size, constraint, and hierarchy measures. These
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measures show the separation between non-redundant contacts. Two criteria rule the
creation of a structural hole: cohesion and equivalence.
•

Ego-network: Measure to analyze the local connection structure by each node; this index

calculates the size and density of a selected focal node.

Connection measures in a network
•

Geodesic distance: Index of the length of shortest path between a pair of nodes ni and nj.

The geodesic distance is a function of the power matrix; mathematically it can be found
p
from the formula: d (i, j ) = min p xij > 0 (Wassermann et al., 1994).

•

Dependency: Index to measure how the node ni depends of the node nj when the flows go

to other nodes. The dependency is calculated based on the betweenness centrality’s
process (Netminer 2005). The betweenness centrality of node ni is given by;

∑∑
i

i

g ikj
;i ≠ j ≠ k
g ij

.

Dependency basically shows the number of times that a node ni needs a node nk, whose
centrality is being measured, in order to reach a node nj via the shortest possible path. It
can be interpreted as the control that a certain node has over the amount of flows sent to
other nodes.
•

Connectivity: Measure of the vulnerability of the network. Line connectivity between two

nodes is the minimum number of arcs that must be removed to leave two nodes
disconnected. Notice that the bridge concept arises from line connectivity since a bridge
could leave two subsets of nodes disconnected. Node connectivity is the minimum
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number of nodes that if they are removed can leave a subset of nodes or the whole
organization disconnected.

Subset measures: Dyad and triad

Dyads
The isomorphic contacts between two nodes in the network are called dyads. In fact the
contact or non-contact between two nodes is a sub-network of the whole network. There are
only three ways for how two nodes make contact between them; this concept is known as
“isomorphism states.” If in the adjacency matrix N the values of ( i,j) and ( j,i) are located
symmetrically, the dyad is named “mutual” and it is defined as Dij = ( 1,1) (Wasserman et. al.
1994). If in the adjacency matrix N the values of ( i,j) and ( j,i) are located asymmetrically,
then the connection between the pairs of nodes can occur in two ways, when the Dij = (0,1) and
Dij = (1,0). This kind of dyad is known as asymmetric. If there are no contacts between (i,j) and

(j,i), then the dyad is defined as Dij = Dji = (0,0) and this kind of non-relationship is known as
nulls dyad (see Figure 13).

ni Dij = ( 0,0)

nj

ni Dij = ( 0,1)

nj

ni Dij = ( 1,0)

ni Dij= ( 1,1)

Figure 13: Isomorphic type of dyads
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nj

nj

The implications that dyadic isomorphism types have for a simulated network centric
environment are relevant, from the perspective that our methodology deals with interactions in
the organization, and each isomorphism state represents if there is transference of entities
between two nodes.
The distribution probabilities of the flows will depend on the nature of the node
simulated. For instance, if we assume the behavior of a node ni which is a tsunami sensor located
150 miles from of the coast, we could assume that sensor has a Dij = (1,0) independently of the
nj, which is being fed for the sensor.

On the other hand, we have to consider the external events which govern the behavior of
each node. In the case of a sensor, it reacts to physical events produced by nature, but in the case
of nodes composed by human being, they react to the procedures and rules pointed out in the
emergency planning.
We may represent a Dij = (1, 1) as discrete or continuous flows between ni and nj, where
the internal node behavior will depend on the event’s magnitude and the node’s position in the
organization. According to this research, the dyad is the starting point to find out the
performance of an emergency management organization in a networked environment. The
statistical information derived from the connected pairs of nodes is defined as dyad census, and
these indexes are a function of the matrix N, where:
M= Number of mutually connected pairs of nodes and is computed according to:
Dij = ( 1,1) = (1/2)trace(NN);
A= Numbers of asymmetrically connected pairs of nodes and it is computed according to:
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A = trace(NN’) – trace (NN);
N = Number of not connected nodes and it is computed according to:
Dij = ( 0,0) = n(n-1)/ 2 – trace( NN’) + (1/2)trace(NN’).

Triads
Three nodes (n1,n2,n3) ε N of the graph G = (N, L,D) with L =∅, the sub-graphs derived
from the set T (n1,n2,n3) are called a triad.
We highlight a significant issue: “To capture the structure of a directed network, we must
proceed from dyads to triads” (Nooy, Mrvar, Batagelj , 2005). Lets explain why we consider the

previous statement significant. Under an isomorphism analysis there are sixteen classes of triads.
If we consider that each isomorphism graph represents different types of flows between the three
nodes, we could conjecture a causal dependency between the number of triads and the efficiency
of an emergency organization. In fact there are

(3n ) triads in a graph with n nodes. Figure 14

shows the sixteen types of triads.
The standard for labeling the different types of triads is known in SNA as MAN. Based on
the number of dyads, MAN convention uses three and four characters to identify the type of triad.
The first M digit shows the number of mutual positive dyads. The second one, A, shows the
number of asymmetric dyads, and the third, N, presents the number of null dyads in the triad.
When required, a character is added to show if the triad is transitive (T), cyclic(C), or on its way
is up (U) or down (D).
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1 - 003

2 - 012

3 - 102

4 – 021D

5-021U

6-021C

7-111D

8-111U

9-030T

10-030C

11-201

12-120D

13-120U

14-120C

15-210

16-300

Figure 14: Isomorphism classes in a triad

The rate of repetition of each triad in a configuration is named triad census. It can be
used to predict structural properties in the whole network. The force of the concept of triad
emerges from the analysis of the sixteen types of isomorphism. Only a few networks have triad
censuses that depart substantially from those generated by random networks of the same size and
density. This finding reminds us that the range of possible structural patterns in a social network
is highly constrained by its size and density (Faust, 2005). This assertion presents notable
opportunities for fitting emergency structures composed by hundreds of nodes to random
networks; nevertheless data will be necessary for testing structural hypotheses.
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A similar statement is suggested by Nooy et al, (2005) who pointed out that “It has been
shown that the overall structure of a directed network can be inferred from the type of triads that
occur”.
Both of these arguments confirm that tools exist for predicting complex network centric
behavior. Thus, we could analyze the complete structure of an emergency management
organization by only analyzing the digraphs formed by three nodes. Heider and later Newcomb
developed the balance theory, which provides the foundation for interpreting the quantitative
aspects yielded on triple nodes (Wassermann et al., 1991).
The following are the main features of a network studied from the perspective the
balance theory:
•

A path is a cycle in which the first and last nodes coincide.

•

A cycle is a closed path

•

A semi-cycle is a closed semi-path.

•

A semi-cycle and cycle are balanced if they do not contain an uneven number of mull
dyads.

•

A digraph is balanced if all of its semi-cycles and cycles are balanced.

•

A digraph is balanced if it can be portioned into two clusters such that all arcs are
contained within the clusters and all null dyads are situated between the clusters.

•

A cycle or semi-cycle is clusterable if it does not contain exactly one null dyad.

•

A digraph is clusterable if it can be portioned into clusters such that all arcs are contained
within clusters and all null dyads are situated between clusters.
The theory of structural balance is extremely polarized because the nodes can be

grouped in only two clusters. Table 18 shows that it is possible to relax the balanced model in
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five additional levels. Although the theory of structural balance was intended for applying in the
psychology field, it provides an invaluable mathematical foundation for capturing the
interactions produced in an emergency management system.

Table 18: Balanced theoretic models (Nooy et al, 2005)
Model
Balance

Clusterability

Ranked Cluster

Arcs within a Cluster
Symmetric arcs within a
cluster. No arcs between
clusters.
Max two clusters.
Symmetric arcs within a
cluster. No arcs between
clusters.
No restriction on the
number of clusters.
Symmetric arcs within a
cluster. No arcs between
clusters.
No restriction on the
number of clusters.

Transitivity

Idem

Hierarchical
Clusters

Asymmetric arcs within
a cluster allowed
provided that they are
acyclic.

No Balanced –
Theoretic model .
(Forbidden)

Arcs between Ranks Permitted Triads
None
102
300
None

102
300
003

Asymmetric arcs
from each node to
all nodes on higher
ranks. Null arcs
may occur between
ranks.
Null arcs may occur
between ranks
Idem

102, 300,003, 021D, 021U,
030T, 120D, 120U

Idem

102, 300,003, 021D, 021U,
030T, 120D, 120U, 012
102, 300,003, 021D, 021U,
030T, 120D, 120U, 012,
120C, 210.
021C,111D,111U,030C,201

In the context of this research, triad census and balance theory will support the analysis
of the dynamic flows between the components of an emergency management organization. Since
the organizational structure can be mapped to a digraph, using a simulation technique those
flows will take either continuous or discrete entities produced in the nodes. Thus, this
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methodology merges two different techniques for understanding the complexity that arises in a
networking centric scenario.
We developed two examples for testing different patterns produced in an organizational
structure. The first example shows three hierarchical configurations which could be found in an
ICS (see Table 19). The three configurations have seven nodes, but the rules that control the
flows are given for different dyad interactions. The vector T shows the sixteen triads types
contained in the

(3n ) sub-graphs of each configuration.

Table 19: Three hierarchical configurations for testing the 16 isomorphism triads
A

Mutual Dyads : 0
Asymmetric Dyads: 6
Null Dyads : 15

B

C

Mutual Dyads : 9

Mutual Dyads : 6
Asymmetric Dyads: 0

Asymmetric Dyads: 0
Null Dyads : 12

Null Dyads : 15

Density : 0.143

Density : 0.286

Density : 0.429

TA=[ 12,16,0,3,0,4,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]

TB=[ 12,0,16,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,7,0,0,0,0,0]

TC=[ 4,0,20,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,0,0,0,0,3]

We could state that the model A has a low density and the relationships are asymmetric;
in fact there are 16 asymmetric dyads and Triad 003 and 012 populate with more frequency the
vector TA.
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Could the graph A apply to how we validate configuration in a network centric scenario?
Earlier, we defined network centric decision making as how the interactions of human beings
and machines lead to decision making, then the vector TA might perfectly represent a portion of
the network composed of a set of three sensors which after checking their signals report
automatically their data to four different nodes integrated by human beings.
On the other hand, configuration B and C could present many types of interpretation. We
only argue one respect to the level of situation awareness of an emergency management
organization.
Configuration B shows a classical ICS, with return feedback to the upper authority level
in the chain of command. (The National Incident Management System recommends a span of
control between three and seven nodes (NIMS, 2004).) The interactions only are verticals and it
does not allow horizontal communication. The density of the network is 0.286. Configuration C
increases the mutual dyads in three arcs, since that allows the interactions between nodes at the
same level. Thus the density of C changes to 0.429.
What is the most significant difference between configuration B and C? If we analyze the
level of situation awareness of a commander incident, we realize that configuration C provides
more accurate information than configuration B, since the lower levels had the chance for
checking the observables hints on the ground, and as consequence, the commander incident
avoids confusion and duplicity of effort and he can react quickly to the variations produced in the
complete scenario.
Comparing only the vectors TB and TC, we can say that there are two isomorphic classes
that modify the behavior of the configuration B and C; they are Triad 003 and Triad 300.
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Network measures
•

Density: Proportion of the number of arcs present to the maximum possible on a network.

•

Average degree: Average degree value of all nodes in given network.

•

Inclusiveness: Proportion of all connected nodes to the total number of nodes in the network.

•

Reciprocity: Proportion of the maximum number of reciprocated arcs to the total number of

arcs.
•

Transitivity: The proportion of the number of transitive triads to the number of potentially

triads.
•

Clustering coefficient: Average of all nodes’ clustering coefficients. For each node the

number of connections that could possibly exist between these neighbors is calculated; then
the proportion of the connections that actually does exit is the clustering node coefficient.
•

Mean Distance: Average geodesic distance between any pair of nodes in a network.

•

Diameter: The largest geodesic distance between any pair of nodes in a network.

•

Connectedness: Proportion of nodes which are not mutually reachable and the maximum

number of possible nodes unable to reach other nodes in the network.

⎡
⎤
U
Connectedness = 1 − ⎢
⎥
⎣ N (n − 1) / 2 ⎦
•

Efficiency: A network N with n nodes is composed of Ns sub-networks. The sum of all the

connections over n-1 in N is known as E, and the sum of the maximum number of
connections in Ns is named as Max E. The value of 1 minus the proportion of E and MaxE is
denominated efficiency.
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⎡ E ⎤
Network − efficiency = 1 − ⎢
⎣ MaxE ⎥⎦
•

Hierarchy: For each pair of nodes where ni can reach another nj, the second nj cannot reach

the first ni. The number of unordered pairs of nodes that are symmetrically connected is
named S and the maximum number of unordered pairs of nodes connected between ni and nj
is named MaxS; thus the index of 1 minus the ratio of S and MaxS is known as Hierarchy.

⎡ S ⎤
Hierarchy = 1 − ⎢
⎣ MaxS ⎥⎦
•

LUB (Least Upper Boundedness): “Within each sub-network each pair of nodes (ni and nj)

has at least one least upper bound . An upper bound for a pair of nodes is a third node nk
from which there is a path to each of the pair; a least upper bound is an upper bound nk that
is included in at least one directed path from each other upper bound to each of the pair
(ni,nj). Violations to this condition occur whenever a (ni,nj) pair of points in the sub-network

has no LUB” ( Krackhardt, 1994 ).

⎡ T ⎤
LUB = 1 − ⎢
⎣ MaxT ⎥⎦

where

⎡ ( Nn − 1)( Nn − 2) ⎤
MaxT = ⎢
⎥⎦
2
⎣

Every sub-network has at least Nn -1 connections and then has by definition at least Nn -1
pairs of nodes that do have LUB. Krackhardt (1994) stated that LUB is the most complex
measure to evaluate structure, since it is the only measure in a network sensitive to the
direction of the nodes’ connections. LUB enables us to study the unity of command principle
in our research and to analyze the position of a decision maker in the network centric
scenario.

102

Two-mode network: Definition and implication for NCDM
This kind of network presents two types of node sets in which the one set only can be
connected to the nodes of the other set. Usually in the literature of social network a two-mode
network is called membership network or hypernetwork. The affiliation relation between the set
of networks is referred to as an involvement relation.
The first set of nodes is known as actors and can be denoted as: N = {n1,n2,..nn}. The
second set of nodes is known as events and can be denoted as: M = {m1,m2,..mn}. The affiliation
network matrix is called affiliation matrix and can be denoted as A = {aij}. See Table 20.
The affiliation relation between the vector N and M can also be represented by a bipartite
graph (Wasserman et al, 1994) in which the socio-matrix contains only 0 and 1 and represents
the association between the node and the event. See Figure 15.

Table 20: Affiliation matrix in two-mode
Actor

Event 1

Event 2

Event 3

Node 1

1

1

0

Node 2

1

0

1

Node 3

0

0

1

Node 4

1

0

0

Node 5

0

0

1
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Node 1
Event 1
Node 2
Node 3

Event 2

Node 4
Event 3
Node 5

Figure 15: Bipartite graph to a two-mode network

Sometimes the nodes in a network centric scenario are involved in more than one
simultaneous task. For instance the chief of a department of police, from his command post,
could be making a decision regarding an incident that happened in sectors A and B of his local
jurisdiction simultaneously. In this case a two-mode network could provide a better
understanding of the behavior shown by the decision maker (chief of police) when dealing with
two or more events concurrently. We describe a set of six two-mode metrics (Wasserman et al,
1994):
•

Rate of participation

•

Reachability

•

Event Size

•

Diameter

•

Density

•

Connectedness
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All the measures above are calculated over the bipartite graph but using the technique mentioned
in one-mode network; nevertheless we need to keep in mind that we analyze the participation of
a set of nodes in sets of simultaneous extreme event.

Finding measures for testing in an incident command system
According to the summarized analysis made over the five extreme events (Kobe
Earthquake, Oklahoma Bombing, Mitch Hurricane, Chernobyl nuclear accident, and Hurricane
Katrina) we could identify only in the case of Hurricane Katrina that the authorities had a well
defined general plan for dealing with an extreme event, which is known as National Incident
Management System.
In the others four incidents, there did not exist a clear plan of response, and there also did
not exist any system for integrating the different agencies, authorities, volunteers and non
governmental organizations that were worked on site.
The first question that arises is how can we apply the network metrics in a real scenario
such as the previously studied?
Initially, if an organization has a formal structure with systematized procedures tested in
a training system, then we argue that the emergency management system can be analyzed
analytically in the time T- (before the extreme event occurs) by using the mentioned metrics
combined with LP technique.
From the T0 (time that the alert system is activated) we will require data coming from the
database of the organization. Those data correspond to the interactions produced in a real time
environment and should contain all the attributes necessary for populating the matrixes of a
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hybrid simulation model. Figure 16 shows a schema in which the triad i, j, k performs the
interactions by means of an isomorphic class type 300.

Node i

Node j

Database
Message Attributes

•
•
•
•
•

Type
Time
Sender
Receiver
Classification

Node Attributes
Type
Degree
Tasks
Position
• Resources
•
•
•
•

Node k

Figure 16: Model for capturing the interactions of the triad i, j, k

The process for collecting the information stored in the database with the attributes of the
nodes i, j and k can generate plausible arcs which represent the interactions and their attributes.
Notice that the scheme shown in Figure 16 is relatively simple to implement whether the
organization has available either a command and control system or a training system for
collecting data coming from an organization in the loop.
Since the dyads are not persistent during the development of a crisis, the relationships
between two nodes could be in three different states: mutual, asymmetric or null.
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Therefore, we suggest that the systems more suitable for capturing those dynamics states
are built over information technology.
According to the network classification, a second question arises in our methodology:
Could an emergency structure fit either a random or scale free network?
We proved that the organization structure is well defined in the EOP and ICS. Thus, nodes,
positions, sequences and arcs can be collected from those documents and mapped to a simulated
network. At this point, there are no dynamic interactions among the nodes, but surveys,
interviews and analyses of the historic incidents could be useful tools for fitting the layout of the
organization to a network model whose statistical parameters are known.
On the other hand, once that emergency management organization is activated, the
relationships between the nodes change according to how the situation evolves. Here we will
require the mentioned systems based on technology of information for gathering those
interactions. For instance, suppose that the different components of the organization can be fitted
with a random network of size n and number of connections l, and suppose that we found that the
uniform distribution is the best suitable distribution for analyzing the complex nodes’ interaction
in the organization. Using the equation P (N=n), we could generate the adjacency matrix A
distributed as a uniform random variable.

⎡ 1 ⎤
P ( N = n) = ⎢ n ( n−1) ⎥
⎣2
⎦
For comparing how the parameters affect the organizational structure of the random network and
its measures of performance, we defined a longitudinal network in four moments of its evolution:
•

Timeframe 1: Random network with eight nodes and sixteen arcs. Density equal to 0.28.
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•

Timeframe 2: Random network with sixteen nodes and thirty-two arcs. Density equal to
0.13.

•

Timeframe 3: Random network with thirty-two nodes and sixty-four arcs. Density equal
to 0.06.

•

Timeframe 4: Random network with sixty-four nodes and one hundred twenty-eight arcs.
Density equal to 0.03.

Timeframe 2: Random Network with 16
nodes and 32 arcs

Timeframe 4: Random Network with 64
nodes and 128 arcs

Figure 17: Longitudinal network generated with uniform distribution

Table 21 shows eleven metrics found in the longitudinal network. We can identify
dependent patterns in the four moments of the random network. The growth of the longitudinal
network is explained by the incorporation of new nodes to the structure according to the
evolution of the extreme event.
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Table 21: Metrics obtained from four uniform random networks
Nodes

Arcs

Density

Inclusiveness

Reciprocity

Transitivity

Clustering
Coefficient

Mean Distance

Diameter

Connectedness

Efficiency

Hierarchy

8

16

16

LUB

0.28

2

1

0.27

0.64

2.08

5

0.75

0.816

0.25

1

32

0.13

1

0.25

0.07

0.19

2.63

6

0.30

0.92

0.67

0.9

32

64

0.06

1

0.06

0.05

0.17

4.72

11

0.423

0.96

0.53

0.91

64

128

0.03

1

0.03

0.02

0.09

4.34

10

0.427

0.98

0.48

0.90

An alternative model was generated based on the parameters of a scale free network. We assume
that the evolution of the structure of the organization follows a power law behavior. In order to
test the same metrics used for a random network, we generated the second longitudinal scale free
network based on the following parameters:
•

Timeframe 1: Scale free network with eight total nodes and two starting nodes. Density
equal to 0.21.

•

Timeframe 2: Scale free network with sixteen total nodes and four starting nodes..
Density equal to 0.10.

•

Timeframe 3: Scale free network with thirty-two total nodes and eight starting nodes.
Density equal to 0.04.

•

Timeframe 4: Scale free network with sixty-four total nodes and sixteen starting nodes.
Density equal to 0.02.
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Timeframe 1: Scale free network with 2
initial nodes and a total of 8 nodes.

Timeframe 4: Scale free network with 16 initial
nodes and a total of 64 nodes.

Figure 18: Longitudinal scale free network

Table 22: Metrics obtained from four scale free networks
Nodes

Arcs

Density Inclusiveness

Reciprocity

Transitivity

Clustering
Coefficient

Mean
Distance

Diameter

Connectedness

Efficiency

Hierarchy

LUB

8 (2)

12

0.21

1

0

0.125

0.271

1.65

3

0

0.898

1

1

16(4)

24

0.10

0.93

0.0

0.12

0.19

1.61

3

0.0

0.94

1

0.50

32(8)

48

0.04

0.96

0.0

0.033

0.07

2

5

0.0

0.98

1

0.37

64(16)

96

0.02

0.95

0.0

0.008

0.036

2.46

6

0.0

0.99

1

0.30

Table 22 shows eleven metrics found in the longitudinal scale free network. We can identify
dependent patterns in the four moments of the scale free network. With similar arguments we can
say that the growth of the longitudinal network is explained for the incorporation of new nodes to
the structure according to the evolution of the extreme event.
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Applying linear programming in a network centric scenario
The after action analyses carried out for understanding why a huge organization, such as
an ICS, performs well or bad facing an extreme event always have been made from a
qualitative perspective and those analyses never consider analytic tools with numerical results
that support the conclusions of the analysts and stakeholders.
In Appendix A we show that the five cases of extreme events do not consider any form of
quantitative analysis that permits the enhancement of expensive and complex emergency systems
which are usually composed by human beings and intelligent machines.
The Vincennes incident is the exception to the rule, because extensive, detailed and
quantified studies were conducted to determine why a very well-trained crew equipped with an
advanced fire-control defense system failed at a critical event. Those numerical results were
used to improve the human-system interaction technologies and to design better decision support
systems.
Our proposal hereby is a hybrid approach that combines different techniques for
enhancing the analysis and collaborative response to the disasters. In this context we suggest that
LP is one of the techniques (likely the most rigid, but best understood) for improving the
structures of an ICS and also for evaluating the performance of nodes at the federal, state and
local levels.
Notice that throughout this research, we emphasize the word hybrid, which applies such
as the combined interpretation of the role and position of the nodes involved in a LP and SNA.
We have identified four main features that are conducive for applying LP in an incident
management system:
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•

Standardized incident protocols and procedures documented in the EOP which are
mandatory for all responders at federal, state and local-levels to conduct and coordinate
response actions.

•

The implementation of the ICS under the concept of unity of command which specifies
that “each person within an organization reports to one and only one designated person”
to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective (NIMS,
2005).

•

The necessity of integrated planning at the federal, state and local levels, given that the
incidents are managed at the lowest jurisdictional level possible, and the upper levels are
involved as soon as the situation reaches state or national significance.

•

The incident command systems work over a network centric environment and the
networks are well situated to analyze with linear programming.
We suggest three LP models among many other possibilities and we propose to enhance

the interpretation of the LP outcomes by means of SNA technique; signal path optimization
(network flow), deployment of resources (allocation) and data envelopment analysis (evaluation
of performance).
In Appendix B, we show the adjacency matrix which represents a theoretical structure of
an ICS with 37 nodes. Each node must belong to the federal, state or local level. In social
network terminology, the classification levels are known as a partition and it must be
incorporated as an attribute vector of the adjacency matrix. Thus the digraph is shown in Figure
19 according to the centrality values nodes and their partition attributes.
At the federal level, blue nodes are governmental decision makers and agencies. At the
state level green nodes correspond to organizations and agencies, and finally, at the local level,
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red nodes correspond to task forces, mayor, incident commander, police, fire-rescue, private
organizations, etc.

Figure 19: Digraph of an incident command system at federal, state and local levels

By simple visual inspection, we can distinguish the high centralization of two nodes in
the local level: the incident commander and the mayor.
At the state level, the governor is the node with the most incident connections and at the
federal level, the High Emergency Management Agency has the most incident connections.
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One of the most recurrent problems in an ICS is interoperability jurisdiction, which
implies clear delimitation of authority levels, coordinated procedures, balanced assignation of
tasks and synchronized transferring of flows and resources from federal to the state and local
levels. In order to demonstrate how the study of a network centric environment is enhanced by
using LP and SNA, we suggest the use of the Gould and Fernandez’s brokerage measures to
analyze jurisdictional roles of the nodes in a network centric environment. By using the partition
vector, the brokerage index counts the number of times each node is involved in five kinds of
brokerage: coordinator, gatekeeper, representative, itinerant, and liaison relationships (Gould, &
Fernandez, 1989; Netminer, 2005).
Suppose we want to optimize the warning alarm flows sent simultaneously by the nodes
Sensor, Police Department, and Hospital 1. In accordance with the ICS rules and the EOP, we

could arbitrarily state that those data must be first known by two nodes at the local level, three
nodes at the state level, and two nodes at the federal level.
A number of twelve alerts (si) are sent by the three local nodes (gray color). Seven nodes
(white color) feed different number of alerts (si) such as is shown in Figure 20.
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Federal Government

High Emergency Agency
2

3

Sensor

State Governor

5

2

Set of Dyads
Connections
in the ICS
digraph.

Police
3

Hospital

State Situation Map
1

State Situation Map
2

4

1

Mayor

1

Incident Commander

Figure 20: Sender and receptor nodes at three levels

The signal path optimization problem can be formulated as a classical minimum-cost
network flow, where the sender nodes provide certain numbers of warning alert signals ( si ) and

the receptor nodes feed an exact number of si to make decisions about activating the ICS in its
ego-digraph ( dyads connections of the receptors nodes).

We assume the cost of the connections of each dyad is a function of the quality of the link
and the performance of the nodes.
To apply LP the number of alerts sent must be equal to the number of alerts fed by the
nodes, which is represented by the equation:
12

∑s
i =1

i

=0
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If there is an unbalanced alert flow yielded and fed in the digraph, we can apply the
classical technique of dummy variables. Notice that the 27 nodes, which are not considered in
Figure 20, play the significant role of transshipment in the digraph.
By defining the decision variables such as:
x ij = Number of alerts from the node i to the node j along connection i, j in the

digraph.
The minimum cost problem to optimize the warning alert system in the ICS is defined:
177

∑c

Minimize z =

Subject to:

∑x

( i , j )εD

( i , j ) εD

ij

−

ij

x ij

∑x

( j , i ) εD

x ij ≥ 0 for all (i,j)

j ,i

= si

∈ digraph.

The objective function generates the total cost of the selected paths in the digraph, and
the

xij variables show the optimized path for transferring the data from the sender nodes to the

receptor nodes.
Early in the research, we defined the structure of the ICS, in which a vector partitions
reminder us that we are working at three levels of decision making: federal, state and local. How
could we know the patterns of jurisdiction in the ICS due to the implementation of the
optimized path obtained through LP?
In order to deal with the number of times each node is involved in jurisdictional paths,
we use brokerage’s measures to define the patterns of each node in the ICS depending if they
belong to the federal, state of local level.
Figure 21 shows the five brokerages in the context of an ICS.
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State Level

Federal Level

6
7

3

10

11

9
8

2

Local Level

12

4

1
14

13
15

5

Figure 21: Type of brokers according to Gould and Fernandez’s measures

1. Coordinator (n1). Counts the number of times node 1 is a broker:
S(n6) = S(n1) = S(n7)

(State jurisdiction).

2. Gatekeeper (n8). Counts the number of times node 8 is a broker:
S(n2) ≠ F(n8) = F(n9) (Federal and state jurisdiction).
3. Representative (n3). Counts the number of times node 3 is a broker:
F(n10) = F(n3) ≠ L(n11) (Federal and local jurisdiction).
4. Consultant (n4). Counts the number of times node 3 is a broker:
L(n12) ≠ F(n4) ≠ L(n13) but L(n12) =L(n13) (Federal and local jurisdiction).
5. Liaison (n14). Counts the number of times node 14 is a broker:
S(n14) ≠ F(n5) ≠ L(n15) (Federal, state and local jurisdiction).
Figures 22 and 23 show the two main nodes with the highest scores in the ICS diagraph
according to Gould and Fernandez measures.
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Brokerage :Coordinator
Incident Commander = 106
Mayor = 64

Brokerage: Gatekeeper
Mayor = 51
State Government. = 30

Brokerage :Representative
Incident Commander = 33
Mayor. = 29

Brokerage :Itinerant
HEMA = 3
State HEMA = 2

Figure 22: Four brokerages measures in the Incident Command System
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Brokerage :Liaison
State HEMA = 13
Mayor. = 8
HEMA=8

Brokerage :Total
Incident Commander = 162
Mayor. = 154
State HEMA=53

Figure 23: Brokerage liaison measure and total brokerage measure in the ICS

The brokerage role in the optimized path enables us to test hypotheses to understand how
the jurisdictional problems arise in the ICS. For instance if a determined brokerage dominates in
a path, then the signal alert could require more or less time according to the interoperability of
the components in the vector partition (jurisdictional levels). On the other hand, if we analyze the
internal composition of a broker (node) then we could acquire awareness whether the node is
prepared to carry out the broker role and its associated tasks. Thus, we have demonstrated as a
combined interpretation of the Gould and Fernandez’s brokerage measures and the results of a
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LP model can provide additional information to validate optimized transactions over the
structure of an ICS.
So far we have worked with the topological representation of an ICS and nothing has
been stated regarding the incorporation of geographic measures in a networked emergency
organization. The identification of LP models in the deployment of resources and command post
enables decision makers to solve potential difficulties during the period that the extreme event
affects the geographic area.
We mentioned that in the pre-event scenario, the social network technique is a good tool
for analyzing the different relationships between the organizational nodes (topological analysis),
but this technique is not enough for analyzing these issues:
•

Are the federal resources well placed to augment state and local capabilities due to an
extreme event?

•

Are the C2 systems geographically well located and topologically well assigned to the
different nodes in the digraph?
Thus LP could help to select a number of clusters for placing logistic areas and command

post facilities to provide resources in better way to the nodes affected for an extreme event.
By using the ICS digraph (Appendix B), in Figure 24 we describe a LP model to select
three logistic areas from six propose. Assuming that the optimal solution areas are controlled by
the nodes: Industrial Plant A, Airport Adm. and State Transport, in Figure 24 we show the
geographic and the centrality deployment of the three nodes (yellow circles).

120

34

6

i =1

j =1

∑∑d
6

∑

j =1

y j ≤ 3;

6

∑x
j =1

ij

ij

⋅ x ij

= 1 for all i ;

xij − y j ≤ 0 for all i,j

Industrial Plant

Airport Adm.

In-degree = 0.02

In-degree = 0.05

Out-degree= 0.11

Out-degree= 0.05

Logistic Support
Logistic Support

State R Transport.

Logistic Support

In-degree =0.16
Out-degree=0.19

Concentric centrality deployment

Geographic deployment

Figure 24: Deployment of resources in the ICS geographic and centrality areas

The LP model and the centralities results enable us to conclude regarding to the
interpretation of the optimal logistic areas and their centralization in the structure.
Since the ICS digraph has an asymmetric adjacency matrix, the three nodes depict indegree and out-degree centrality values, which are shown in Figure 24. Notice in the concentric
deployment the weak positions of the nodes Industrial Plant and Airport Adm.
Therefore the combined analysis suggests that even though the so-called logistic nodes
are the best situated geographically for supplying the ICS, their centrality values are low and
easily they could be unreachable for other nodes in the information domain. As a consequence of
this issue, many of the problems exposed in the Appendix A Disaster Analysis could happen
again in an emergency structure. Besides of the degree centrality measures three additional
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indexes can be used for testing a combined LP and social network analysis: closeness,
betweenness and eigenvalues (Those were defined in the first part of this chapter).
We have used an individual centrality measures to enhance the LP analysis; nevertheless
there exists three overall degree indexes, which explain the degree centralization of the whole
ICS, they are: in-degree centralization, out-degree centralization and degree centralization.
In the digraph, the in-degree and out-degree centralization scores are 0.21 and its
associated total degree is 0.18. The measures provide us a representation of the digraph
configuration and allow comparing the structure with another digraph of the same size (a start
configuration obtains a score of 1). Thus a LP analysis should be aware of either robustness or
weakness of the digraph derived of the overall centralization values.
The lack of quantitative analysis in the after action review of the extreme event is
extensive to the evaluation of the efficiency in the components of the digraph. We suggest DEA
as a tool to measure the relative efficiency of the nodes with the same goals and objectives in the
ICS.
In Chapter Three we defined three types of events, (IE, PE and UE) and we characterized
the last one as a universal event that affects the whole ICS, at different levels and places.
When a universal event occurs, it will be common to find multiple nodes with the same
roles and objectives at different location, for instance multiple either fire-rescue teams or hospital
facilities integrated in the ICS. In DEA terminology those nodes are decision making units
(DMUs).
In order to determine the efficiency of the DMUs, the logic of DEA model allows
determining whether a composite node can achieve the same or more output while requiring less
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input. We summarize the process in five steps (Anderson, et al., 2000; Mollaghasemi & PetEdwards, 1997):
•

To create a hypothetical composite node based on the outputs and inputs for the nodes
which have the same goals.

•

For each node output measure, the output for the composite units is determined by
computing a weighted average of the corresponding outputs.

•

For each input measurement, the inputs of composite nodes are determined by using the
same weights to compute a weighed average of the corresponding inputs for all nodes.

•

Constraints in the LP model require all outputs for the composite unit to be greater than
or equal to the outputs of the nodes being evaluated.

•

The node being evaluated is inefficient if the input for the composite node is shown to
have the same, or more output for less input. In other words, if efficiency is less than 1,
the composite node does not need as many resources as the node being evaluated to
produce the same level of outputs.

In the context of an ICS, the identification of DMUs is not enough, because DEA does not
consider the position of the DMUs in the organizational structure, thus nodes in a better
topological position could improve their outputs and decrease their inputs. We suggest the use of
REGGE algorithm (regular resemblance) to identify that two or more nodes are regularly
equivalent if they are equally related to equivalent others. The result of REGGE is a symmetric
similarity matrix which provides a measure of regular equivalence in the digraph. This matrix is
automatically submitted to a single link hierarchical clustering routine (Netminer, 2005; Borgatti,
Everett &Freeman, 2002).
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Figure 25 shows the hierarchical clustering of the equivalent nodes in the digraph, which
enable us to apply DEA to the DMUs with the same goals and objectives.

1.000
0.999
0.998

0.993
0.983

0.966

0.924

0.892
0.567

0.302

Figure 25: Hierarchical cluster of the regular equivalence of the nodes
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Conclusion
In this chapter we defined three domains for evaluating the behavior of an emergency
management organization that performs its tasks over a networked environment.
Using graph theory and the interpretation of the relationships given by social network
technique, we defined a level of aggregation based on the concept of nodes and arcs. The
methods selected enabled us to deal with the entire organizational structure rather than samples.
The term one-to-one mapping will be used for identifying the level of granularity in our
methodology.
We provided a comprehensive classification of networks and measures which can be
applied to the emergency management organization. Several index measures explained the
concepts of centrality, neighbor and connection.
We showed that if data is available, then a test of hypothesis by using Monte Carlo
simulation could provide a statistical model for predicting the future performance of an
emergency organization.
An invaluable tool was analyzed by implementing the concept of dyad census and triad
census. We supported the idea that relaxing the theory of structural balance could know the

complete structure of an emergency organization and likely to project future organizational
behavior, nevertheless testing the hypothesis over the organizational data is required to validate
our assumptions. (In the field of social behavior, this technique is well explained by Wasserman
et al. 1994; Nooy et al. 2005).
We tested eleven network measures using random network and scale free configurations.
After modifying the density of both networks, we realized that patterns arise when we change the
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size and number of arcs in the network. Thus we can expect that similar patterns might be found
in the dynamic structure of an emergency management organization.
Finally, we proposed to incorporate LP in the optimization of an ICS. By using three examples,
we demonstrated the helpfulness of a combined analysis between LP and social network
measures.
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CHAPTER FIVE: COMBINING SIMULATION TECHNIQUES AND
CONCEPTUAL-OPERATIONAL MODEL

Introduction: Interaction between system dynamics and discrete simulation
Network centric scenarios evolve dramatically according to the evolution of the discrete
and continuous environments variables, and this produces new dyadic configurations in an
emergency management organization.
Most of the natural extreme events present a continuous progress over time. However,
sometimes human beings do not realize that, and they perceive the evolution of the events as
discrete spatial-temporal changes. On the other hand, the majority of the man-made extreme
events are carried out in a specific place and time, because they are intended for producing panic
and physical damage in a selected location. According to those characteristics, we classify the
man-made extreme events mainly as discrete events.
In this research context, the organizational behavior can be viewed from two
perspectives, the external and internal behaviors. The former are the dyads’ transactions made
between the nodes, such as message chains, tasks, signals, missions, and movement of resource,
all of which can be represented as discrete flows of entities. The latter are the internal processes
carried out in each node, an aspect that suggest modeling as continuous and discrete variables.
Rogalski (1991) pointed out that situations of emergency management can be considered
as specific cases of dynamic environments, in which the notion of operational flows in any
model of distributed decision making is a function of time. By operational flows, he defined the
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“environment states, cognitive tasks, material tasks to be performed and on the other, networks
of organization for communication and resources.”
In agreement with the previous statement, this section presents several approaches for
merging SD and DES techniques. In fact, we identify the mechanisms for interacting continuous
and discrete variables for getting a specific behavior. After that, we propose how to use those
mechanisms for modeling several components of the network centric scenario, leaving open the
methodology for implementing other models using the hybrid approach.
In this research context, we do not discuss the foundation of SD and DES, and assume a
previous knowledge regarding both techniques. We will focus on the state transition technique
and the identification of the best candidate for modeling and simulating the interactions in a
network centric scenario and the internal nodes processes. Advantages and disadvantages of the
named techniques will be presented.
Finally, we present a conceptual and operational model for simulating a networked
decision making scenario.

System dynamics technique (SD)
The SD technique is based on a clear structure of differential equations and auxiliary
variables. The interactions of the levels, inflows, outflows, and parameters yield a complexity that
grows rapidly with the size of the model and the number of feedback loops in the system. Thus,
simple systems can reach exorbitant and uncontrollable non-linear behaviors in the variables of
states (levels).
Kampman pointed out, “It is still an open question whether the feedback loops concept is
useful in large-scale systems” (Kampmann, 2004). Even so, SD presents many features which
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might be useful for modeling nodes and their interactions in a networked scenario. For instance,
the variable of state named level shows four useful features (Adapted with modifications of US.
Department of Energy, 2006):
•

Have memory: Variable of state conserves the number of entities if the inflow and
outflow are constants.

•

Change the time slope of flows: When there exists a feedback loop between level and
inflow or outflow, the behaviors of both are modified.

•

Decouple inflows and outflows: Enables control of the entities by different variables of
the model.

•

Create delay: Enables interruption of process of data and resources in time.
Many attempts have been made to reduce the complexity of the structural behavior

derived from many feedback loops. Research efforts have identified nine types of feedback loop
structures named archetypes, because they describe similar patterns previously found in different
SD models.
Senge (1990) described a set of archetypes to recognize, and modifying specific feedback
loops in a system. Wolstenholme (2003) summarized those archetypes in four models based on
the two basic types of feedback loops (balancing and reinforcing), as shown in Figure 26:
•

Underachievement: The intended achievement fails to be realized.

•

Out of control: The intended control fails to be realized.

•

Relative achievement: The achievement is only gained at the expense of others.

•

Relative control: The control is only gained at the expense of others.
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Figure 26: Set of archetypes in system dynamics (Wolstenholme, 2003)

Archetypes are solutions for reducing the complexity of the system size, but those are not
enough if we want to test if the SD technique is a good candidate for modeling a network centric
scenario. In order to identify strengths and weaknesses of SD models we need additional tools
for understanding the behavior of an emergency management organization.
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One significant issue for using SD technique in the context of this research is to find out
how many feedback loops exist in the structure of an emergency management organization. In
Chapter Four we presented a preliminary approach to this problem by mean of the analysis of the
vectors triads and dyads.
Kampmann (2004) showed that in a SD model, the number of feedback loops in a
maximally connected graph with n variable of state and p auxiliary variables reaches the number
of 2np(n-1)! loops. Furthermore, he argued that there are no general formulas for finding the
number of feedback loops for a given system, and he proposed an algorithm to identify all loops
in a given graph. (According to the Kampmann formula we tested his outcomes, and they should
be considered an estimation of the number of loops in a SD model).

Table 23: Number of loops in a maximally connected system with n levels and p auxiliary
variables (According to Kampmann (2004))
n

0
1 1
2 3
3 8
4 24
5 89
10 106

1
2
8
34
192
1458
108

p
5
32
1088
68704
106
108
1020

10
1024
106
109
1012
1016
1035

We showed in Chapter Four that an emergency management organization has clear and well
defined procedures, and the relationships among its components generate different
configurations before, during, and after the extreme event.
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As those configurations are hierarchical digraphs which respond to well-defined
problems, we might argue that systems for emergency management will have a number of
reduced feedback loops, at least in the first period of an extreme event, when the organization
can control the effects of the event.
Two examples of the previous statement were showed in the Kobe Earthquake in Japan,
and Hurricane Mitch in Central America (Appendix A). In both cases, we hypothesized the
existence of initial configurations with a reduced number of feedback loops due to the
controlled chain of command, but according to the severe evolution of the extreme event, those
“configurations” were losing their structures and the number of uncontrolled feedback loops

increased dramatically. By using graph terminology, the number of graph components also
increased, producing a lack of communication, coordination, and situation awareness in the
organization. Analyzing the chain of command in Hurricane Mitch, the recurring question “Who
is in charge?” is an example of the uncontrolled feedbacks loops that are produced at determined
periods in the organization. (See Hurricane Mitch analysis in Appendix A.)
Thus, we conclude that the number loops is relevant for a networked organization, and it
might be a good indicator of the emergency management system performance. We argue that the
identification of the number of feedback loops is the first step for testing the helpfulness of SD
technique in a networked scenario.
Researchers have developed few techniques for understanding the behavior of the feedback
loops over time. The most significant of these techniques according to our research are:
•

Model analysis – Looks to explain the cause of the oscillations in the feedback loops by
using “causal loop diagram” and polarity.
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•

Loop knockout technique – Useful for studying loop dominance, the modeler disconnects
specific loops to analyze what loops have more significance in the system behavior.

•

Sensitivity test – Based on variations of parameters, seeks to identify the causes of the
system oscillations.

•

Eigenvalues analysis– Measures that identify the loops that contribute more to the system
behavior.

Because the three first techniques are based on trial and error and they are time consuming, we
will concentrate our effort into a mathematical analysis to evaluate the helpfulness of the
eigenvalue measures in the study of the network centric scenario.

Eigenvalues and eigenvalues elasticity for evaluating a networked organization
Since SD is a set of nonlinear differential equations, this technique requires us to
linearize the equations as a set of linear differential equations. The equation dX/dt = A X+ b,
represents the SD model under study as a set of linearized matrices with X being the state
vector, composed by all the variables of states in the system. (Speller, Rabelo and John, 2004).
The eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix A determine the expected behavior of the
system. This behavior depends on the position of the eigenvalue on the complex plane. Figure 27
shows the six possible behaviors based upon eigenvalues analysis.
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Figure 27: Behavior of a SD model derived from eigenvalue analysis

The real part of the eigenvalue will determine the mode stability. A negative real part will
cause decay or goal seeking modes, whereas a positive real eigenvalue will cause exponential
growth (positive or negative). A pure imaginary eigenvalue will cause never-damping
oscillations.
Complex eigenvalues, which always occur in conjugate pairs of the form a ±bi, where i²
= -1, will identify oscillations and either growth or decay, depending on the sign of its real part;
negative implies decay or goal seeking, positive indicates exponential growth (Speller et al.
2006).
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The question that arises is: Could SD be a good candidate for simulating the interaction
among the nodes in a network centric environment?
Let us answer the question by formulating a small example regarding how local and state
authorities could react according to established procedures to a warning alert sensor which sends
an alarm when a natural extreme event comes out in the jurisdiction of those authorities. (See
Figure 28).
The model presents seven variables of states and twelve flows. The reader should note
that a SD model of an organization has fewer feedback loops than models used in others fields.
There are two reasons that justify this apparent lack of complexity. The first one is the modeling
of a hierarchical organization whose adjacency matrix (say digraph) is essentially asymmetric;
the second one is the nonexistence of auxiliary variables that alter the correlation between the
variables of states (it avoids, in part, the introduction of chaotic behavior in this simple model).
We implemented a pulse as an in-flow to stand for the external behavior of an extreme event. A
sensor is a variable of state (node) which represents a warning alert in a network centric

emergency system. The sensor gets data from the pulse, and sends a warning alert to the alert
node.
Basically, the warning alert is an increment in the rate flow to the next node. People in
charge of the alert node activate the chain of command by sending modified flows to its
connected nodes Situation awareness and Local decision maker. Thus the diffusion information
is expanded through the digraph.
The matrix C and the digraph show the connections of the decision makers who are
modeled as variables of states. The main assumption in the model is while more flows of data
arrive to the nodes, variables of states transmit data with more intensity to others nodes
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(regulated by the flows). Thus, we use the variables of states as control of the internal nodes’
behavior. By using this technique, we are constrained to model only one type of flow among the

nodes, and if another type of flows is required, then we need another SD model.

C=

0100000
0010100
0101100
0000101
0101011
0000100
0000000

Figure 28: Adjacency matrix for a warning alert scenario

The digraph, in Figure 28, contains seven nodes and thirteen connections. The matrix C
was used for collecting statistics information in regard to the sub-graphs produced by the dyad
census, in Table 24. There are four mutual dyads and five asymmetric flows; also the census
shows that twelve null dyads are produced in the emergency system.
Figure 29 shows a sketch of the SD model which represents the adjacency matrix C. The
blue arrow represent the feedback loops shown in the matrix C. A triad census was conducted for
collecting the triads that arises from the SD model Table 25.
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Figure 29: Triad census performed in a SD model with seven stocks (SD model was
implemented in Vensim software and digraph analysis in Netminer software)

In Figure 29 there is a dominance of the triad 003 and 012, the former points out a null
connection among seven triads and the latter shows asymmetric flows characteristic of the
hierarchy organizations without feedbacks.
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Table 24: Dyads census
Nodes: 7 Arcs: 13
Number of Mutual Dyads
Number of Asymmetric Dyads
Number of Nulls Dyads

Observed
4
5
12

Expected
3.116
5.884
12

Expected
6.42
9.42
2.11
0.74
1.02
3.66
2.94
3.15
0.96
0.14
1.17
0.25
0.33
1.12
1.43
0.013

St Dev.
1.02
2.25
1.34
0.74
0.66
0.87
0.89
0.74
0.75
0.35
1.04
0.44
0.49
0.76
0.57
0.11

Table 25: Triads census
Nodes: 7 Arcs: 13
003
012
102
021D
021U
021C
111D
111U
030T
030C
201
120D
120U
120C
210
300

Observed
7
10
4
0
0
2
3
3
0
0
3
1
1
0
1
0

Std. Err.
0.032
0.071
0.042
0.024
0.021
0.028
0.028
0.024
0.024
0.011
0.033
0.014
0.016
0.024
0.018
0.004

Variance
1.04
5.09
1.79
0.56
0.43
0.76
0.80
0.56
0.56
0.12
1.09
0.20
0.24
0.58
0.33
0.13

Four triads show a mutual relationship, and since that the system is composed by only
seven nodes, we might suggest that the configuration presents a high grade of feedback among
its components. It is consistent with the feedbacks loops produced by the four dyads found in the
dyads census in Table 24.
If we generate a random digraph with seven nodes and thirteen connections, we could
expect the number of type of dyads and triads shown in Tables 24 and 25. By now, we do not
compare the observed with the expected columns in both tables, because of the reduced number
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of nodes in the digraph. Additional conclusions we can get by analyzing the matrix C with the
“one mode” social network measures showed in Chapter Four.

By performing feedback loops analysis, we collected the outcomes in three nodes: Local
Decision Maker, Alert and Situation Awareness. Table 26 shows the feedbacks loops of length 1

to 7.

Table 26: Feedbacks loops in the nodes local DM, alert and situation awareness (Loops
generated by using Vensim software)
Local DM
Loop Number 1 of length 1
Local DM
Send6
Loop Number 2 of length 1
Local DM
Send5
Loop Number 3 of length 1
Local DM
Send2
Loop Number 4 of length 5
Local DM
Send2
Alert
Send1
Situation Awareness
Send3
Loop Number 5 of length 7
Local DM
Send2
Alert
Send1
Situation Awareness
Send4
Regional DM
Send5

Alert
Loop Number 1 of length 1
Alert
Send2
Loop Number 2 of length 1
Alert
Send1
Loop Number 3 of length 5
Alert
Send1
Situation Awareness
Send3
Local DM
Send2
Loop Number 4 of length 7
Alert
Send1
Situation Awareness
Send4
Regional DM
Send5
Local DM
Send2

Situation Awareness
Loop Number 1 of length 1
Situation Awareness
Send4
Loop Number 2 of length 1
Situation Awareness
Send3
Loop Number 3 of length 5
Situation Awareness
Send3
Local DM
Send2
Alert
Send1
Loop Number 4 of length 7
Situation Awareness
Send4
Regional DM
Send5
Local DM
Send2
Alert
Send1

A complementary insight we obtain from Table 26, since that triad and dyads census provided
some hints in regard to static behavior of the system, now we find out the exact number of the
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direct and indirect causal relationships that influence the final behavior of each node. Clearly
those feedbacks loops are measures of the complexity of the system in each critical point.
For instance the node Alert has four loops whose lengths are; 1, 1, 5, and 7.
The fourth loop involves four flows and three variables of states, and it confirms the
presence of one triad 210 (see Figure 29) obtained in the digraph analysis.
Figure 30 shows the behavior of four nodes in the system, the simulation was
implemented in a timeframe of 100 units of time. Tables 27 and 28 show the dynamic matrix A,
at the periods 10 and 90. The reader should note as matrix A changes its values and its
eigenvalues in time according to the equation Ax =λx, where λ is an eigenvalue of the matrix A,
and x is its associated vector.
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Figure 30: Behavior of node in the warning alert system

In Figure 30 the graph sensor shows the behavior of the node which only is driven by the
pulse generated by the extreme event, at time 4. Notice that this graph is consistent with the
eigenvalue -0.00298 + 0.11864i shown in Table 27, Table 28 and Figure 27. Basically the
damping oscillation decays constantly at the period t=10 and t=90.
The graph Alert shows a decay behavior, which also is consistent with its eigenvalue -0.1
+ 0i shown in Table 27, Table 28 and Figure 27.
The situation awareness shows a goal seeking behavior at the period t=10 and t=90. The
eigenvalues do not change in the time.
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The graph Local DM shows an oscillatory behavior which corresponds to permanent
changes of sign in the real and imaginary parts of its eigenvalue (See Table 27 and 28. Data was
obtained using Vensim Software, Analyzt software and Netminer software.)
The feedback loops in Table 26 show that the behavior of either one or several variables
could influence the behavior of others variables. In order to determine the magnitude of the
influence, we calculate the elasticities of the eigenvalues. Basically, this index enables us to
identify the loops that govern the behavior of a selected variable.
Selecting as variable the node Alert (shadow value), we identified the intensity of the
relation that exists between the feedback loops and the node Alert. At the times t=10 and t=90 we
can see that the Sensor node is the main direct causal for the decay behavior of the node Alert.

Table 27: Dynamic matrix A, time=10: Eigenvalues and eigenvalues elasticities
Eigenvalue Analysis

Time = 10

Regional DM- Sensor- Situation Awareness- Others- Police- Local DM- Alert
Dynamic Matrix A
Eigenvalues
0.1
0.0
0.5 0.0 0.0
0.1 0.0
-0.99405
velocity 0i
-0.00298
velocity 0.11864i
0.0 -0.1 0 .0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.00298
velocity -11864i
0.0
0.0
-1
0.0 0.0
0.0 -0.1
0.1
velocity 0i
0.0
0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
-3.97e-012 velocity 5.74e-007i
0.0
0.0
0.0 0.0 0.1
0.1
0.0
-3.97e-012 velocity 5.74e-007i
-0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
0.1
velocity 0i
0 .0 0.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 2.31E-11 -0.1
Loop Elasticities
Sensor →→Sensor
-0.99999
Regional DM→→Regional DM
4.18458e-005
Situation Awareness →Situation Awareness -2.20177e-005
Police →→Local DM→ Police
1.89066e-005
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velocity NaN
velocity NaN
velocity NaN
velocity NaN

Table 28: Dynamic matrix A, time=90: Eigenvalues and eigenvalues elasticities
Eigen value Analysis Time = 90
Regional DM- Sensor- Situation Awareness- Others- Police- Local DM- Alert
Dynamic Matrix A
Eigen values
0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
-0.99405
velocity 0i
0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-0.00298
velocity 0.11864i
0.0 0.0 -1
0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
-0.00298
velocity -11864i
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.1
velocity 0i
7.4926e-007 velocity 0i
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
-0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1
-7.5061e-007 velocity 0i
0.0 0.09 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -1.19E-11
-0.1
velocity 0i
Loop Elasticities
Sensor →→Sensor
-1.0000
Situation Awareness →Situation Awareness -4.29693e-005
Police →→ Police
-3.15856e-005
Local DM→→Local DM
2.04404e-005

velocity NaN
velocity NaN
velocity NaN
velocity NaN

Although SD technique is only based on the connection of three elements – inflows,
outflows and variable of state – all connected by feedback loops, the non linearity that arises
from the interaction of those variables is hard to control, especially in a model with more than
three variables of state.
By using eigenvalues, we demonstrated the stability of an SD model can be controlled
and significant conclusions can be obtained from its analysis.
On the other hand, if the feedback loops are an obstacle for evaluating the accuracy of the
performance of an ICS, we can reduce the complexity by using the ego-net concept from Chapter
Four, thus we might reduce the number of nodes and concentrate our effort over a sub-graph of
the whole system.

143

Discrete simulation: A network centric approach
Traditionally discrete simulation techniques have been used from a discrete event
perspective such as manufacturing systems, services lines, business and supply chains. Whereas
all those models are regulated by an event scheduling mechanism, little attention has been given
to the combination of others discrete approaches such as petri net, agent based, finite machine,
and state transition. This is likely because there exists a number of commercial packages for

implementing discrete event simulation.
In the context of a network centric scenario, we will analyze the synergy that arises from
the interaction of two discrete simulation techniques, discrete event and state transition, making
emphasis in the advantages that present the combination of both techniques for modeling an
emergency management organization in a networked scenario. Thus, for a network centric
analysis, a comprehensive definition of discrete simulation is: “Modeling of a system over the
time, where the state of the variables change according to either fixed mechanisms or by
controlled algorithms over the processes.”
Fixed mechanism makes reference to the two historically main approaches for advancing
the simulation clock: next-event time and fixed-increment time advance (Law & Kelton, 2000),
and as extended literature exists in discrete event simulation, we will concentrate our discussion
primarily on state machine discrete approach. We will demonstrate part of our methodology for
fitting a discrete simulation based on state transition with a standard discrete event approach,
and we will show how both implementations might be used in a networked scenario.
A model based upon state transition has four components (adapted and modified from
Mosterman, Biswas and Sztipanovits, 1998):
•

I= {µo,…….. µk } the set of states describing operational modes of the system.
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•

∑={σo,…….. σk }, the set of events that can cause state transitions. Events are generated

by dynamic process, the closed-loop controller, and by external, open-loop control
signals, i.e., ∑= ∑p x ∑c x ∑ x.: I x ∑→I, a discrete state-transition function that defines
the new mode after an event occurs.
•

C= { Ik….... Ik } represent a community of set of states defined in the context of a network

centric scenario.
We characterize the state µi as the set of values shown by the variables and parameters of
a system during a certain period of time. If we define a discrete event process over time as σi,
then the state µi always could describe either the entire process or part of σi.
On the other hand, we could use σi for driving the set of events ∑. Thus the discrete event
model will determine when the discrete function φ triggers the transition toward a new µk.
The function φ is transitive and reflexive; it might transfer the control from one state to another
or back to the original state. The final behavior of the system arises from the combination of all
the states of the system.
The implementation of a combined discrete event and state transition model presents
multiple advantages for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of an emergency
management organization, especially if data is available to simulate the interactions between
nodes and to drive the scenarios that should face an ICS.

Using unified modeling language (UML) definitions, we will describe four types of state
transitions and we propose a fifth state named community of states which fits well for

implementing our proposed hybrid methodology.
•

Sub-state: A state which resides within another state.

•

Sequential states: A chronological succession of states that occur one after the other.
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•

Concurrent states: States executed at the same time.

•

Composite states: A state composed of other concurrent or sequential states.

•

Community of states: A set of states located in either different composite states or
objects for which signals are their main mechanisms of communication.
The community of states enables the implementation of a concurrent behavior in more

than one composite state, allowing the generation of a set of communities; thus C= { Io,.... Ik } is
the community of states describing the whole set of operational modes of the system.
We propose a state transition technique for governing the external events which should
produce a chain of reactions on the whole emergency management organization according to
how it is regulated in the EOP. The community of states transition should show the states space
with the algorithms, events, and transitions.
For instance, the Figure 31 shows two classes with two composite states of transition
each one for controlling the chain of command and decision making processes.
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Figure 31: Community of states defined for a network centric scenario

The community of state transition is well situated as a control mechanism that the
modeler can use for testing different components of the whole system. The succession of events
over time could be regulated by using either random or deterministic variables for controlling the
transitions, events, and actions.

Integrating system dynamics and discrete event simulation
So far, we have focused our methodology on continuous and discrete variables separately
by using SD, DES, and state transition simulation techniques. Now we will concentrate our
effort on identifying comprehensive mechanisms for modeling more complex behaviors putting
together continuous and discrete variables.
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The behavior of an emergency management organization depicts both discrete and
continuous variables; the former might be resources, entities, process time, queuing messages,
and activation alarms, and the latter might be the effect of stress on the team, time for
accomplishing a task, and evolution of a physical event.
By using both techniques we have to distinguish between two different modeling
approaches:
•

Interactions of models

•

Interactions of variables
Interaction of models means that one part of the system was modeled by using SD

technique and the other part by using DES technique, and both models interact through a discrete
interface.

System Dynamics
FLOW 1

STOCK

FLOW 2

Discrete Simulation

s

Discrete
interface
Bidirectional
transition

s

ENTITIES
P

C

J

Figure 32: Interaction of models in hybrid simulation approach

Figure 32 shows the two models; a continuous with a feedback loop based on SD, and a
process flow, in which the entities follow a programmed sequence based on DES. Both models
interact only through a discrete state transition interface that manages the changes of the
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dynamic parameters. The configuration requires the use of sensors and signals for detecting
when selected variables from both simulation techniques cross specific thresholds.
Figure 33 shows that the second modeling approach, named interactions of variables,
implies that there exists only one model implemented by means of two simulation techniques.
Thus, either the variables of the SD model could be dynamics parameters of the DES model or
the variables of the DES model, such as number of entities in the queue or resources utilization
could be dynamics parameters that modify the behavior of the variables of state (level) in a SD
model.
From the interaction of variables arises the concept of dynamic simulation, since the
parameters of the processes (DES) and flows (SD) change over time.

System Dynamics - Discrete Simulation
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Figure 33: Interaction of variables in a hybrid simulation approach

By using the two previous approaches, the modeler of a network centric environment has the
chance to capture six types of behavior as is shown in Figure 34.
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Figure 34: Variables’ behaviors according to inputs and outputs mechanisms

Since an input to the Node 1 applies the function F and produces a discrete output, this
could be the case of a classical discrete event simulation.
In contrast, if Node 2 is a state variable, then it seizes the flows and applies the function
F to the in-flows (for those familiar with SD, F could be an information delay) and it releases the
out-flows according to a fixed rate.
Node 5 shows the effect of discrete variables which produce a continuous behavior over

the node. An example is a discrete extreme event such as an explosion that generates, by means
of a function F, stress over the population; the effect of this stress is a continuous variable.
Node 6 receives continuous input and, after applying F, releases discrete outputs. A clear
example of this kind of behavior is the effect of the fatigue over the number of tasks carried out
by a team. It is assumed that as the team works more hours continually, the rate at which it
completes tasks will decrease.
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Nodes 3 and 4 are combinations of the processes described for the other four nodes.

Conceptual model of a network centric decision making scenario
After discussing how to combine the main simulation techniques available for modeling
continuous and discrete processes, we define a conceptual model of the organizational structure
and the network centric environment in which it performs its tasks.
By means of a conceptual model design, we specify three main sets of features of a
modeled system:
•

Essential components of the organization structure.

•

The relationships of the nodes and their position in the structure.

•

The kinds of changes in either the environment or the emergency organization that affect
the functioning of the complete structure.
In order to present the design logically and according to the current “mental model” that

the people and community have of an emergency management organization, the conceptual
model was designed following the structure of a set of interconnected graphs. The model
captures the essential elements of an ICS which was defined as “the combination of facilities,
equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common
organizational structure” (NIMS, 2004). Those essential elements are:
•

Structure representation of the emergency management organization based on an ICS.

•

Dynamic interaction into the elements of an ICS.

•

Identification of measures of performance and vulnerabilities in the organization
structure.
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•

Evolution of the configuration over time by the effect of new events and interruption of
the dyads flows.

•

Representation of resources available.

•

Representation of the internal structure of the elements in the networked organization.

•

The communication between the elements considers diffusion of information rate.
Making use of the level of aggregation defined in Chapter Four, each element that plays a

critical role in the structure of an ICS is modeled as a node, allowing a high level of granularity.
Besides providing a model that aligns the mental models that the modelers and decision
makers have of a networked emergency organization, the conceptual model enabled us to create
fixed mechanisms for merging simulation technique with graph structure. Thus the static dyad
and triad relationships of a digraph can evolve toward a simulated model that contains the
configuration of an ICS at local, state, and federal levels.
We conceptualized the model in five steps which represent the evolution of the processes
of decision making in an ICS. See Figure 35.
Step 1 captures the organization layout and the adjacency matrix N of the digraph
associated with the organization structure. Figure 35 (shadow area) shows the asymmetric
relationships among the nodes that correspond to the hierarchy’s emergency organization.
Step 2 corresponds to the definition of the set of discrete and/or continuous events that
begin the activation of the system by means of signals. A sensor should transfer the signal to the
set of nodes in the organization. The signal is a function of the type of event and how it evolves
over time.
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Figure 35: Conceptual model

Step 3 must consider the representation of the internal structure of the nodes based upon
pieces of information received, processed, and transferred to other nodes. The complexity of the
internal structure of the nodes is a function of the role and position that the nodes have in the
digraph. Thus nodes with similar roles like task forces should have similar compositions, but the

parameters that govern their internal structure will be different. For example, a small team of fire
and rescue personnel at a local level is different from a military engineering company specialized
in rescue and construction, but their organizational processes are similar.
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In step 4, the methodology contains the exogenous and endogenous variables, those that
affect the organization performance. In agreement with the lesson learned from the five case
studies, we have considered two types of models that influence the organization; team
performance and the evolution of the extreme event.
Step 5 considers the dynamic interaction among the nodes. This step is linked with the
analysis of the longitudinal network pointed out in the previous chapter. Since there exist dyads
that modify their behavior in time, the model captures those changes in fixed times to apply
longitudinal network analysis. This step is highly dependent on the data available in the database
of the organization. Those changes will be shown in the adjacency matrix N and as consequence
will produce changes in the digraph.
Finally, Step 6 conceptualizes the transmission of different types of data and resources
between of the nodes.

Operational model of a network centric scenario
After defining a conceptual model, we present a blueprint of our vision of a networked
scenario in which an emergency management organization performs its tasks according to well
documented alarms and procedures contained in the ICS and EOP. This framework provides
mechanisms for capturing, sharing, and communicating the essential objects and interactions of a
given configuration and its surrounding scenario.
Early, we defined the concept of a digraph for studying the mathematical structure of an
organization and since the graphs enable a one-to-one modeling of the nodes components and the
subsequent interactions that arise from the system, our approach combines these characteristics
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with an object oriented (OO) design and language implementation of an emergency management
system.
By taking the best of these two worlds (graph and OO) it is possible to analyze complex
networked organizations (hundreds of nodes with thousands of connections) by defining only a
few pattern behaviors of the nodes.
Someone could argue that that functionality has been already performed by an exhaustive
digraph analysis, but this is incorrect because that digraph analysis examines the isomorphic

relationships from a static perspective only. Here we additionally incorporate the analysis of the
dynamics flows performed by the nodes and suggest the necessity of defining internal nodes’
behaviors and external objects that affect the performance of an organization studied as a
digraph.

For instance under an OO design we propose a decision maker behavior which represents
the position and role of n nodes in the digraph. Thus, the decision maker is a class of the model,
and the objects “decision maker_1, decision maker_2…decision maker_n” are instances of that
class. By using this approach, a modeler might model different roles such as people in charge of
a federal agency, an incident commander, or a city mayor in a county only changing the
parameters of the named class.
An object oriented approach provides us similar arguments by defining several subclasses
that inherit the behavior of a super class. In this way, we are dealing with the complexity for
providing behavior to the multiple nodes in the adjacency matrix.
The starting point for combining a digraph approach with OO modeling is defined by the
operational model depicted in Figure 36. We portray an emergency management organization in
three levels – federal, state, and local – and as consequence three clusters arise from the
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organizational structure (Usually an adjacency matrix does not allow identifying clusters nodes,
ego-net, or component digraph easily, and algorithms and statistical analysis will be required).

The city and state levels have sensors for detecting automatically the signals that might send an
extreme event; only in this case the dyads’ relationship between two nodes is always
asymmetric. In all others cases the three dyadic isomorphism types can be found in the
organization.
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Figure 36: Operational model based on the interactions among dyads of the digraph
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Based upon the five disaster cases analyzed in Chapter Three, we suggest that the
emergency organization have three different ways for realizing that a critical event arose (See in
Figure 36 how events 1, 2, and 3 arrive in the organizational structure):
•

By a node that initially takes knowledge of the critical event and transfers the information
to other nodes of the organization (e.g. a hospital director that detects in his facility an
illness which might evolve into a pandemic).

•

By a set of nodes that simultaneously take knowledge of a critical event and transfer the
information to other nodes (e.g. local authorities that simultaneously see a tanker truck
fire on the local TV news).

•

By the whole organization that simultaneously takes knowledge of the critical event (e.g.
an earthquake which affects an entire country).
The dissemination of the data and resources in the networked organization is complex

due to the multiple nodes that take part in the incident procedures and the different types of data
that the dyads transfer between them.
According to the structured and non-structured data transferred in real command and
control systems and in simulated training systems (e.g. constructive simulations), we propose a
classification for modeling and simulating the data transferred between the dyads of an
organization digraph (Figure 37).
•

Alarms. Standard procedures which are known by all nodes of the organization, provides

the preliminary data for reacting to an extreme event.
•

Collaborative communication. Several non structured messages transferred by email, face

to face, telephone, radio, and other electronic devices. Must always be classified
according to their purpose, such as logistical, intelligence, operational, personnel, etc.
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•

Decisions. Given a critical event, a decision maker performs milestones named decisions,

carried out after getting early situation awareness by means of collaborative tools.
•

Missions. Given a critical situation, it defines the tasks, units, goal, timeframe, and

resources. These are mandatory messages format which are recorded in the database.
•

Tasks. Activities which must be accomplished by a task force; they are consequences of

the missions and still recorded as message format in the database.
•

Resources. Physical equipment, supplies, or personnel required for carrying out a task.

They are defined in the mission to support the way a task is achieved.
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Figure 37: Summarized schema of the data and resources transferred among the nodes in a
command and control emergency system
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CHAPTER SIX: HYBRID MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Introduction
In Chapter Three we suggested that any emergency organization performs its tasks over
three domains: physical, cognitive and informational. Thus this methodology proposes to
incorporate those domains over a simulated environment by using graph structure, discrete event,
states of transition, and system dynamics techniques.
In order to demonstrate the last part of the methodology process, we implemented a
simulated model based upon the operational model exposed in Chapter Five.
Based on the ICS digraph (Appendix B), we define a hypothetical structure of an ICS with
thirty-seven nodes which are implemented at three levels: federal, state, and local.
Through the first part of this chapter we explain the continuous and discrete components
of the model that enables us to represent the internal and external behavior of the ICS digraph. In
the second part of this chapter and according to the graph classification defined in Chapter Four,
two sets of measures are used to explain the structure of the digraph that represents a networked
emergency organization. These sets of measure are node level analysis, and sub-set and network
level analysis.

Finally in the third part of this chapter, we develop an experimental analysis of the
discrete interactions of the thirty-seven nodes that encompass the digraph and combine those
results with those obtained from the social network analysis.
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Model implementation
An overview of the proposed model is shown in Figure 38. Given that the model is a oneto-one mapping of the hypothetical emergency structure, the thirty-seven nodes are represented

as thirty-seven objects in the model.
In order to provide one common interface of the whole scenario to other possible digraph
configurations, we encapsulated the digraph and its surrounding environment in a super-class
named main1.

Figure 38: Encapsulated objects for representing the three domains in the digraph
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The class Electric_power_system represents a portion of the critical infrastructure in the
physical domain. The object electric_power_system is an instance of this class and contains the
SD model of a power grid that feeds two big cities.
In Chapter Five we showed how different simulation techniques could combine to
produce a desired behavior. In this case, the power grid is a continuous network that is constantly
monitored by a control system. When the electrical power either fails or reaches a critical level, a
control system modeled as a state transition object sends a signal to an object named
external_control, which is a set of states transition. Thus we are applying the defined concept of
community of states. Figure 39 shows the SD class and the encapsulated state transitions.

Figure 39: System dynamics model that feeds others simulation techniques
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The SD model has five state variables, which are levels of accumulation of electricity
produced by five sources named oil, coal, nuclear, gas, and hydro plants. A set of networks
formed by the interactions of the states variables (squares), inflow (valves), out flow (valve), and
auxiliaries’ variables (circles) show the causal dependency in the complete system.
Four state variables are used for representing the transference nodes that carry the
electricity toward the cities, and finally two variables of states called City_1 and City_2 stand for
the accumulator levels required for supplying both cities.
The power grid model represents a type of extreme event that might be useful for
producing input to test the chain of command of the digraph. Because of the OO design of the
whole model, the implementation remains open to incorporation of other classes which might
represent different events.
In the context of a networked scenario, we suggest two approaches for relating a SD
model with another simulation paradigm. The first is by means of a set of continuous variables
that are shown as interfaces of the external model. Thus, other objects interact with those
variable interfaces according to pre-established rules. The second approach is by means of a state
transition interface which was used in the SD model shown in Figure 29.

The best approach will depend on the type of system that the modeler is attempting to
build. According to our methodology for simulating a networked scenario with three domains,
we suggest connecting a SD model with the state of transition technique, because in this way the
modeler can control the whole behavior of the model by means of conditions specified for
triggering transitions to different states.
According to the operational model, the extreme event will evolve as a set of differential
equations where it is possible to distinguish three specific timeframes:
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•

The period previous to when the event reaches its threshold, which is named T-.

•

The exact time in which the event reaches the critical threshold and turns on the alarms in
the emergency management organization, which is named as T0.

•

The period after the event reaches its critical threshold, which is named T+.
Notice that T- and T+ are periods of time before and after to the initial impact of the

extreme event, and T0 is a defined instant of time.
In agreement with an ICS, a scalable reaction of the emergency organization is expected
depending on three factors: extreme event features, extension of the timeframe named T-, and
location affected.
The initial state State_Event represents the ordinary condition in which the organization
executes its tasks; the evolution of the event in T- is regulated for both differential equations sets
and communities of states. The values of the adjacency matrix of the digraph show the ties
among the nodes according to the established procedures in the ICS.
At the time T0 (which is regulated by the set of differential equations of the SD model) a
transition triggers an alarm to the whole digraph, a subset of it, or only to one node.
The community of states of transition enables the creation of transition branches for
either sending the control to more than one state or for evaluating some clause before selecting
the better suited state according to the clause. This characteristic presents enormous advantages
for modeling the network centric scenario given that the community of states takes the role of a
high control that regulates the behavior of the nodes, events, and interactions.

Therefore, branch dynamics destination states could be well suited to replicate how in
real life an ICS performs its communications and tasks.
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In Figure 40, we show a proposed model of high control which is a composite of
concurrent and sequential states to control the local, state, and federal levels.
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Figure 40: Organizational control based on state of transition

Using the UML definitions we suggest that the community of states emerges from the
interactions of the global composite that resides in the main object and the composite states that
reside in each object that represents a node of the emergency structure.
A modeler that uses the community of states as a mechanism of control has four tools for
controlling the model:
•

To define the sequence of states to control the possible extreme events.

•

To modify the parameters of the objects in the model, for testing a selected measure of
performance.
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•

To close and open connections according to historical cases, modifying in this way the
adjacency matrix.

•

To modify the discrete parameters in the nodes such as resources, time in queue, and
utilization.
The algorithms that control the connections of the adjacency matrix should be the result

of the analysis of historical cases in which the chain of command of the emergency management
structure was interrupted either by the extreme event or its consequences. At this time, we make
emphasis regarding the significance of this hybrid approach, since the mechanism of control
based on state transition allows an evolution to the adjacency matrix, and as a result new
interpretations based on social network analysis can be made for projecting the performance of
the complete emergency structure.
This methodology does not present a fully developed internal behavior of the nodes, and
it is limited on purpose to a simple approach based on discrete entities that arrive to the nodes,
and then are processed and sent to others nodes according to the adjacency matrix.
The type of entity that arrives at a node ni is a function of the sender node nj, thus we
could emulate the distribution probability that a real command and control system has performed
in real situations.
Table 29 shows the attributes’ data that a sender and a receptor could transfer between
them in a standard formatted message of a real command and control system.
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Table 29: Attributes of the data transferred between two nodes
Organization
Date and time
Sender identification
Receiver identification
Message type
Priority
Resources

Figure 41 portrays a layout of the internal nodes’ behavior, and since we have defined six
types of roles in the digraph, the behavior of each role in the emergency structure is modified
according to different parameters applied to each object. Basically the interactions inputs (I) and
outputs (O) are made in the dyad placed in the asymmetric adjacency matrix.
In accordance with the node’s role and position in the organizational structure, it will
require a certain number of pieces of data for processing and will produce one unit of
information. We assume that the incoming data is combined with internal data produced by the
node. Thus for each piece of data that is internally produced one piece of information is
generated that is sent as output to the dyads in the adjacency matrix.
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Figure 41: Internal node behavior (Implemented with Anylogic software)

The Agent A based on states of transitions accomplishes four tasks in the internal node
behavior:
•

Regulates the discrete behavior according to the type of event and parameter evolution of
the external environment.

•

Opens or closes the connections in the adjacency matrix, modifying the asymmetry in the
digraph.

•

Communicates to the external environment any continuous variables that might be
required by another object.

•

Communicates to the internal environment any continuous variables that might be
required by the internal objects in the node. This task also might be accomplished by an
interface variable which is shown as a triangle in Figure 29.
An example of the dynamic modification of parameters by means of Agent A or a

continuous interface variable is shown in Figure 42. Given an exponential distribution of
probability with parameter β0 to an object source that generates internal entities in the node,
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either the Agent A or the continuous interface variable might change the parameter in time by a
continuous set of parameters β1, β2…βn and thus reach a required behavior that evolves according
to the surrounding environment.

Figure 42: Evolution of the generation of entities according to dynamic parameters

An example of the cognitive domain was implemented based upon a SD model designed
by Rudolph and Repenning (2002). Two variables of states combined with a set of in-flows, outflows, and constants allow quantifying the positive and negative effects of stress in a node.
Basically, the model is composing of the following sequence:
•

A variable of state provides quantification of the number of interruptions currently
pending.

•

The rate at which interruptions arrive is an exogenous variable.

•

A rate confronts and resolves interruptions. Interruptions handled incorrectly stay in the
stock of interruptions pending.

•

The desired resolution rate represents the system's perception of how fast it needs to
resolve interruptions. The desired resolution rate is equal to a first order exponential
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smoothing of the indicated rate. The smoothing represents the delay in perceiving change

in the number of interruptions pending.
•

A rate shows how interruptions should be resolved in order to achieve the desired
resolution time.

•

Stress is equal to the ratio of the desired and normal resolution rates. The higher the
desired resolution rate relative to how the system normally performs, the higher the
stress.

•

A variable captures the positive influence of stress on productivity. It is captured by an
upward sloping table function that uses stress level as an input.

•

A variable captures the negative impact of stress: As the system is overwhelmed, its
ability to resolve interruptions decreases. It is captured by a downward sloping table
function that uses stress level as an input.
In accordance to the performance of the model shown in Figure 43, the dynamics of the

variables is different if it operates on the upward or downward sloping portion of the YerkesDodson curve.
An agent built as a state of transition gathers the most significant variables from the
mathematical structure of the model. Those variables are used for modifying the behavior of the
node named Hospital_1_A.

170

Figure 43: Example of a model for capturing the cognitive aspects of a node

The digraph measures from a dynamic adjacency matrix

In Chapter Five we defined three types of network properties; here we analyze the dyads
and triad census, network properties, and one-mode metrics, and finally we will present some
inferences regarding two-mode networks.
All the analysis was made over the hypothetical digraph which was built based on an
ICS.

Sub-set measures: Dyad and Triad
The dyads were obtained from the digraph and compared with the expected values of a
random digraph that contain the same number of nodes and connections. The number of Monte
Carlo simulations was 10,000. The results are shown in Table 30.
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Table 30: Observed and expected values in the digraph
Dyad Type

Observed Expected(Mean)

Mutual

55

35.803

Asymmetric

67

86.197

Null

544

544

From Table 30 we can conclude 55 relationships have reciprocity in the procedures for
transferring information. On the other hand 67 flows are sent to others nodes and the node sender
should not wait for feedback from the node receptor; essentially there connections are
asymmetric. Finally, 544 dyads do not present any connection.
Wassermann et al. (1994), among others, suggested that a dyadic analysis seeks to answer
several questions about mutual, asymmetric, and null relationships:
•

How might we compare the fraction of mutual dyads either with a theoretical prediction
or a similar organizational digraph?

•

Are mutual dyads statistically more prevalent than other kinds of dyads in the ICS?

•

Are the dyadic relationships more mutual and less asymmetrical than other comparable
organizations?
We apply Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method test to generate random matrices

with a set of given parameters. Thus, testing of a hypothesis is possible to perform between the
observed and expected values. The number of simulation adjacency matrices used for the
expected values were 10,000 matrices.
We showed that the total number of triads in a digraph is given by
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(3n ) .

We will examine the triad census according to the Balance-Theoretic Models; the characteristics
of six models will be contracted with the results of the column Observed in Table 31. Each
model is gradually less restrictive that the previous ones.
Our goal is to find statistical patterns that can be evaluated to gain knowledge regarding
the structure of an incident command system, and as a consequence, to forecast its performance.
Nooy et al state that unfortunately, the social network systems barely ever conform perfectly to a
balance-theoretic model, and most of the time a type of triad occurs at least once. Nevertheless
we must compare the triad census with the distribution expected by chance of a digraph, since if
a certain type of triad occurs more often, we may assert that a determined model guides the
behavior of the complete digraph. (Nooy et. al. 2005).
Balance model: It represents the symmetric connections between the nodes and has up to
two clusters in the configuration. Our emergency structure presents 30 Triad 300 and 1,266
Triad 102 whose observed frequencies are statistically different from the expected triads

obtained from a random digraph (Table 31), this relative difference shows a tendency toward a
balance model. The chi-square statistic is highly significant which helps us to confirm the
tendency.
Clusterability model: This model is less restrictive and permits more than two clusters in
the digraph. This configuration includes the Triad 300, 102 and Triad 003.
In Table 31 we observe 4,363 Triad 003 and 3,268 expected Triad 003.
Since we are studying a network centric environment, this model must be prohibited in the
emergency organizations because it represents the presence of clusters (components in graph
terminology) that do not permit a distributed decision making.

173

Ranked clusters model: This model permits asymmetric connections from each node to
all nodes on higher ranks. Notice in Table 31 the statistical difference between the observed and
expected values of the Triads 021D, 021U and 030T-all of them can exist in this model. There
are two more triads permitted in this model, Triads 120D and 120U; whose observed and
expected values also are statistically different.
The presence of a statistic difference in the triads with symmetric connections implies
that the relationships between the nodes are not hierarchical and have high feedbacks, which
could be critical when they are required to transmit information quickly and the decisions must
be immediate.
Transitivity model: In the analysis of the emergency configuration, this model introduces
the concept of transitivity, where all the triads with a path of length two are closed from the
initial node (n1 connects to n2, n2 connects to n3 then n1 connects to n3). The digraph presents
1,428 Triad 012 and the expected value is 3,044 in the model, which implies that the digraph is
not transitive.
Hierarchical clusters model: In addition to the previous triads, this model permits the
Triads 120C and 210. Since asymmetric dyads exist, they are interpreted as a form of ranking in

the organizational structure, therefore the asymmetric connections should not permit any cycles.
According to Table 31 we compared 22 Triad 120C and 42 Triad 210 against an expected value
of 11 and 1.7 respectively, which means that the configuration has a tendency toward the
hierarchy.
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Table 31: Observed and expected triad values (Report from Pajek software)
Type

Number of triads (ni)

Expected (ei) (ni-ei)/ei

3 – 102
1266
236.34
16 – 300
30
0.05
1 – 003
4363
3268.67
4 - 021D
37
236.34
5 - 021U
46
236.34
9 - 030T
15
73.38
12 - 120D
18
5.70
13 - 120U
17
5.70
2 – 012
1428
3044.71
14 - 120C
22
11.39
15 – 210
42
1.77
6 - 021C
89
472.68
7 - 111D
142
73.38
8 - 111U
142
73.38
10 - 030C
6
24.46
11 – 201
107
5.70
Chi-Square: 28914.5328***
2 cells (12.50%) have expected frequencies less than 5.
The minimum expected cell frequency is 0.05.

4.36
654.55
0.33
-0.84
-0.81
-0.80
2.16
1.98
-0.53
0.93
22.75
-0.81
0.94
0.94
-0.75
17.78

Model
Balance
Balance
Clusterability
Ranked Clusters
Ranked Clusters
Ranked Clusters
Ranked Clusters
Ranked Clusters
Transitivity
Hierarchical Clusters
Hierarchical Clusters
Forbidden
Forbidden
Forbidden
Forbidden
Forbidden

Network measures
In recent years, researchers have found similar patterns in the configurations of dense
networks, such as chemical interactions, the Internet, citations in books, the World Wide Web,
etc., and they have generated a set of rules of thumb for enhancing the desired characteristics
of robustness, tolerance to failure, adaptability, flexibility, etc. We argue that current systems
based on command and control provide enough data for determining the desired properties of a
standardized ICS.
In Table 32 we showed the main properties obtained from the digraph as a whole.
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We will discuss some of these measures and will make inferences about desired properties in a
digraph which represents an ICS.
According to our experiments, the number of nodes in the digraph is 37, but most of the
time an ICS in the federal, state and local levels will have more than 100 nodes, especially if we
include private and non governmental organizations in the process of making decisions.
The number of connections in the adjacency matrix is 179. Care (2005) provides rules of
thumb for military networks according to the number of nodes. He suggests: connections<<2N
(too brittle), connections=~2N (desired value) and connections >>2N (possible overhead).
We recommended that the number of connections will emerge as a realistic parameter
when data coming from the database of the command and control systems can be analyzed.
Meanwhile we should test the hypothesis of a range between 2N <connections<4N. Our
suggestion is based on the previous analysis of the ICS and the five case studies.
In the digraph the density is 0.13; it shows the proportion of the number of connections
present to the maximum possible. This measure should be studied in parallel to the number of
nodes and the ego-digraphs produced in the organizational structure, because some clusters
might concentrate most of the connections. Nevertheless we suggest values over 0.30 might
demonstrate a lack of hierarchy and overflow in processing data and resources.
The average degree of the digraph is 4.78. This index should be compared with the
degree distribution shown in Table 34, since the number of isolated and pendant nodes could
affect the performance of the organization, especially if one of them plays a critical role in the
whole structure.
The inclusiveness index for both in-degree and out-degree helps us to distinguish weak
connections. The first one has a value of 95% and the second one 100%.
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The reciprocity index is 0.62. This is linked to the dyads census and provides an overall
view of the feedbacks produced in the digraph.
The transitivity index is 0.38. This enables us to characterize the whole digraph with
tendency toward the transitivity.
The diameter index is 6. This value is the largest geodesic distance between any pair of
nodes in the digraph, which means that there exists at least one node that must send its data or
resources through five nodes before arriving at the receptor node. We suggest that an ICS should
not have path larger than 4.
Finally the index hierarchy is equal to 0.2 and provides a strong overall measure for
inferring the proportion of the number of nodes with asymmetric connections to all nodes.
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Table 32: Digraph measures of the emergency organization
Property

Value

Nodes

37

Connections

177

Density

0.13

Average Degree

4.78

Inclusiveness

1

Reciprocity

0.62

Transitivity

0.38

Clustering Coef.

0.64

Mean Distance

2.48

Diameter

6

Connectedness

0.79

Efficiency

0.89

Hierarchy

0.2

LUB

0.99

Table 33: Distribution of degree
Measures
Sum
Mean
Std.Dev
Min
Max
Number of isolated
Number of pendant
Inclusiveness (%)

In-degree
179
4.83
3.41
0
14
2
5
94.59

Out-degree
179
4.83
3.33
1
14
0
4
100
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Table 34: Node Type in the digraph
Isolate

Transmitter
0

Receiver

2

Carrier
0

Ordinary
1

34

There are no nodes with degree equal to zero, and four nodes only transmit data and do
not receive information from others nodes. One node shows in-degree and out-degree equal to
one and it is classified as a carrier node. The others thirty-two nodes are classified as ordinary
nodes since they have both in-degree and out-degree greater than 1.

The digraph does not have a bridge connection that implies vulnerability because
removing it might disconnect the digraph.

One mode measures
In Chapter Four we defined three sets of measures to examine the individual properties of
the nodes: centrality; neighbor; and connection measures. In Table 35 we show twelve
measures, which are representatives of the three sets and we describe possible influences of the
values in the performance of the whole structure of the organization.
By each node, the first two columns depict the in-degree and out-degree connections in
the ICS. Maximal values such as Mayor and Incident Commander provide an initial indicator of
the position and role of these nodes in the digraph. Minimum values such as Sensor and Red
Cross also require attention regarding their role in the structure. The 3rd and 4th columns called
degree centrality standardize the degree measures for comparing those with others ICS digraphs.

Notice that the centrality index plays a fundamental role for knowing the hubs in a dense ICS,
but it does not necessarily mean that nodes with a high centrality degree are most significant in
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the digraph. For instance, the node Sensor has a centrality in-degree equal to 0.0 and an outdegree equal to 0.028 and in accordance to our model most of the time this node triggers the
alarm warning that activates the complete emergency system.

Figure 44: Centrality measures of the digraph

Figure 44 shows a concentric analysis of the in-degree centrality of the digraph. The
nodes with highest values are in the center of the figure and the lowest values are in the
periphery. Notice the position of the nodes that belong to the federal and state levels (blue and
green nodes), they are located in the intermediate area of the figure. On the other hand, the local
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nodes (red color) are still in the periphery of the figure with values close to zero, except the
nodes Incident Commander and Mayor A, which are the most central with a value of 0.389.

Table 35: Selected measures of each node in the digraph
Node
Air Operat. Chief A
Airport Adm. A
Area of Command A
ECall_ Center A
Fed.Situation Map
Federal Gov.
Fire Depart A
Heliport Resources A
HEMA
Hospital 1 A
Incident Comm. A
Industrial Plant A
Intelligence A
Liaison Officer A
Mayor A
Multi Agency A
Multi Agency Coor.
National Guard A
Operations Chief A
Police Depart A
Private Org 1. A
Red Cross A
Risk Ass. A
Sensor
Stadium/Arenas A
State Evacuation
State Govern.
State HEMA
State Situation Map
State Transp.
State National Guard
Task Force A1
Task Forces A2
Transp. Agency
Transport Agency A
Weather Inf. A
Wings Resources

In
Deg.

Out
Deg.

Centrality
In
Out

Ego
Size

Ego
Density

4
2
4
8
5
6
5
2
10
3
14
1
4
0
14
6
7
0
2
6
1
0
4
0
1
4
10
9
8
6
6
3
3
6
5
4
4

1
2
5
4
5
7
5
2
9
3
13
4
3
2
14
3
4
3
5
4
1
1
3
1
3
9
7
10
10
7
5
3
3
8
2
4
2

0.11
0.06
0.11
0.22
0.14
0.17
0.14
0.06
0.28
0.08
0.39
0.03
0.11
0.00
0.39
0.17
0.19
0.00
0.06
0.17
0.03
0.00
0.11
0.00
0.03
0.11
0.28
0.25
0.22
0.17
0.17
0.08
0.08
0.17
0.14
0.11
0.11

5.00
3.00
6.00
10.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
3.00
11.00
5.00
19.00
5.00
4.00
2.00
19.00
6.00
7.00
3.00
6.00
7.00
2.00
1.00
4.00
1.00
4.00
9.00
12.00
14.00
10.00
9.00
6.00
3.00
3.00
9.00
5.00
5.00
5.00

0.60
1.00
0.47
0.44
0.67
0.71
0.50
1.00
0.60
0.10
0.22
0.50
1.00
1.00
0.26
0.60
0.67
0.67
0.60
0.62
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.56
0.42
0.46
0.58
0.47
0.67
1.00
1.00
0.47
0.60
0.80
0.40

0.03
0.06
0.14
0.11
0.14
0.19
0.14
0.06
0.25
0.08
0.36
0.11
0.08
0.06
0.39
0.08
0.11
0.08
0.14
0.11
0.03
0.03
0.08
0.03
0.08
0.25
0.19
0.28
0.28
0.19
0.14
0.08
0.08
0.22
0.06
0.11
0.06
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Eigen
Vector
0.03
0.07
0.06
0.16
0.19
0.24
0.10
0.02
0.34
0.07
0.22
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.33
0.16
0.20
0.07
0.05
0.11
0.03
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.05
0.24
0.28
0.31
0.32
0.20
0.20
0.05
0.24
0.22
0.11
0.05
0.03

Closeness
In
Out

Min
Cutset

0.41
0.35
0.39
0.44
0.36
0.42
0.43
0.40
0.50
0.35
0.57
0.31
0.39
0.37
0.49
0.42
0.42
0.29
0.39
0.44
0.34
0.00
0.39
0.00
0.34
0.39
0.51
0.44
0.48
0.41
0.40
0.38
0.38
0.37
0.37
0.39
0.43

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.19
0.22
0.23
0.26
0.23
0.25
0.25
0.16
0.25
0.24
0.27
0.22
0.22
0.23
0.28
0.24
0.21
0.24
0.22
0.25
0.21
0.24
0.22
0.24
0.21
0.25
0.24
0.27
0.27
0.25
0.24
0.22
0.22
0.24
0.23
0.22
0.16

Betweeness

Flow
Btwn

0.05
0.00
0.04
0.06
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.00
0.08
0.06
0.42
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.27
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.08
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.08
0.10
0.10
0.03
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01

462
224
624
834
831
968
613
221
1341
284
1914
186
513
237
1743
473
825
287
593
749
90
0
485
0
350
876
1406
1520
1219
1079
813
338
338
1102
346
532
333

The local connection structure of each node in the digraph is represented by the values of
ego-size and density. Because density is inversely proportional to the ego-digraph size, (the
number of possible connections increases rapidly with the number of nodes, whereas the number
of connection usually is limited), Nooy et al. (2005) suggest considering alternative measures,
nevertheless in the context of an ICS, the density measures provide an intuitive glance of the
cohesion of the local structure of a node and its dyads connection. For instance the nodes; Task
Force A1 and Task Force A2 present a density of 1, which demonstrates a high cohesion with the

three nodes that each one has with its dyads.
Eigenvector centrality of a node is recursively proportional to the sum of eigenvector
centralities of the nodes connected in the digraph. The High Emergency Management Agency
and the Mayor A present the highest value in the eigenvector centrality of the ICS because they
are connected to many nodes which also are well-connected.
Closeness measure changes the concept of centrality by the geodesic distance of the
nodes, an issue that in an extreme event could be more significant than a traditional degree
centrality measure. The reason is simple: a network centric environment such an Incident
Command System requires reaching the whole emergency structure in the least amount of time

possible. From Table 35 two nodes help us to understand this measure; the node sensor presents
a closeness centrality in-degree of 0 because it does not interact with any other node. On the
other hand the node State_R_Governor whose closeness in-degree value is 0.51 shows that this
node is the best situated for quickly reaching any other nodes in the emergency organization.
The minimal node cutset is the node Hospital 1 A. If it is removed the digraph will be separated
in three components. This measure enables us to identify the vulnerability of the transference of

182

flows in the ICS and to find out where the ICS could be disconnected with severe consequences
for the whole system.
The column betweenness centrality shows that the Incident Commander node has the
highest proportion value (0.42) of all geodesic connections between pairs of other nodes. Notice
the large difference with the second position obtained by the Mayor A node (0.27). This index is
critical if we assume that the flows and resources go by the geodesic path in an ICS.
The dependency matrix shows the dependency that the 37 nodes have among them when
a node source sends flows to other nodes. The highest values are the connections between the
Sensor and Hospital 1 and the Red Cross and Hospital 1, both with a value of 34.

In order to find out the underlying data structure of the one mode measures and to reduce
the amount of correlated indexes we applied principal component analysis to the twelve digraph
measures. We used correlation matrix to standardize the measurements because they do not have
the same scale.
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Eigenanalysis of the Correlation Matrix
Eigenvalue
Proportion
Cumulative

7.9607
0.663
0.663

1.5701
0.131
0.794

0.9298
0.077
0.872

0.6433
0.054
0.925

Eigenvalue
Proportion
Cumulative

0.0321
0.003
0.998

0.0222
0.002
1.000

0.0004
0.000
1.000

0.0003
0.000
1.000

PC1
0.337
0.337
0.337
0.337
0.347
-0.125
0.302
0.236
0.245
-0.025
0.286
0.347

PC2
-0.070
0.013
-0.073
0.013
0.019
-0.669
-0.082
-0.436
0.303
0.480
0.136
-0.071

PC3
0.103
-0.102
0.098
-0.107
0.040
0.116
-0.132
0.470
-0.325
0.761
0.140
-0.026

PC4
-0.129
0.102
-0.132
0.089
-0.147
0.324
0.472
0.029
0.463
0.371
-0.495
0.010

0.2669
0.022
0.979

0.1289
0.011
0.990

0.0670
0.006
0.995

Scree Plot of In_d, ..., Flow_Bet
8
7
6
Eigenvalue

Variable
In_d
Out_d
Cen_In
Cen_Out
Ego-size
Ego-de
Eigenv
Clos_In
Clos_Out
Cutset
Between
Flow_Bet

0.3783
0.032
0.957

5
4
3
2
1
0
1

2

3

4

5
6
7
8
Component Number

9

10

11

12

Figure 45: Principal component analysis of Table 35

The first principal component has variance 7.96 and accounts for 66% of the total
variance. This is representative of ten measures from Table 35, except the ego-density and cutset
indexes. The component depicts a contrast between two groups of variables, the first is formed
by the ego-density and cutset indexes and the second group formed by the other ten measures.
This issue is confirmed if we calculate the Pearson correlation between each pair of variables.
According to the test of correlation:
H0: ρ = 0 versus H1: ρ ≠ 0 where ρ is the correlation between a pair of indexes
The p-values of the indexes ego-density and cutset showed values greater than 0.05 which
demonstrate that there is no evidence of a linear relationship between the two measures and the
other ten indexes. The second principal component has variance of 1.57 and accounts for 13% of
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the data variability. The third principal component has a variance of 0.92 and account for 7.7 %
of the data variability. In Figure 45 a plot of the eigenvalues associated with their component
show the magnitude of the three selected components.
Because of the lower value of the variance in the fourth component, we suggest that the
data structure in Table 35 can be captured with the first three components, which represent the
66 %, 79 % and 87% of the total variability.

Experimental analysis

Experiment 1: System dynamics – Discrete event simulation

Description
We tested the combined behavior of the object electric_power_system and the discrete
behavior of the nodes that form the organizational digraph. The goal was to identify the most
comprehensive mechanism for modeling the influence of continuous events over the discrete
behavior of the nodes, particularly the parameters of the objects that generate new entities.

Conditions
According to our findings, we suggested two types of hybrid implementations between a
SD and a DES model. The first was built by means of an interaction of variables, using the
concept of dynamic simulation. The second one was built by means of an interaction of models,
using an external control that modifies at run time the internal parameters of the nodes.
The model with 37 nodes was set up to run during 30 time units.
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Conclusion
The interaction of variables required an external interface for sending the level of
electricity s which is produced in City 1. The dynamic parameter was passed to the inter-arrival
exponential time of the object creation, such as exponential(s/20).
Figure 45 shows the throughput (red curve) of the node Sensor which sends new signals
to the rest of the emergency system according to how the level of electricity in City 1 decreases
(green curve).

Figure 46: Dynamic simulation by mean of interaction of variables

The second implementation tested was interaction of models. This tool requires an
interface between the SD and DES models.
When the electrical power either fails or reaches a critical level, a set of state- transitions
sends a signal to another set of state transitions in which reside in the node Sensor. Both statetransitions are shown in Figure 46. Notice the strong difference comparing with the interaction
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of variables, because by using state-transitions as an interface, the modeler must define critical

thresholds that modify the generation of entities in the internal behavior of the node Sensor. The
generation of entities in the time is shown in Figure 47.
state0

state4

state0

state3

state1

state2

state1

state2

state3

Figure 47: Set of state-transitions between a SD and a DES model

Figure 48: Behavior of the SD and DES simulations governs by a set of state-transitions

Nevertheless both techniques provide additional tools to the modeler and permit an
implementation of a more complete simulation than either an isolated SD or DES model.
The interaction of variables is better situated when there exists a validation of the influence of
the continuous variables over the discrete and vice versa.
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On the other hand, interaction of models is well situated when the modeler does not know
exactly how the model will evolve and requires controlling it by means of state transitions.

Experiment 2: System dynamics—Community of states—Discrete event simulation and digraph
analysis

Description
We tested a SD model embedded into the hybrid model. Since the whole model presents
many parameters and variables, which most of the time are difficult to control, we designed a
high control based on the defined concept of community of states. The high control categorizes
the data coming from different simulation techniques, and sends it to a selected composite of
states to process and finally to generate new data which will be sent to the digraph. We will
summarize how a social network analysis enhances the study of the performance of the whole
model.

Conditions
The node tested, State_Map was defined as a instance of the class Situation_Awareness.
The parameters were incorporated to the object State_Map according to the rules that govern the
position of the node in the digraph. Figure 48 shows the high control formed by three composite
states: federal, state and local. In accordance to the data received from external models, the high
control sends the signal to a selected composite state. Notice that the interactions of the dyads
can be governed from the high control (named as community of states).
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Figure 49: Community of states formed between the high control and the state transition of the
node State_Map

Conclusions
The mechanism implemented regulates the sequence of three types of simulation
paradigms: SD- states transitions- DES.
We concluded that the implementation of a high control is a unique form to manage the
sequences, parallelism of actions, activation of alarms and hierarchies in a hybrid model that
emulate an ICS.
The high control enables a test of the diffusion of data through the complete digraph.
Nevertheless, the complexity of the model requires a topological analysis based on the social
network techniques previously developed.
In order to enhance our conclusions, we summarized an analysis of the ego- digraph of
the node State Map (Figure 49) which fired the initial alarm in the organization.
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In-degree

=8

Out-degree = 10
Ego-size

= 10

Figure 50: Ego-digraph formed around the tested State_Map node

The focus node has a 10 out-degree and an 8 in-degree, thus we can infer that there are
two nodes that require to use others nodes for sending data to the State_Map. Nevertheless, in
accordance to the concept of density, the focus node presents a high centralization
(density=0.57), which makes sense since its role is sharing data and keeping the situation aware
of its level.
Table 36 depicts the geodesic paths in the ego-digraph. A preliminary analysis of the
matrix points out the critical position of the node Multi_Agency_A due to its extended average
geodesic paths. For instance, it requires three steps to reach the Federal_Map node, and two
steps to send feedback to the State_Map node.
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Table 36: Geodesic path in the ego-digraph of the node State_Map
F.M HEMA S.G S.M S.E S.H S.T S.N M.A M.A I.C
Fed. Map
0
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
HEMA
1
0
1
State Gov.
2
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
State Map
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
State Evac
1
1
1
1
0
1
2
1
1
2
2
State HEM
2
1
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
0
1
1
1
2
State Tran
2
2
2
State Nati
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
0
2
2
2
Mayor A
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
0
1
1
Multi Age A
3
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
0
2
Incid.Comm
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
0

Table 37 shows the dyads census performed over the ego-digraph; this analysis enables
us to conjecture regarding the direct feedbacks that the eleven nodes will have in the elapsed
time for the duration an extreme event.
Initially, researchers in network centric environments forecasted that a maximal network
was the best solution for sharing data and resources (mainly influenced by the computer
networks). Our model showed that those configurations delay the flows and most of the time are
unnecessary. For instance, the ego-digraph presents 20 mutual dyads, which proves that the
nodes will have an immediate feedback to the data transferred. In Table 37 we infer that 16
connections do not receive direct feedback and the data will be transferred through the others
nodes. A statistic analysis regarding the patterns of the observed and the expected dyads could be
made based on the data obtained from the organizational structure of an ICS.
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Table 37: Dyads census in the ego-digraph of the node State_Map
Number of.
Mutual
Dyads
Asymmetric
Dyads
Nulls
Dyads

Observed

Expected
(Mean)

20

18.43

16

17.56

19

19

Another significant conclusion that arises from the ego analysis is that the level for
managing the extreme event does not fit necessarily with the relationships produced in an ICS.
For instance, in the ego-digraph the Federal_Map is a bridge between the state and federal level.
The same case occurs with the Incident_Command which belongs to the same ego-digraph but
corresponds to the structure of the local levels.
Additionally, Table 37 confirms that the node State_Map is the ego of the digraph since
all its geodesic paths in the matrix have a value of 1.
The timing analysis and synchronization of the data is another advantage that produces a
hybrid simulation merged with a digraph analysis (adjacency matrix). In Figure 50, we show that
when the extreme event reaches an unsafe level, the composite state transfers a signal to the node
State_Map, which is in charge of keeping the situation aware of its organizational level. At

time 1, the node generates a piece of data that is transferred to its dyads. The amount of time that
the node State_Map will take for distributing the data in the three levels of the emergency
organization will depend on two features: the number of paths toward the nodes receptors, and
the internal configuration of each node for processing the incoming data.
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Figure 51: Number of entities generated in three different nodes.

We can distinguish that the Federal_Gov has a geodesic path of 2 with the State_Map
and generated the first piece of data at time 4, which coming from its dyad
Federal_Situation_Map. On the other hand, the Incident_Command node belongs to the egodigraph but yields the first piece of data only at time 6 (2 time units after the Federal_Gov).

Finally, at time 11, the node named Liaison_Officer did not yield any piece of data.
According to our methodology we infer two possible reasons: the first is the geodesic path of
two steps that exist between the node State_Map and the node Liaison_Officer; the second is the
high-degree centralization that presents the node Incident_Command which is a bridge for
arriving to the node Liaison_Officer.
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Experiment 3: Influence of cognitive modes (Yerkes-Dodson curve) into the internal discrete
behavior of the nodes

Description
By using the hybrid model, a node incorporated a subclass which represents a
mathematical model to understand the role of interruptions and stress in organizational collapse.
The Yerkes-Dodson curve enabled us to demonstrate the relationship between the stress and the
performance of the nodes. Initially the increasing stress enhances the performance of the node
(short delay in the processes time), but after a period the performance decreases (extended delay
in process time). The complete model was previously explained in Figure 43 (Rudolph and
Repenning, 2002). We attempted to demonstrate that cognitive models are well situated in our
methodology, and under an object oriented design they can enhance the validation of the internal
behavior of the different nodes that compose an emergency management organization.

Conditions
To evaluate the influence of the SD model “role of interruptions and stress in
organizational collapse” we built a class named Team Performance which was incorporated into
the internal behavior of the node Hospital_1_A.
According to our theoretical description of the interrelationships between a SD and a
DES model, we tested the influence of the continuous and discrete parameters in the final
behavior of the node. (Notice that behavior means pieces of entities processed in the nodes.)
In execution time, the SD model took two dynamic parameters from the discrete model:
number of resources and task arrival rate. On the other hand, at run time, the DES model took
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the variable Effect_Stress_Tasks to modify the delay time in the servers that process the data in
the node Hospital_1_A.

Conclusions
The class Team_performance was incorporated as a subclass of the node Hospital_1_A.
The interaction of the two types of simulations was implemented by using an interface
based on states of transitions. We found that the feedback loops of the SD model highly
influence the stability of the continuous variable Effect_Stress_Tasks (see Figure 43).
In the same way, the parameters sent for the DES model produce a high instability in the
SD model. In order to deal with this problem, we used two sets of states of transitions for putting
boundaries on the thresholds that the model can reach.
The internal structure of the node Hospital_1_A is shown in Figure 51. It is an instance
of the class Support which was defined in Chapter Four, Table 16.
The structure of the model allowed that the node parameters were fixed according to the
position and role of the node in the digraph. Thus the methodology is open to incorporate many
other nodes with an equivalent internal structure but that depict different either discrete or
continuous behaviors.
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Figure 52: Internal structure of the node Hospital_1_A

Experiment 4: Community of states – Internal node behavior

Description
Since many types of messages and supplies are transferred in an ICS, we tested the
implementation of a reactive algorithm to generate different types of messages and resources
according to the severity of the event. We also used the algorithm to modify the node capacity at
runtime according to fixed rules between the federal, state and local levels.
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Conditions
By mean of community of states to modify at run time the internal parameters in the node
named Incident_Commander such as; type of messages, number of resources, delay time and
queue priority.

Conclusion
The results showed that a hybrid model is well situated for simulating structured and nonstructured data according to fixed distribution of probabilities identified in real command and
control systems. Nevertheless, it is necessary to create an intelligent mechanism to follow the
sequence of the data and resources throughout the components of an ICS.
The traditional discrete applications based on queues and servers can be enhanced by
means of community of states but validated experiments are required for supporting the models.
Figure 53a shows a set of passing messages, generated in the logger of the internal
Incident_Commander structure. The types of messages are modified by a signal received from

the either federal or state levels. Figure 53b shows how change the utilization of resources after
receiving signals of the either federal or state levels.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 53: (a) Logger messages passing; (b) Dynamic utilization of resources

Experiment 5: Gathering longitudinal matrices of connections and testing the dissemination of
data and resources in the digraph

Description
Most of the time, an extreme event interrupts the physical infrastructure of an emergency
organization and produces modifications in the dyads relationships of an ICS. In other cases, due
to event evolution, new nodes are incorporated into the ICS, modifying the digraph and
eventually producing a change in the role and position that each node plays in the emergency
system. The dyads relationships were fixed in accordance to the adjacency matrix (Appendix B),
and mechanisms were tested for simulating the dynamic changes of the connections at runtime.
We tested the diffusion of entities in the system by means of alerts sent by the node Sensor to the
node Hospital 1 A. The dissemination of the flows of data in the ICS was collected at different
points in time.
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Conditions
For collecting the longitudinal digraph we tested the mechanism of states of transition
which allowed triggering several methods for controlling the interaction of the nodes. When the
node ni was connected with the node nj, the adjacency matrix must show a number 1 in the
position i,j. On the other hand, when the methods of control disconnected the association in the
position i,j, the adjacency matrix must show the number 0. The disconnection or connection of
the nodes was made by closing or opening the ports of the objects.
In order to analyze the dissemination of data and resources in time, we collected entities
transferred in the ICS digraph at times 5, 15 and 30 units.

Conclusion
The simulation of the adjacency matrix presented three main problems of design and
implementation:
•

The mechanism of states of transition was well situated to control the states of the ports
of a small portion of established connections in the digraph. Nevertheless, an intelligent
algorithm is required to control up to n(n-1) connections in the digraph. Moreover, the
mechanism of control was not prepared to generate new connections at runtime,
additional research will be necessary to deal with this issue.

•

The states of transition could manage the connection between existing nodes, but they
were not designed to generate new nodes at runtime in the ICS digraph. The methodology
will require the incorporation of new nodes at execution time.

•

Once the model was run, the flows were transferred between the source nodes and the
receptor nodes, nevertheless when the connections were interrupted the flows remained in
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the system and the entities were fed by other nodes. It is required that additional research
be conducted for dealing with this problem.
Table 38 shows the evolution of the dissemination of data and resources in the digraph at times
5, 15 and 30 units.

200

Table 38: Dissemination of data in the ICS at different point in time (number of messages)
Node

Closeness
In

Closeness
Out

1.Federal Gov.
2.Multi Agency Coor.
3.Fed.Situation Map
4.HEMA
5.Transp. Agency
6.State Govern.
7.State Situation Map
8.State Evacuation
9.State HEMA
10.State Transp.
11.State National Guard
12.Mayor A
13.Industrial Plant A
14.Stadium/Arenas A
15.Airport Adm. A
16.Transport Agency A
17.Multi Agency A
18.National Guard A
19.Sensor
20.Private Org 1. A
21.Red Cross A
22.Hospital 1 A
23.ECall_ Center A
24.Police Depart A
25.Fire Depart A
26.Intelligence A
27. Risk Ass. A
28. Weather Inf. A
29. Incident Comm. A
30.Liaison Officer A
31.Area of Command A
32.Operations Chief A
33.Air Operat. Chief A
34.Heliport Resources A
35.Task Force A1
36.Wings Resources
37.Task Forces A2

0.42
0.42
0.36
0.50
0.37
0.51
0.48
0.39
0.44
0.41
0.40
0.49
0.31
0.34
0.35
0.37
0.42
0.29
0.00
0.34
0.00
0.35
0.44
0.44
0.43
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.57
0.37
0.39
0.39
0.41
0.40
0.38
0.43
0.38

0.44
0.33
0.39
0.45
0.42
0.42
0.55
0.46
0.55
0.44
0.41
0.57
0.35
0.34
0.37
0.39
0.41
0.41
0.30
0.32
0.30
0.42
0.48
0.45
0.45
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.53
0.38
0.40
0.37
0.27
0.22
0.36
0.22
0.36

In
Deg.

Out
Deg.

6
7
5
10
6
10
8
4
9
6
6
14
1
1
2
5
6
0
0
1
0
3
8
6
5
4
4
4
14
0
4
2
4
2
3
4
3

7
4
5
9
8
7
10
9
10
7
5
14
4
3
2
2
3
3
1
1
1
3
4
4
5
3
3
4
13
2
5
5
1
2
3
2
3
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Time = 5
units
Flow Total
1
7
0
0
8
2
9
1
0
0
21
3
10
1
0
0
10
1
2
0
1
1
28
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
5
0
0
0
0
2
6
4
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Time = 15
units
Flow
Total
15
105
5
20
5
25
5
45
5
40
15
105
5
50
5
50
5
50
4
28
6
36
15
210
1
4
4
12
5
10
2
4
5
15
0
0
16
16
5
5
0
0
5
15
5
20
15
60
15
75
4
11
5
15
4
16
15
110
3
3
15
75
13
13
14
14
5
10
15
45
6
13
15
45

Time = 30
units
Flow
Total
30
210
10
40
10
50
10
90
10
80
30
210
10
100
10
90
10
100
10
70
22
130
30
420
3
12
10
30
10
20
10
20
10
30
0
0
31
31
10
10
4
4
10
30
10
40
30
120
26
130
6
18
10
30
6
24
30
420
7
7
30
150
24
24
23
23
10
20
30
90
21
42
30
90

We tested the correlation between the centrality measures (the first four columns) and the
total number of entities transferred in the ICS at different points in time.
The Pearson correlation provided evidence that in time 5, the total number of flows
generated in the ICS digraph has a linear relationship with the in-degree and out-degree indexes
(see Table 39).
In times 15 and 30, the total number of entities generated by the node presents a linear
relationship with the four centrality measures.

Table 39: Pearson correlation between centrality measures and total number of entities
Closeness
In
Total messages at time 5 0.273
p-value
0.102
Total messages at time 15 0.474
p-value
0.003
Total messages at time 30 0.501
p-value
0.002

Closeness
Out
0.521
0.010
0.634
0.000
0.626
0.000

In-Degree
0.614
0.000
0.747
0.000
0.789
0.000

Out-Degree
0.595
0.000
0.772
0.000
0.794
0.000

The critical point in the analysis of Table 38 is the delay time in which the pieces of data arrived
to the Incident Commander node (decision maker on site). Since the ego-digraph of the Hospital
1 A node does not include the Incident Commander and data must pass by other nodes before

arriving to the main node on site. Figures 54a and b show both ego-digraphs.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 54: (a) Ego-digraph Hospital 1 A; (b) Ego-digraph Incident Commander
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Conclusions
In the literature review we identified a great deal of research and models for
understanding how an organization performs its tasks in a collaborative environment.
Nevertheless, most of the research and models have analyzed an organization from a static
viewpoint, and only a few simulations have been built mainly over a discrete platform.

First hypothesis
In Chapter One we formulated as our first hypothesis that a hybrid simulation based on
discrete simulation, system dynamics, and agent-based modeling is an adequate platform to
represent the dynamic sequences produced in an emergency management organization. In
Chapter Three, that hypothesis was associated with several technical questions that addressed
this research and whose answers are summarized below.

What features of an emergency response organization are possible to simulate in a network
centric environment?
By analyzing five cases of extreme events, we determined that most of the time an
emergency organization has a well defined plan based on procedures and alarms, and some
more-developed organizations have an ICS.
It was demonstrated that there exist tools for analyzing the patterns of the dyadic and
triad relationships that are formed in an emergency management system.
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We established that if the digraph presents enough nodes, then it is possible to obtain
significant metrics from its adjacency matrix and to contrast those results with known behavior
of random and scale free digraphs.
If data is available, then the initial model of the dyads relationships can be modified by
mean of community of states, and new measures of performance might be collected.
From a continuous perspective, it was shown that extreme events that have a constant
development over time can be modeled and simulated using a set of continuous variables, and
events that are carried out in specific periods of time might be modeled as a combination of
discrete and continuous variables.
By using a mechanism of control (agents), we showed that the extreme events can be
either stochastically or deterministically managed for impacting one, a set, or the whole
organization, thus permitting us to analyze the chains of command and sequence of procedures
based on the dyadic interrelationships of the digraph.
Finally if cognitive models exist, they can be incorporated as objects (agents) into the
internal configuration of the nodes and testing their influence in the whole digraph behavior.

Is there a more suitable simulation technique for modeling the interactions among the nodes in a
networked scenario? (Testing best candidate simulation technique)
Throughout this research we have maintained that interactions imply the study an
emergency organization in three forms: static, evolution, and dynamic flows. We tied those
interactions to the three types of data defined in Chapter Three: semantic, qualitative and
quantitative data.
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We used a static simulation technique based on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method for comparing the topology of several emergency organizational structures. We
suggested that this technique is an invaluable help for future research in this field, especially
when data stored in the command and control system is available for analyzing the initial
deployment of an organization. Based on the five cases of study, our findings suggest using
semantic and quantitative data for evaluating the static organizational configuration.

We demonstrated that the evolution of the interactions, analyzed as changes in the dyadic
contacts between nodes, requires the inputs that provide the SD models for representing either an
extreme event or the team performance in the nodes. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to use a
mechanism of control, based on community of states, for regulating those interactions. The
timing with respect to how the digraph evolves requires quantitative data stored in the database
of a system.
The dynamic interactions of the dyads are discrete entities, which can be modified during
the simulation execution in accordance with the different types of messages, tasks, decisions and
resources that are transferred in an emergency organization.
We tested the SD technique for modeling the interaction among the nodes, and even
though the eigenvalue analysis of the linearalized matrix A in the system dx/dt = AX+ b provides
good insight regarding the loops that contribute more to the system behavior, this technique
presents three main problems for modeling a huge networked scenario. The first is that it does
not allow modification of the flows between the dyadic interactions and a modeler is restricted to
use only one type of entity. The second is that the number of feedback loops in the networked
scenario might increase dramatically at certain periods, which makes it impossible to
mathematically analyze the system’s behavior (Kampmann, Table 23, Chapter Five ). The third
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problem is the null capacity of the variables of state (levels) for modeling the internal behavior of
the nodes (We propose an object oriented approach to model a complex internal behavior).
Nonetheless, we demonstrated that an isolated SD model is well situated for performing
reduced analysis of part of a digraph, such as in the study an ego-net (sub-graph of a focal node)
and the behavior of its variables of states.
Therefore, the four simulation techniques are suitable for modeling different components
of a networked scenario, but a discrete approach is suggested for transferring entities among the
nodes.

How could several simulation techniques work together in a networked scenario?
We demonstrated that SD and DES techniques are suitable for modeling several features
in a networked scenario that represents the three domains – physical, information and cognitive –
but most of the time an agent mechanism will be required for controlling the relationships
between both. That mechanism was named community of states.

How could a model enhance its usefulness when it is combined with graph theory and social
network analysis?
In the simulation community, no previous research efforts have merged discrete event
simulation technique with graph theory and social network analysis, and only a few applications
were identified in the field of continuous simulation for understanding the feedback loops of a
system.
We argue that graph theory and its interpretation by mean of social network analysis
provide tools for improving the structural analysis and future design of complex systems,
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especially when there are social interactions into them. An ICS and an EOP are social systems
supported in network centric technologies, and in accordance to our findings, the topology and
interactions of those systems should be modeled with a combined approach of simulation
techniques, graph theory, and social network analysis.

Is it possible to combine team performance with flows and tasks carried out by nodes in a
network centric scenario?
Yes, it was demonstrated in two ways: continuous variables that are passed as parameters
of the discrete objects or by using states of transition technique.

What mechanism of control could a modeler use for controlling a hybrid simulation?
It was demonstrated that our definition and implementation of community of states is an
effective mechanism for controlling the whole hybrid simulation.

Can the hybrid simulation be validated for predicting performance of an emergency
organizational structure?
Additional research, surveys, and data analysis of databases will be necessary for
validating and predicting performance in organizational structure.

Second hypothesis
In the second hypothesis we stated that a hybrid simulation can be combined with social
networks analysis and linear programming in order to assess the evolution of an organizational
structure over time, and this type of simulation is suitable for detecting bottle necks,
quantification of reaction time, loading jobs, vulnerabilities, priorities, and synchronization,
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among other measures of performance. This hypothesis was tied to the following operational
questions:

What social network metrics are more significant for designing and evaluating an organizational
structure in a network centric scenario?
The analysis of complex networks is a novel area, and few research efforts have been
conducted focusing in organizational network behavior. Most of the current findings have been
developed in the analysis of the World Wide Web, chemical analysis, and social interactions.
Recently, Care (2005) formulated a similar question in the military arena: “If we could choose
the type of combat network we should design, what properties should it possess?” He defined
some of the more useful network properties and recommends values for combat networks.
The previous statement provides orientations to this research to concentrate the analysis in the
desired properties of the digraph that represent an emergency configuration, and we added that
those properties are determined by the types of threats that an organization must face in a
network centric scenario.
For instance, using the social network classification in Chapter Four, if a community
foresees that a local threat might quickly affect the whole local ICS, an ego-net analysis focused
on selected nodes could likely be more useful for improving the readiness of the organization.
On the other hand, if the event will affect a broad area and requires a collective and coordinated
reaction of the whole ICS, the analysis should probably focus in the set of centrality and
connection measures.
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Does the digraph diameter increase or decrease in an organizational structure when it faces an
extreme event?
Based on the analysis of theoretical digraph and the five case studies (Appendix A and
B), we found qualitative and quantitative evidence that the “network diameter” increases when a
organization faces an extreme event, (we demonstrated that the removal of the Hospital node
breaks up the digraph in three disconnected components), but experiments with real data will be
necessary to confirm this issue. The increment of the digraph diameter will be a function of
vector event defined in Chapter Three and the evolution of the three domains in the networked
scenario.

How can the position and performance of a node in the digraph determine the behavior of the
whole organization?
We demonstrated that the influence of a node in the ICS digraph will depend on its
topological position and the role performed in the organization. For instance, nodes with low
score in degree centrality could control the whole behavior of an ICS if their tasks are not
accomplished. On the other hand, the dyads work by mean of interactions, and those are a
function of the internal behavior of the nodes, thus insufficient measures of performance in a
node could alter the complete performance of the digraph.

Contributions and future research
By means of the verification of both hypotheses and their associated questions and
answers, this research provides a hybrid methodology that combines the three main simulation
paradigms with a social network analysis based on graph theory.
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The application of this methodology to a complex social system, such as an ICS, provides
significant insight for understanding how to design and evaluate an organization in the three
defined domains: physical, informational, and cognitive.
Some might argue that the models used are not representative of the three domains, in which
case the proposed methodology is still valid for incorporating other models in the object oriented
approach.
Thus, we have used the principles and implementations of the main simulation techniques
over only one architecture, and the measures of performance, results, and data yielded in the
model can be analyzed with the classical tools of discrete simulation, system dynamics
simulation, and social network analysis.
Further, the methodology can be applied to other less complex systems that require the
incorporation of a richer approach beyond of an individual either discrete or continuous
simulation.
By analyzing a networked scenario whose data is available, significant experiences and
results can be obtained from a synthetic environment, and these experiences and results can be
used to improve the configuration of the real system that is managed by human beings.
Though the system composed by humans beings and machines are difficult to validate,
when previously established procedures exist, they can be tested for detecting vulnerabilities and
metrics regarding loading jobs, time delays, sequences, message distribution, etc.
In order to continue improving this methodology, we have identified four areas for future
research:
•

Developing an intelligent internal behavior of the nodes, in accordance with the role that
they play in the context (cognitive models). So far, we have showed that as messages
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flow through the organization replicating the flows of a chain of command, at certain
periods the nodes change the types of data sent to others nodes, emulating different
information such as decisions taken, missions for carrying out, tasks, or ordinary
communication. An internal node behavior should incorporate a semantic analysis of the
data sent by other nodes and make decisions based on this information. For instance, that
data might provide information regarding the severity of the extreme event and the nodes
processing this data in accordance to set rules. Notice the strong relationships of this
future research for modeling and simulating an organization with the current research in
semantic analysis of the data stored in the real systems based on information technology.
•

We suggested a set of significant metrics for analyzing an emergency organization, but it
required more research in the database for identifying the metrics ranges in which the
organization works better in accordance with the type and location of the extreme event,
and those ranges can only be found out by means of an extensive collection of data and
simulation experimentation.

•

In order to simulate a longitudinal network, the mechanisms of incorporation of new
actors to the digraph and the interruption of the contact among the nodes must be
validated. These challenges will still be without solution if data is not available for
determining the required patterns that govern the contacts among the nodes.

•

Experimentation is necessary in order to find out if the hybrid model could support an
after action review and if it is simple enough to be used by decision makers and

stakeholders for improving their ICS and EOP.
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APPENDIX A: DISASTER ANALYSIS
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Oklahoma City Bombing, USA
These features were interpreted and summarized mainly from the following documents:
•

Case study that identified the information and communication flows affecting the
response to the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah building. (MIPTS, 2006).

•

Oklahoma City-Seven Years Later. (MIPTS, 2006).

The extreme event
Features for
modeling

On April 19, 1995, a large bomb exploded in front of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City. As a consequence of the explosion, 167 people
died.
Information flows and resources flow.
Research and reports identified information issues from a narrative
perspective. Critical information and critical resources used were not clearly
shown and are mentioned in qualitative way.
Many situations were described regarding connections among first
responders (fire fighters, police officers, and others). The reports also
consider how the federal, state, and local levels were involved in the
extreme event. Nevertheless, the information available do not contain
timing, quantitative data and location of actors.
Disaster planning.
Disaster planning must address internal communication requirements.
The command post was implemented on time, but it must be assumed that
this facility will be on scene within days, and then it should be put in a safe
area.
In the future, media must be incorporated into disaster response plans.
The command post must have a plan to anticipate donations and volunteers.
Communication system.
As a result of the event, capacity and integration of communications
systems were critical to a successful response.
There was not physical damage to the telephone system but after the
incident the demand for service overwhelmed the network.
The problem of frequency in communication systems could have been
solved using media broadcast.
Situation awareness.
The difficulty of conveying and sharing information among responders was
proportional to the physical size of the response area.
The lack of standard formats did not allow using Internet as an element to
share data and information.
Interoperability.
Some inefficiency was produced by the lack of interoperability between
radio equipment of Oklahoma City Municipal, the state and county and the
federal agencies.
The agencies and responders used different acronyms (according to their
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knowledge) which inhibited a clear communication.
Human Factors.
People were working until they were ready to drop. Multiples studies have
shown that judgment begins to erode after a person has worked 12 hours.
For future events it was recommended to deal with this problem.
Chain of Command.
In future extreme events, the incident commander and his staff could
improve their coordination if plans have been made and practiced in training
systems.
The sequence of the tasks and orders in the chain of command and local
decision making were documented from a qualitative perspective. There are
no quantitative data.
It was identified that the coordination among the Governor, the State
Director of Management, the Mayor and other agencies was critical to direct
resources such as Police and National Guard.
Future events require working with telephone service providers to gain
additional capacity in the incident command chain.
Classification for
modeling

Local extreme event, there were no posteriori events and it affected only a
specific place. The authorities were involved in the problem gradually.

Lesson Learned

Many highly detailed studies were made, but with focus on a single aspect.
There are no quantitative data available and no study considers this issue.
After action review showed that “planning” emerged as the most significant
factor for responding to this type of extreme event, every community should
have and test their plan.
It was concluded that reinforced behavior by using a training methodology
is the key issue for keeping the community prepared to face a new event.

Kobe Earthquake, Japan
These features were interpreted and summarized mainly from the document:
•

Lessons Learned from the Kobe Earthquake (Tierney, Goltz, 1997).

The extreme event
Features for
modeling

On January 17, 1995, a devastating earthquake struck the cities of Kobe,
Nishinomiya and Ashiva in Japan; immediately numerous fires began in
different places; a total of 6,279 people died.
Information flows and resources flow.
After action analysis found many delays in the mobilization of critical
resources and the initiation of key response tasks due to lack of situation
awareness.
The resources of the Self Defense Force (SDF) were not
initially mobilized until nearly 24 hours after the earthquake, because
military forces were not well-linked to local preparedness efforts and did
not participate in disaster drills and exercises.
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Disaster planning.
Federal legislation provided an overall structure for planning and response,
but local governments had the primary authority for disaster management.
Each prefecture and local jurisdiction had a Local Disaster Prevention
Council (LDPC) that is responsible for the development of area-specific
disaster plans.
Communication system.
An accurate situation assessment was impossible due to the disruption of
communications and transportation networks.
Situation awareness.
The interferences of communication systems and the magnitude of the
damage to buildings and roadways made early situation assessment difficult.
Loss of back-up power for key emergency functions increased the
confusion.
Interoperability.
Some jurisdictions established close links with emergent groups, while
others officially recognized their existence but engaged in only limited
coordination, and still others allowed newly-formed
volunteer networks to operate but avoided official contact with them.
Human Factors.
Local officials in Kobe City and Hyogo Prefecture were initially unaware of
the magnitude of the disaster because of major communications problems
and traffic congestion that made movement difficult throughout the impact
area, and because so many emergency responders and public officials were
also disaster victims.
Chain of Command.
Due to lack of effective communications links and accurate information
from the impact area, the government failed to comprehend the severity of
the situation for a number of hours and consequently was slow in
committing needed resources.
Classification for
modeling
Lesson Learned

A regional extreme event, there were many posteriori events as
consequences of the initial earthquake, such as fire, explosions, and gas
leaking. Authorities were involved gradually in the event.
The Kobe earthquake highlighted the importance of obtaining and
disseminating information, particularly in the immediate aftermath of a
major earthquake or other disaster.
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Hurricane Mitch, Central America
These features were interpreted and summarized mainly from the document:
•

Hurricane Mitch. (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute,1999)

The extreme event
Features useful for
modeling

In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch, category 5, hit the coast of Central
America, with wind at 208 miles an hour. This event caused more than
18,000 deaths.
Information flows and resources flows.
Immediately after the event there was extensive international cooperation.
Many type of supplies arrived to Central America, but their distribution was
affected by lack of a centralized logistic control.
Many authorities were in charge of various things at various times.
Feedback into the planning process was not structured, and many teams,
agencies and volunteers formulated the question: “What is the Process?”
Disaster planning.
Military and civilian coordination in the operations did not include civilian
agencies, International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), or relevant Host Nation civilian and military
organizations.
Communication system.
The communications, methods and means of operation and command and
control between the various military and civilian components were
disconnected.
Situation awareness.
Lack of unity of effort and a corresponding strategic and operational
planning process.
“People did not know each other and did not know what another
organization could bring to the table and how”.
Interoperability.
Primary recommendations center on the need to clearly define civil-military
authority relationships and supporting and lead roles that, once defined, can
and will generate an effective interagency and multinational unity of effort.
There was a duplication and triplication of effort by lack of coordination.
Human Factors.
Effectiveness and ultimate success in humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief operations depend on educational as well as organizational solutions.
Doctrine was inadequate to meet the requirements of complex multinational,
multiorganizational, and multidimensional humanitarian emergency
situations.
Chain of Command.
Planning and implementing procedures did not work well. This issue was
considered to be, at its base, a command and control problem.
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Consensus was that pervasive ad hoc planning and implementing were
impeded by a recurring question of “Who is in charge?”
Because of a certain lack of clear authority lines and well-defined lead and
supporting roles, each major actor tended to “do his own thing” and stay
within his own “stove-pipe” organizational structure.
Classification for
modeling

The extreme event involved various countries; there were many local,
international, private and military organizations which participated by
several months.

Lesson Learned

There was no multinational doctrine or multinational standard for dealing
with this type of extreme event.
Force protection was required in areas where the law and order have been
broken. It was necessary to ensure a proper balance between force
protection and operational flexibility. Failures in planning,
command/control and organizational structure produced problems of
coordination.
It was identified the necessity of mechanisms and processes for the purpose
of creating viable models that integrate vertical and lateral planning and
implementing processes.

Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, Chernobyl, Ukraine
These features were interpreted and summarized mainly from the documents:
•

Assessment of Radiological and Health Impact. (Nuclear Energy Agency,2002)

•

The Chernobyl Disaster Its effect on Belarus and Ukraine. ( Mitchell, 1996)

Extreme event

On April 25 -26, 1986, a nuclear power accident occurred at Chernobyl,
Ukraine. The nuclear power plant located 80 miles north of Kiev had 4
reactors and, whilst testing reactor number 4, numerous safety procedures
were disregarded. At 1:23 am the chain reaction in the reactor became out of
control, creating explosions and a fireball which blew off the reactor's heavy
steel and concrete lid. The Chernobyl accident killed more than 30 people
immediately, and as a result of the high radiation levels in the surrounding
20-mile radius, 135,000 people had to be evacuated.

Features for
modeling

Information flows and resources flow.
Because there were no nearby hospitals that could treat radiation patients,
some were taken to one hospital in Kiev, and the most severely burned were
transported by plane to Moscow, the only city in the country adequately
prepared for such an emergency.
Disaster planning.
According to the initial reaction of the authorities it was clear that they were
unprepared for an accident, and they had to make decisions as the accident
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evolved based on criteria that could have been established beforehand.
Communication system
As the event was clearly located and it spread out gradually, the critical
infrastructure did not fail, but the kind of information transmitted did not
allow the authorities to evaluate the severity of the incident.
Situation awareness.
Chernobyl was an object lesson in spontaneous and disorganized response
to a major crisis. The distribution of information was limited and the
severity of the consequences allowed to the authorities realized of the
magnitude of the disaster.
Interoperability
Many organizations were involved in the decision making, as no clear –cut
demarcations had been agreed and established.
Human Factor.
After the explosion, fire crews succumbed quickly to the effects of intense
radiation. Helicopter pilots who attempted to blanket the fire with sand and
chemicals also died, usually weeks or months later.
Chain of Command.
It was suggested a lack of personnel specialized as staff in the chain of
command, it delayed the process of make decisions increased the severe
consequences of the extreme event.
Classification for
modeling

An abrupt event that involved quickly all the levels of emergency response.
The consequences of the event were still around after months, and years.

Lesson learned

Since the disaster involved several countries, at that time there was not a
standard system for communicating the problem beyond the country in
which in event happened.
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Hurricane Katrina
These features were interpreted and summarized mainly from the documents:
• The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina. Lesson learned (Federal Review, 2006)
Extreme event

On August 23, 2005, the most destructive natural disaster hit the Gulf Coast
in Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama. As consequence over 1,300 people
died, thousand were evacuated and the city of New Orleans and other
coastal communities suffered irreversible structural damages.

Features for
modeling

Information flows and resources flow.
“The existing planning and operational structure for delivering critical
resources and humanitarian aid clearly proved to be inadequate to the task”.
“Throughout the response, Federal resource managers had great difficulty
determining what resources were needed, what resources were available,
and where those resources were at any given point in time”.
“There was no effective mechanism for efficiently integrating and
deploying these resources”.
“FEMA’s lack of a real-time asset-tracking system, left Federal managers in
the dark regarding the status of resources once they were shipped”.
Disaster planning.
The process for decision making was supported by the best emergency
system, ever before designed, analyzed and documented for facing an
extreme event. The National Incident Management System (NIMS)
provides a common approach for Federal, State and Local government and
develops and administers an integrated National Response Plan (NRP).
There was a national response plan adopted to establish a single framework
for managing domestic incidents.
Nevertheless the incident systems do not “provide the necessary framework
to manage the challenges posed by 21st Century catastrophic threats and
the new plan created by the federal government since the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001 failed to adequately account for widespread or
simultaneous catastrophes”.
“At the most fundamental level, part of the explanation for why the
response to Katrina did not go as planned is that key decision-makers at all
levels simply were not familiar with the plans”.
Communication system.
“Hurricane Katrina destroyed an unprecedented portion of the core
communications infrastructure throughout the Gulf Coast region”.
“The storm debilitated 911 emergency call centers, disrupting local
emergency services”.
“Many available communications assets were not utilized fully because
there was no national, State-wide, or regional communications plan to
incorporate them”.
“DOD brought robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and
planning capabilities”.
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Situation awareness.
The specific triggers for the NRP were unclear and it was found lack of
clarity regarding when and how an event becomes an Incident of National
Significance.
In the federal level “lacked real-time, accurate situational awareness of both
the facts from the disaster area as well as the on-going response activities of
the Federal, State, and local players”.
“FEMA requested assistance from DOD without knowing what State
National Guard forces had already deployed to fill the same needs”.
Interoperability
The Incident Command System (from NIMS) was the mean by which all the
actors should have coordinated their effort and eliminated duplication of
tasks.
Likely the most important issue in NRP is the “concept of operation”
applied in Hurricane Katrina.
Concepts, principles and terminology might have provide a clear
coordination and effectively.
At that time,” Federal, State, and local governments had not yet completed a
comprehensive strategy to improve operability and interoperability to meet
the needs of emergency responders. This inability to connect multiple
communications plans and architectures clearly impeded coordination and
communication at the Federal, State, and local levels.”
Human Factor
There was a clear incident management protocols and procedures for all
levels, for instance was reported: “ JFO staff and other deployed Federal
personnel often lacked a working knowledge of NIMS or even a basic
understanding of ICS principles”.

Classification for
modeling

Lesson learned

Chain of Command
“Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear, and often overlapping,
roles and responsibilities”.
Event that involved simultaneously all the levels of the emergency
management organization. The evolution of the extreme event enables a
modeler to simulate of the emergency organizational structure behavior
before, during and after of the Hurricane, nevertheless it is required to
process the data stored in the database of the either the command and
control systems or the communication systems.
Four critical deficiencies in the national preparedness were reported:
1. The processes for unified management of the national response.
2. The command and control structures within the federal government.
3. The knowledge of the preparedness plans.
4. The regional planning and coordination.
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